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I. INTRODUCTION
In the hypercompetitive American economy, marketing and advertising are
critically important for businesses that seek to edge out the competition, attract
new customers, and build customer loyalty. One online casino has found a way
to cut through the clutter of advertising messages in a uniquely attention-getting
way: branding the faces and bodies of human beings with its corporate logo. In
June 2005, GoldenPalace.com paid Kari Smith $15,000 to have “GOLDEN
PALACE.COM” tattooed permanently on her forehead. Smith auctioned her
forehead as marketing space via eBay, apparently in an effort to raise funds to
1
pay for private school for her son. The resulting notoriety and news coverage
was extremely beneficial to GoldenPalace.com, according to its marketing
2
department. GoldenPalace.com CEO Richard Rowe explained: “Conventional
forms of advertising just don’t cut it anymore. To get people’s attention, you
3
have to stand out from the crowd.”
Whatever one may believe about the wisdom or ethics of contracting to use
human beings as billboards, Kari Smith was paid for the exact thing that she
sold—her appearance, her personhood, her identity. Suppose, however, that a
service business “brands” its workers by adopting compulsory appearance
codes as part of a marketing strategy to promote distinctive services that will
appeal to customers and so garner greater profits. Although the “branding”
does not take place literally, through tattooing, it operates upon the bodies and
psyches of employees in ways that certainly follow employees when they leave
the workplace at the end of a shift, and that are sometimes permanent. Should

1. See Lester Haines, Online Casino Tattoos Woman’s Face, REGISTER, July 1, 2005, http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2005/07/01/casino_tattoos_womans_face; Utah Woman Uses Head to Get Child in
School, June 30, 2005, http://www.goldenpalaceevents.com.
2. Aaron Falk, Mom Sells Face Space for Tattoo Advertisement, DESERET MORNING NEWS, June 30,
2005, http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/1,1249,600145187,00.html.
3. Haines, supra note 1. Smith was the first woman to bear GoldenPalace.com’s brand
permanently; however, just a few months earlier GoldenPalace.com had contracted with twentyseven-year-old Angel Brammer to have its URL (Uniform Resource Locater) tattooed temporarily
over her cleavage. Lester Haines, Casino Brands eBay Cleavage Woman, REGISTER, Feb. 4, 2005,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/04/casino_brands_cleavage.
GoldenPalace.com has also contracted with four athletes—all boxers—to have “Golden
Palace.com” temporarily tattooed on their bodies while they are competing. The athletes
commanded higher payments than Ms. Smith or Ms. Brammer: Middleweight champion Bernard
Hopkins fought twice while displaying the GoldenPalace.com tattoo on his back and received a
$100,000 endorsement. Charlie Bachtell, To Tattoo or Not to Tattoo?, http://www.golden
palaceevents.com/sports/tattoo02.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). The Nevada Athletic Commission
banned this body advertising on the basis that it was distracting to judges, demeaning to the sport,
and potentially unsafe since the ink could rub off and contaminate the athletes’ eyes. Id.
GoldenPalace.com challenged the ruling, and a Clark County district court judge overturned it as a
violation of the boxers’ First Amendment rights. Id.
Pundits predict that this form of advertisement will become increasingly popular. A new Web site,
http://www.leaseyourbody.com, has been established to connect companies seeking to locate
independent contractors who are willing to serve as temporary human billboards. In addition to
GoldenPalace.com, Toyota and Dunkin’ Donuts have experimented with “body advertising.”
Christopher Simmons, Body Advertising: Pittsburgh Waitress Paid to Wear Lease Your Body Tattoo,
SEND2PRESS NEWSWIRE, Aug. 19, 2005, http://www.send2press.com/newswire/print/news_200508-0819-002.shtml.
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service workers who are required to conform to these codes receive
compensation for the lease of their bodies and psyches as the locus of the
employer’s brand? If the branding encodes sexual stereotypes that the law seeks
to eradicate, should it be tolerated at all?
In this Article, we show how the adoption of increasingly sophisticated
forms of marketing and branding strategies by service businesses creates
property-like interests—separate and distinct from workers’ physical and
4
mental labor—from which employers profit: branded service. We then analyze
the role that law has played in reinforcing the practice of branding. In particular,
work law defers to managerial prerogative to construct the business image and
to control the workforce as the public face of that image, affirming the
employer’s power under the doctrine of employment at will to command
adherence to appearance codes. The combined effect of the employment-at-will
rule and workers’ lack of bargaining power at an individual level thus permits
employers to extract this additional value from workers above and beyond the
compensated value of their labor, without cost. In the context of unionized
workforces covered by collective bargaining agreements, companies have—at
most—been required to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the
grooming code and the business’s effort to project a corporate image that it
5
believes will result in a larger market share. In a small number of cases,
sexualized branding that exposes workers to sexual harassment or is predicated
upon sexual stereotypes not essential to performance of the job has been
6
curtailed by the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII. However, challenges
under Title VII have been effective only where corporate branding is at odds
with community norms; where the branding is consistent with community
norms that encode sexual stereotypes, customer preferences and community
norms become the business justification for branding.
We explore the marketing of branded service and the law’s response
7
through an analysis of Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., in which the Ninth
Circuit rejected a female bartender’s Title VII challenge to Harrah’s “Personal
Best” grooming and appearance policy, which required (among other things)
that women wear makeup, a practice that Darlene Jespersen found both
personally and sexually demeaning. We examine the marketing and branded
service strategy that Harrah’s adopted, explain how it created a new and
valuable property-like right for Harrah’s, and describe Jespersen’s reaction to
8
her sexualized commodification. We discuss the law’s failure to respond to her
individual claim, regardless of how it was bracketed. In analyzing the legal
doctrine that emerged under Title VII, we pay particular attention to the ways in
which judicial acceptance of the cultural stereotypes that shaped Harrah’s
9
branded service limited the law’s ability to respond. Next, we place Harrah’s

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra notes 12–80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81–177 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 159–77, 618–64, and accompanying text.
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
See infra notes 178–275 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276–464 and accompanying text.
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sexualized branding in the historical context of the gendered structure of work
10
in the gaming industry and the bartending occupation.
Finally, we make suggestions for reframing claims arising from branded
service and the appearance and grooming codes associated with it. We urge
reconceptualization of sex-stereotyped corporate branding as a collective harm
to workers and evaluate avenues of resistance, including union organizing and
collective bargaining, class-action sex discrimination or sexual harassment
claims, and public consciousness-raising by social justice and community
groups. Although these strategies, too, are limited—by the law’s assumptions
about the primacy of employer property rights, the tendency of majoritarian
labor unions to focus on the economic interests common to all workers in the
bargaining unit (rather than issues pertaining directly to gender identity), and
judicial hostility toward collective action more generally—they afford the most
powerful lever for altering community norms and, ultimately, for reshaping the
11
values that guide the law.
II. BRANDING, MARKETING, AND APPEARANCE STANDARDS IN SERVICE BUSINESSES
Like GoldenPalace.com, businesses operating in the competitive American
marketplace are developing increasingly sophisticated strategies designed to
12
help them “stand out in the crowd.” Using market surveys of consumer tastes
and preferences, businesses look to customers for information about what
attracts them to a particular product or service. Ultimately, businesses hope to
13
develop a “brand” that will draw and retain customers. A “brand” in this
context means the set of practices, products, and marketing that create a unique
14
identity that becomes associated in the public mind with a particular business.
Advertising that educates the consumer about the brand and reinforces its
15
association with the particular business is critical to the success of branding.
Ultimately, successful branding yields high profit margins: Customers will pay
more for a strong brand, and stock prices are considerably stronger for popular
16
brands.
Effective corporate branding produces a distinct emotional response in the
customer which in turn leads to a predictable pattern of behavior: repeat
business, willingness to pay higher prices, tolerance for errors, joining clubs that

10. See infra notes 465–521 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 522–664 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13. The branding concept is not limited to businesses—it can be linked to an industry, an
occupation, or even a city. Las Vegas, for example, is a branded city; despite efforts during the 1980s
to brand itself as a city where family fun and entertainment abounded, it ultimately retained its
strong brand as “Sin City.” JANELLE BARLOW & PAUL STEWART, BRANDED CUSTOMER SERVICE: THE
NEW COMPETITIVE EDGE 25 (2004).
14. Id. at 1. Brands have traditionally been associated with ownership (cattle and horses are
branded) and with status (criminals and adulteresses were branded in early America; Jews and
homosexuals were branded during the Nazi regime). See id. at 23–24.
15. Id. at 2–3.
16. Id. at 32–33 (reporting that customers will pay nineteen percent more for a leading brand
name than for a weak brand and that strong brands are associated with stock prices that are five to
seven percent higher than weak brands).
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relate to brands, and providing favorable word-of-mouth advertising about the
17
brand. Customers who form an affective connection to a business’s products
and services develop loyalty and commitment to—even passion for—the
18
brand. Consumers who feel passion for the brand typically also embrace brand
ownership as a means of self-expression: “[C]onsumers choose brands in great
part to tell the world and themselves who they are. . . . The consumer in effect
believes, ‘The only way I can be who I am is to have specific products or
19
services.’”
A. Branded Service
While branding in the product context is a familiar concept, “branded
service” is relatively new. Service businesses theorize that just as customers
become attached to brands in the product market, they seek out familiar brands
in the service market as well. “Brand atmospheres,” “brand standards,” and
“branded customer service” draw the consumer, creating a “quasi-monopoly”
for the business and helping it to stand out from the many businesses offering
20
similar products and services. Thus, customers will return to familiar
restaurant chains and hotels as they travel through various cities, seek out the
same airline for all their travel needs, and prefer the same vacation resorts in
various locales (e.g., Sandals Resorts for couples, Club Med for singles) in order
to gain access to the quality of service, amenities, and comfort to which they
have grown accustomed.
In the service economy, the service “produced” is created and consumed
21
simultaneously, so that no tangible product remains. Because customers often
participate in producing the service, management strategies that are customer22
focused are the linchpin of successful business practice. The interactive nature
of service work means that in order to affect customer behavior and to conform
to customer expectations, employers must regulate workers’ personal
characteristics, appearance, and behavior in more sophisticated and potentially
invasive ways. Sociologist Robin Leidner explains:
By definition, nonemployees are a part of the work process of interactive
services. Their presence decisively changes the dynamics of workplace control,

17. Id. at 20.
18. Id. at 3–4, 18. Many customers willingly adopt and display the corporate brand, sometimes
paying premium prices for the privilege as they purchase shirts, shoes, bags and other items
emblazoned with the corporate logo. Harley Davidson’s brand spawned a club with 750,000
members, the Harley Owners Group (HOG); many members have the HOG brand tattooed on their
bodies. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 1.
20. See Jill Esbenshade et al., Profits, Pain, and Pillows: Hotels and Housekeepers in San Diego, 9
WORKINGUSA 265, 270 (Sept. 2006); BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 1–2.
21. Sometimes it is difficult to separate the branded service from products that become
associated with the service. For example, in 1999 Westin Hotels introduced the “Heavenly Bed,” the
first branded hotel bed. This luxury bed, advertised as “an oasis for the weary traveler,” contributed
significantly to Westin’s increased occupancy rates. Esbenshade, supra note 20, at 270.
22. Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Service Society and the Changing
Experience of Work, in WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY 1, 3 (Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen
Sirianni, eds., 1996).
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since service recipients may both try to exert control themselves and be the
target of workers’ and managers’ control efforts. Also, because the quality of the
interaction is frequently part of the service being delivered, there are no clear
boundaries between the worker, the work process, and the product in
interactive service work. For this reason, employers often feel entitled to extend
their control efforts to more and more aspects of workers’ selves. Workers’
looks, words, personalities, feelings, thoughts, and attitudes may all be treated
23
by employers as legitimate targets of intervention.

Branded service, then, refers to the process of integrating the business
24
image into the service itself through human resource policies. Since it is the
service that ultimately creates the emotional connection between the consumer
and the brand in a service business, regulation of workers’ self-presentation and
25
interactions with customers is critical. Helena Rubenstein advises that “only
people can brand products or services effectively—. . . we are not just selling a
26
branded product but a mass of branded people who support and deliver it.”
Thus, the service employer’s regulation of workers essentially imprints the
business brand on the worker’s person.
B. Mechanisms of Control
One of the unique attributes of service work is its “emotional labor”
27
component. The emotional state of service-sector workers, unlike that of
manufacturing workers, is a critical part of the service rendered. An unhappy,
alienated factory worker may not be fond of her employer or the day-to-day
tasks that she performs, but she is still able to perform them competently with a
frown upon her face. The same cannot be said for many service workers, whose
jobs require face-to-face, or at least voice-to-voice, interaction with customers.
Such workers must convey the impression that they will provide willing service
to the customer’s satisfaction. Their goal—to produce a particular “feeling state”
in the customer (i.e., satisfaction, pleasure)—requires that they suppress any
contradictory feelings to maintain the outward appearance of a cheerful
28
demeanor in order to produce the appropriate state of mind in customers. In
29
short, “the emotional style of offering the service is part of the service itself.”
23. Robin Leidner, Rethinking Questions of Control: Lessons from McDonald’s [hereinafter Leidner,
Rethinking Questions of Control], in WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY, supra note 22, at 29, 30. See also
ROBIN LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK: SERVICE WORK AND THE ROUTINIZATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE
26–27 (1993) [hereinafter LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK].
24. BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 2, 11–12, 18–19. Experts also recommend exposing
staff to advertising and marketing. As part of the company’s internal communication network,
advertising reinforces and builds brand culture. See id. at 217–18.
25. Id. at 29.
26. Who Said What?: Making Work Meaningful, ON-BRAND, OFF-BRAND: VIEWS AND NEWS FOR
BRAND ENABLERS, Sept. 2006, at 4, http://www.brandedservice.com/ZoneUsersFolder/
Documents/on-brand_off-brand_Sept06.pdf.
27. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN
FEELING 5–7 (1983). Hochschild explains: “I use the term emotional labor to mean the management of
feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display. . . .” Id. at 7.
28. Macdonald & Sirianni, supra note 22, at 3. The burnout rate for workers required to perform
emotional labor is high; alienation from one’s emotions is common. Id.
29. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 27, at 6.
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Service businesses have developed two primary strategies for minimizing
their dependence on workers’ natural feeling states and controlling and
standardizing the service-sector work process. The “production line” approach
is oriented toward scripting and routinizing customer interactions, substituting
technology and patterns of interaction for skill and motivation. Primarily
appropriate for use with low-skilled, low-waged workers, this strategy gained
popularity and acceptance through its use by McDonald’s and other fast-food
30
restaurants. Production line routinization techniques allow management to hire
fungible, low-cost labor and to tolerate high turnover rates.
The second method, the “transformation” or “empowerment” approach,
confers control over the work process by transforming the worker into one
whose personal characteristics, appearance, and values match the image that the
company is seeking to project and market, and then allowing the worker to
make his or her own judgments in interactions with customers. Such “selfregulation” techniques seek to create workers who act like managers without
sharing managerial control or receiving managerial pay. Management control
over self-regulated, empowered workers is inevitably more invasive of workers’
31
private and psychic lives than more traditional means of supervision. Because
worker identification with the company and its image in consumers’ minds is
critical, workers’ demographic characteristics (age, sex, race, education level,
class status, etc.), presentation, dress, grooming, and behavior must fit the
32
prescribed corporate image. Advantages of the transformative approach
include cost-savings realized from reduced middle management, increased
productivity, and reduced union activity because the participatory management
techniques tend to engage workers in a way that their hunger for respect and
33
voice is diminished.
1. Production Line Routinization
Standardization of service is not a new concept. Principles of scientific
management were first applied to routinize industrial manufacturing work
during the first half of the twentieth century. The goal of scientific management
was to shift knowledge and control over the work process (and therefore power)
from workers to management: By splitting up high-skilled jobs into their
constituent parts and assigning the parts to less-skilled workers, costs could be
reduced and efficiency (and therefore output) increased. At the same time,

30. Macdonald & Sirianni, supra note 22, at 6–7. Scripting and routinization may also be used
with professional workers, however, where the employer seeks ideological control over the
substantive skill set. For example, doctors employed by many managed-care health organizations
must follow scripted “critical pathways”—total-quality-management techniques consisting of
roadmaps that suggest the course of treatment once a diagnosis is made. Deviations from the
pathway can be tracked and recorded, so that hospital oversight over nonconforming physicians is
maximized. Alternatively, “protocols”—flow charts that dictate which decisions will be made at
each stage in a diagnostic process—effectively allow management to control the practice of medicine
by physician-employees. See Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 543, 567 (2004).
31. Macdonald & Sirianni, supra note 22, at 9, 10–11.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 8.
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34

control over the work process was centralized. The assembly line was the
prototype of technological control achieved through application of scientific
management principles to industrial production processes: Production was
divided into discrete tasks that could be most efficiently performed by the
worker who specialized in that particular assembly, and workers’ movements
were standardized. No worker possessed a complete picture of the production
process; the work’s conception was divorced from its execution.
In the service sector, routinization may be applied to the noninteractive
aspects of the work—such as clerical aspects or assembly of fast food on a tray—
exactly as it would in an industrial context. For the interactive aspects of the
work, however, the form that routinization assumes will turn on how complex
the task is. For the simplest interactive work, scripting, uniforms, and rules
about worker demeanor and behavior may be sufficient.
McDonald’s is the prototype for “production line” routinization in the
service sector, particularly in low-waged, fast-moving, consumer-goods businesses. McDonald’s systematically breaks down the service interaction into its
component parts and scripts it in order to achieve uniformity. It regulates
workers’ clothing (uniforms are required), haircuts, jewelry, makeup, fingernail
length and color, demeanor, words, mood, and manner (requiring smiling, eye
contact, and a pleasant countenance, as well as a scripted series of questions and
35
responses in interchanges with customers). Ray Kroc, McDonald’s founder,
succeeded in controlling work routines and product quality on a massive scale,
36
yielding an immensely popular and profitable brand. The combination of
detailed training, automation, and a “Hamburger University” (where managerial practices are inculcated) created front-line, low-waged service jobs that are

34. Frederick Winslow Taylor is credited with developing the principles of scientific
management for the express purpose of controlling labor. Through the use of time and motion
studies designed to maximize output, Taylor sought to convert autonomous, skilled craftsmen into
fungible automatons governed by the technology of the assembly line. In 1911, Taylor wrote: “The
foreman and superintendents . . . know better than anyone else that their own knowledge and
personal skill falls far short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the workmen under
them.” FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 31–32 (1911).
Taylor exhorted managers: “The duty of gathering in all of this great mass of traditional knowledge
and recording it, tabulating it, and in many cases, finally reducing it to laws, rules, and even to
mathematical formulae, is voluntarily assumed by the scientific managers.” FREDERICK WINSLOW
TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, COMPRISING SHOP MANAGEMENT, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT AND TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SPECIAL HOUSE COMMITTEE 40 (1947), available at
http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;;idno=heb01156.
See
generally
HARRY
BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 85–121 (1974); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1915, at 9–57, 214–56 (1987); DAVID MONTGOMERY,
WORKERS’ CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR
STRUGGLES 9–10 (1979). For an interesting analysis of these issues as they pertain to the question of
who owns the new technology and intellectual property of today’s workplace, see Nathan Newman,
Trade Secrets and Collective Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2002).
35. Leidner, Rethinking Questions of Control, supra note 23, at 29, 34.
36. Id. at 31–32.
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“almost idiot-proof”; workers became fungible and high turnover was no longer
37
costly.
From the workers’ perspective, production line routinization tends to rob
workers’ tasks of their variety and interest, and is associated with higher injury
rates (particularly repetitive-motion injuries) because it affects the nature and
38
pace of the work. It is also linked to stagnation of workers’ creative and
39
problem-solving capacities, and to boredom and alienation. Its primary
psychological effect is to require suppression of the self in the service of others
and enforced depersonalization; workers must separate themselves emotionally
from the scripts they are required to utter or the responses that customers make
to them that deviate from the script. The effects of such scripting and the
requirement of service with cheer are potentially demeaning. However, routines
may also be embraced by workers as functional, either because the routines
assist them in controlling service interactions or because the routines provide
shields behind which workers can take shelter from the insults and indignities
40
that come with contact with the public.
2. Standardization by Transformation
For more complex interactive work, such as the jobs of bartenders, cocktail
servers, and flight attendants, scripting is inadequate to the task. Such work is
typically branded and controlled in two ways: (1) the employer deliberately
selects employees with characteristics that dovetail with the brand service that
the employer seeks to market; and (2) the employer then builds on that “fit”
with training that orients the workers psychologically toward the business’s
brand values and with regulations that script worker self-presentation (uni41
forms, appearance codes, and grooming rules).
a. Selecting for “Brand Fit”
Transforming workers into “brand partners” inevitably impacts selection
42
processes: Human-resources professionals are advised to select for “brand fit.”
Barlow and Stewart suggest hiring applicants “who have a natural resonance”
43
with the business brand. Consider the retailer Abercrombie & Fitch. It actively
sought college students who resembled its brand image: young, attractive,

37. Id. at 33, 35–36.
38. See, e.g., Esbenshade, supra note 20, at 270, 282 (discussing spillover effects of Westin’s
Heavenly Bed program on housekeeping staff, who were required to make up larger, heavier beds
with more intricate pillow and sheeting arrangements; the luxury beds were associated with unsafe
lifting ratios and additional time spent on making up beds).
39. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 4. See generally BARBARA GARSON, THE
ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOP: HOW COMPUTERS ARE TRANSFORMING THE OFFICE OF THE FUTURE INTO THE
FACTORY OF THE PAST (1988); BARBARA GARSON, ALL THE LIVELONG DAY: THE MEANING AND
DEMEANING OF ROUTINE WORK (1975).
40. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 5.
41. Id. at 25–27.
42. ON-BRAND, OFF-BRAND: VIEWS AND NEWS FOR BRAND ENABLERS, June 2006, at 2, http://
www.brandedservice.com/ZoneUsersFolder/Documents/on-brand_off-brand_june06.pdf.
43. BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 214.
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white, male, and preppie—”walking billboards” who sported “the A & F
45
46
look.” This sort of selection obviously risks violating antidiscrimination laws.
The significance of the law’s sanction of branding is clearest here: The remedy
for discriminatory selection processes may trigger judicial orders aimed at
marketing practices themselves. In the Abercrombie & Fitch settlement, for
example, the consent decree obligated the company to alter its marketing
47
materials to reflect diversity.
A more subtle example of selecting for brand fit involves Southwest
Airlines’ highly successful effort to brand its customer service as fun and highspirited. Despite customer disenchantment with the no-frills aspects of
Southwest such as no reserved seats and no first-class seats, the comedic
philosophy of the airline persuades customers to tolerate the no-frills aspects
48
and to book repeat business in spite of it. Southwest searches carefully for
workers who will be capable of providing branded service: As part of its
interview process, it tests applicants for their ability to make fun of themselves
and for their altruistic propensities (selecting workers who display both comedic
49
and caring qualities).
b. Inculcating Brand Values
Although employers may seek to script or routinize emotions at work—
obligating employees to personalize the script with simulated sincerity, eye
50
contact, and a smile —maximally-effective branding is not completely scripted.
A scripted encounter is unlikely to be perceived as authentic, and thus the
emotional connection that allows the business to exploit the brand will not be
51
made. Accordingly, employers may institute training programs that seek to
transform workers’ personalities, appearances, and thought-processes so that

44. Id. at 158–59.
45. Patrick F. Dorrian, Pending Ninth Circuit Case Key to Viability of Image-Based Bias Claims,
Panelists Say, EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP., May 25, 2005, http://emlawcenter.bna.com/pic2/em.nsf/
id/BNAP-6CPKWH?OpenDocument.
46. See id. Abercrombie & Fitch was sued for race and sex discrimination based on this hiring
practice. Plaintiffs (female, Latino/Latina, African-American, and Asian-American applicants) who
did not fit the company’s “look” brought a class-action discrimination suit. In November 2004, the
company agreed to settle the suit for $40 million plus $10 million in costs and attorneys’ fees.
Barbara L. Jones, Keeping Up Appearances: How to Advise Your Employer Clients on Addressing Issues of
Dress, MINN. LAW., Aug. 15, 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4185/is_
20050820/ai_n14916495. The settlement was approved by the court in December 2005. Afjustice.com,
$40 Million Paid to Class Members in December 2005 in Abercrombie & Fitch Discrimination
Lawsuit Settlement, http://www.afjustice.com (last visited Dec. 24, 2006).
Similarly, a temporary employment agency in France has been sued for rating job applicants
according to skills and skin color, in an effort to provide employees who conformed to their business
clients’ demographic preferences for frontline service positions. Some clients, including the
Disneyland Resort Paris theme park, imposed explicit limits on the number of black workers they
would accept. Molly Moore, French Discrimination Suit Calls Égalité into Question, WASH. POST, Jan.
15, 2006, at A20.
47. Dorrian, supra note 45.
48. BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 79–80.
49. Id. at 175.
50. Leidner, Rethinking Questions of Control, supra note 23, at 35.
51. See BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 64–65.
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they make predictable judgments that the employer would approve—even in
52
variable work scenarios that are themselves not always predictable. Therefore,
the most sophisticated branding integrates the personalities of the workers with
the service, positioning them as an “essential living expression” of the brand:
53
“the brand in action.” Human-resources policies seek to brand workers “from
the inside out”; training programs and policies should produce a staff that acts,
54
looks, sounds, and even feels in sync with the brand. Ideally, the brand and the
55
service should merge with one another in the customer’s mind.
Because it impacts personality and psyche, this form of routinization affects
workers’ identities more deeply than simple production line routinization does.
For example, Amway Corporation has a sophisticated branding program that
utilizes the transformational form of routinization to maximize the efficacy of its
distributors as salespeople and recruiters for other distributors. Robin Leidner
explains:
Amway goes far beyond providing distributors with routines for doing their
work. The company tries to affect their lives in a global and permanent way,
molding them through a process it calls “duplicating.” There is no part of
distributors’ lives that Amway does not see as relevant to the success of the
business, and therefore none is immune from corporate influence. Amway tries
to shape the workers’ family lives, political convictions, religious beliefs,
personal goals, and self-concepts. It encourages distributors to break off ties
56
with friends or relatives who are critical of Amway . . . .

Workers subject to transformative routinization must either embrace the
changes or don false personalities at work. For workers whose identities conflict
with the employer’s imposed norms of behavior, attitude, and appearance, the
57
effect can be self-alienating. In an effort to make this process easier for workers
and to minimize their resistance, employers often furnish psychic strategies to
58
help workers reconcile the conflicts between their work and their self-image.
3. Effects of Routinization on Customers and Culture
In addition to its benefits for management and impact on workers,
routinization of service-sector work has spillover effects on customers and on
the surrounding culture.
a. Effects of Routinization on Customers
A significant difference between routinization in the industrial context and
routinization in the service context is the replacement of the dyadic struggle for
control with a triad of workers, management, and customers. In order to be
52. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 36–38.
53. BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 74–75.
54. See id. at 116.
55. Id. at 76.
56. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 38.
57. Indeed, the difficulty of retaining one’s authenticity and personal autonomy is experienced
by some workers as a challenge to gender identity. Id. at 184 (noting that requiring insurance agents
to conform to a script potentially challenged their sense of manliness).
58. Id. at 189.
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effective, routinization must also control the behavior of customers. Routines
associated with front-line customer service standardize customers’ behavior by
limiting their demands to a predetermined spectrum (e.g., a menu notice that
59
instructs “no substitutions”). Where the routine denies workers the flexibility
to respond to customers’ requests, or the logic of the routine does not match
social norms, or the customer simply refuses to participate, customers are likely
60
to respond with frustration directed at the workers. Interactions can be scripted
to reduce or prevent customer resistance, or to mute the effects of customer
61
frustration by using empathic or choice-preserving language.
Routinization can also entail the involuntary shifting of labor to the
62
consumer, as Nona Glazer has explained. Consumers scan and bag their own
groceries, serve themselves at buffets, salad bars, and soft drink machines, bus
their own tables in quick-order restaurants, and pump their own gasoline—all
work that was once paid labor. Employers use routinization and technology to
break the service into its component parts and shift work to the consumer that
the employer previously paid workers to perform.
b. Effects of Routinization on Culture
Finally, routinization impacts the culture at large by shaping social norms.
Because “[r]outinization assumes that people are largely interchangeable, that
they are not deserving of sincerity, [and] possibly that they can easily be
63
duped,” it contributes to an atmosphere of deception and illusion. Consider
sociologist Robin Leidner’s analysis of the cultural impact of routinization:
The efforts of service organizations to routinize human interactions violate
important cultural standards about the status of the self, standards that honor
authenticity, autonomy, sincerity, and individuality. Although these values are
compromised daily in countless ways, they are ideals most Americans take
seriously. In routinized service interactions, the collision between ideals and
practices is particularly marked, and the uncomfortable contradictions are hard
to ignore. Service routines compromise the identities of workers most obviously,
but the principles and self-conceptions of service-recipients are challenged as
well as they are forced to respond to organizational manipulation.
....
Authenticity, autonomy and sincerity allow the development and expression
of the unique self that is culturally ascribed to every person. Individuality is
highly honored in American culture (even though conformity is richly
rewarded), and this value is especially hard to reconcile with routinized
interactions. . . . Routinized interactive service affronts the individuality of both
worker and service-recipient. It assumes that workers’ individuality is not
substantial enough or worthy enough of deference to interfere with their

59. Id. at 31–32.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 32–33.
62. See generally Nona Y. Glazer, Servants to Capital: Unpaid Domestic Labor and Paid Work, in
FAMILIES AND WORK 236 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987); NONA Y. GLAZER,
WOMEN’S PAID AND UNPAID LABOR: THE WORK TRANSFER IN HEALTH CARE AND RETAILING (1993).
63. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 11 (alterations added).
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adoption of qualities designed for them by others. And it further assumes that
service-recipients, grouped according to market segment, will be able and
64
willing to fit into standard procedures and accept standardized treatment.

C. The Walt Disney Model of Branded Service
In the early 1980s, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman revolutionized
management strategy with a best-selling book that explored the art and science
of management techniques used by leading companies with records of
65
profitability and innovation. One of the companies featured was Walt Disney,
which subsequently established the Disney Institute to teach its branded quality
service and management to others. Because Disney’s sophisticated servicebranding methodologies and human-resources policies have become so
influential, they are worth summarizing here.
1. Hiring and Training for Branded Service
Disney begins by looking for “brand fit.” Its interviews are designed to
ferret out workers who will have the attitude that Disney seeks. Disney adheres
66
to the maxim, “Hire for attitude, train for skill.” During the application process
67
(which Disney refers to as “casting the show”), Disney shows a video that gives
prospective applicants information about employment conditions, including its
dress code and grooming regulations; about ten percent of applicants leave at
68
that point, but those who stay accept the circumstances of their employment.
Once a worker is hired, “basic training” at “Disney University” takes a full
69
week. The training covers Disney’s history, a cultural indoctrination to the
70
Walt Disney philosophy, and an overview of all aspects of the Disney property.
The message is that Disney cast members are a team with a uniform look;
individuality or anything that tends to attract attention (other than the scripted
71
Disney theme look) is discouraged. In an effort to inculcate the proper worker
attitude towards service, Walt Disney refers to its workers as “cast members” or
“hosts” and its customers as “guests”; uniforms are “costumes” and workers—
from sweepers to bakery workers to Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck—put on a
72
“show.” Turnover is low (fifteen percent in the 1990s), morale is high, and
73
customer service touted as outstanding.

64.
65.

Id. at 216–17, 218–19.
See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM
AMERICA’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES (1982).
66. See Douglas P. Shuit, Magic for Sale: Part 2 of 2, WORKFORCE MGMT., Sept. 1, 2004, at 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cheryl Hall, Disney School Fashions Workers in Its Image, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 9,
1993, at 1H; see Disney Institute, http://www.disneyinstitute.com (last visited Dec. 24, 2006).
70. Hall, supra note 69, at 1H.
71. Dianne Klein, Disney Hotel Crew Gets the Word: No Beards and No Glitz, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1988, § 2, at 1.
72. Dan Malovany, Backstage at Disney World; The International Theme of the Disney World Bakery,
25(4) BAKERY PROD. & MKTG. 120, Apr. 24, 1990; Hall, supra note 69, at 1H.
73. Hall, supra note 69, at 1H.
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2. Branded Workers: Appearance Codes
Disney’s appearance regulations are legendary and have been emulated by
74
many other companies. When Disneyland first opened in 1955 in California,
Walt Disney established appearance-code guidelines in an effort to distance its
facilities from the American image of amusement parks as “sleazy carnivals,”
75
instead portraying itself as “a clean, wholesome family environment.” The
purpose of the appearance code was to ensure that workers appeared clean-cut
and fresh-faced, without gaudy makeup, excessive jewelry, disheveled locks, or
outlandish hairdos. By 1958, the general guidelines had metamorphosed into
strict and specific quality standards that took the form of do’s and don’ts: do
wear undergarments; don’t wear fingernails extending more than one-quarter of
an inch past the fingertips; don’t wear eye shadow; no frosting or streaking of
hair; only certain colors of nail polish were acceptable; limitations on the amount
and size of jewelry applied; men could not grow beards, mustaches (although
76
Walt Disney himself had a mustache), or wear sideburns below the ears.
Violation of the code was grounds for discharge.
The strict 1950s standards were modified slightly over the years as fashion
trends shifted: earrings were permitted for women (at first only studs, then later
larger earrings); a summer uniform of Bermuda shorts and knee socks was
instituted; eye shadow and eye liner were authorized in 1994; mustaches (but
not beards) were permitted in 2000; cornrows and hoop earrings were embraced
77
in 2003. The “Disney look” is defined in a forty-page book, complete with
78
sketches of do’s and don’ts.
Disney’s brand-service standards and the human-resources strategies that
create them have been so successful that Disney has profited from marketing the
branding method itself. A visit to the Disney Institute’s Web page reveals a
diverse and impressive array of corporate clients who have traveled to Florida
79
for instruction. Perhaps not coincidentally, Gary Loveman, who became the
chief operating officer of Harrah’s Entertainment in 1998 (and later its CEO),
80
consulted for Disney in his early days as an academic at Harvard. Clearly,
branded service and its associated human-resources policies are big business.

74. David Cole, Hospital Strengthens Dress Code; Policy Covers Hairdos, Makeup, Tattoos,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 30, 2000, at 2B (describing Kenosha Hospital and Medical Center dress
code that spells out strict rules on makeup, hairstyles, jewelry, and tattoos, modeled on the Walt
Disney appearance code).
75. Leslie Doolittle, Disney’s All-America Look Now Includes Eye Shadow, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 29, 1994, at A1.
76. Id.
77. Jeff Gottlieb, Whiskers While You Work? Disney May Change Rules, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000,
at B1; E. Scott Reckard, Bare Upper Lip No Longer a Must for Disney Workers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000,
at C1; Richard Verrier, For Disney Workers, A Hipper Place on Earth, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2003, § 3, at 1.
78. Hall, supra note 69, at 1H.
79. Disney Institute, supra note 69. Duke University is among the clients that has received
training from the Disney Institute. Id.
80. See infra notes 360–61and accompanying text.
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III. BRANDING: SANCTIONED BY LAW
The law’s response to corporate branding signals deference to corporate
interests in developing and marketing a public image. In the service economy,
the firm’s interest in branding its workforce has been elevated to quasi-property
status. In this Part we outline the law’s apparent sanction of branding through
trade dress protection under the Lanham Act and through protection under the
work law of managerial prerogative to control the workforce.
A. Trade Dress: Protecting an Employer’s Property-Like Interest in Its Brand
The way that service workers and their services are “packaged”—the
design and color of their uniforms, the scripted routines they use to deliver their
services, or the décor of the company’s retail premises—are elements of the
employer’s branding of its service/product that are described in trademark law
as “trade dress.” One court defined the term as follows:
“‘Trade dress’ refers to ‘the image and overall appearance of a product.’ It
embodies ‘that arrangement of identifying characteristics or decorations
connected with a product, whether by packaging or otherwise, [that] make[s]
the source of the product distinguishable from another and . . . promote[s] its
sale.’” Trade dress “‘involves the total image of a product and may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or
even particular sales techniques.’”
. . . [R]ecently “‘trade dress’ has taken on a more expansive meaning and
includes the design and appearance of the product as well as that of the
container and all elements making up the total visual image by which the
product is presented to customers.” . . . [A]ny “thing” that dresses a good can
81
constitute trade dress. Protectability is another matter entirely.

An employer’s investment in trade dress that arises out of the creation and
enforcement of dress codes, such as uniforms, creates a property-like interest
that is protected from infringement by competitors under common-law and
statutory trademark law only if the unregistered “trade dress” is both
“distinctive in the marketplace, thereby indicating the source of the good it
dresses,” and “primarily nonfunctional,” and, in addition, “the trade dress of
82
the competing good is confusingly similar.” For example, the Court of Appeals

81. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d 619, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted). For a summary of the development of trade dress protection under the
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), P.L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (West Supp. 2007)), and its relation to image branding, see Joseph Cockman, Note,
Running from the Runway: Trade Dress Protection in an Age of Lifestyle Marketing, 89 IOWA L. REV. 671
(2004).
82. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 280 F.3d at 629. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763 (1992) (holding that restaurant décor that is inherently distinctive and nonfunctional is trade
dress entitled to protection from infringement by a competitor under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 60
Stat. 441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159 (1995) (holding that a color is protectible as a trademark under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act only if
it has acquired a secondary meaning). See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S.
205 (2000) (holding that “product-design trade dress can never be inherently distinctive” and that “a
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for the Second Circuit found that the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., had “a
valid trademark in its cheerleader uniform,” which consisted of “white vinyl
boots, white shorts, a white belt decorated with blue stars, a blue bolero blouse,
and a white vest decorated with three blue stars on each side of the front and a
83
white fringe around the bottom.” The court found that “the particular
combination of colors and collocation of decorations that distinguish [the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders’] uniform from those of other squads” constituted an
“arbitrary design which makes the otherwise functional uniform
84
trademarkable” under the Lanham Act. Moreover, the court found that
Pussycat Cinema—in producing a sexually-explicit film featuring an actress
who wore an “almost identical” cheerleader’s uniform—not only created the
“likelihood of confusion” about whether the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
sponsored or approved the use of the trademarked uniform in the film, but also
85
risked injuring the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ good name and reputation.
While distinctive, nonfunctional aspects of service workers’ uniforms,
appearance, and service routines may in some circumstances be protectible
“trade dress,” many elements of an employer’s investment in “packaging” its
86
service workers can be freely copied by competitors. For example, in HI Limited
87
Partnership v. Winghouse of Florida, Hooters claimed that Winghouse, a
competing sports bar and grill in Florida, was liable for trade-dress infringement
because it required its female employees to wear uniforms of black tank tops
and black running shorts that Hooters alleged were “confusingly similar” to the
uniforms worn by Hooters Girls. The district court concluded that, “as a matter
of law, the Winghouse Girl, with her black tank top and black running shorts, is
88
not a ‘knockoff’ of the Hooters Girl.” The court explained that
what distinguishes the Hooters Girl from other sports bar and grill servers is her
distinctive uniform, consisting of a white tank top shirt prominently featuring
the Hooters name and “owl” logo across her chest, and orange nylon running
shorts. Although Hooters Girls occasionally wear black uniforms, as a matter of
law, those uniforms are not distinctive, nor have they acquired secondary
meaning associated with Hooters restaurants.
....
. . . Hooters simply cannot prevent a competitor from using a server outfit as
different as a black tank top and black running shorts. If Hooters could stop

product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible [under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act], only
upon a showing of secondary meaning”).
83. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202, 203 (2d Cir.
1979).
84. Id. at 203–04.
85. Id. at 205. For a discussion of the gender stereotyping in the court’s analysis of the
“likelihood of confusion” element in the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case, see Ann Bartow, Likelihood
of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 726, 813–14 (2004).
86. The Supreme Court observed that “[t]rade dress must subsist with the recognition that in
many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless an
intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
87. 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 451 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006).
88. 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
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Winghouse from using that particular color and combination, then it could
prevent any other competitor from using any color combination of tank top and
running shorts. This would be an impermissible burden on competition.
Moreover, a server uniform consisting of a tank top t-shirt and nylon running
shorts is fairly common to sports bar and grills. Hooters cannot monopolize this
generic theme any more than an upscale steak restaurant featuring tuxedo-clad
89
servers could preclude competitors from using the same or similar uniform.

In some situations, the human being wearing the “trade dress” merges with
the brand image delineated by the employer’s appearance code. In such cases,
the “functionality” and centrality of the human being in conveying (or in being)
the employer’s branded product disqualifies the employer’s interest from trade
90
dress protection under the law. Moreover, the more ephemeral aspects of the
way an employer literally dresses and markets its workers—such as a uniform’s
“professional” or “sexy” appearance—also cannot be protected as “trade dress,”
even though these may be essential components of the brand image the
employer intends to convey to its customers:
Although producers and marketers of goods can adopt and seek to protect a
seemingly infinite variety of product packages and product configurations, the
recognition that trade dress can comprise “any thing,” “‘even particular sales
techniques,’” should not be taken to mean that a company can protect a
product’s marketing theme or any other incorporeal aspects of the good
incapable of being perceived by the senses. The aura about a product, the cachet
that ownership or display of it creates, and the kind of appeal it has to certain
consumers do not dress a good in trade. Rather, those intangible “things”
emanate from the good, its dress, and the marketing campaign that promotes
91
the dressed good.

The difficulty of protecting its investment in employee dress and grooming
styles from copying by competitors, however, does not leave an employer
without means to build up its own “brand” of employee appearance and set
itself apart from its competitors. The mechanism employed will be rigorous
89. Id. at 1258–59.
90. For example, in the Winghouse case, the district court noted that the “Hooters Girl” is “[t]he
only component of [Hooters’] trade dress that is either distinctive or has achieved secondary
meaning.” Id. at 1259. The court observed that, because the “elements of trade dress must be
considered in toto, the overwhelmingly predominant feature of Hooters’ trade dress is the Hooters
Girl.” Id. at 1258.
The Hooters Girl is not entitled to trade dress protection because the evidence
establishes to a legal certainty that the Hooters Girl is primarily functional. As Hooters has
represented to state and federal regulatory agencies investigating complaints of
discrimination, the Hooters Girl is not a marketing tool. Rather, Hooters has admitted that
the Hooters Girl’s predominant function is to provide vicarious sexual recreation, to
titillate, entice, and arouse male customers’ fantasies. She is the very essence of Hooters’
business. This essential functionality disqualifies the Hooters Girl from trade dress
protection.
Id. at 1258–59. The EEOC at one point instituted an investigation of Hooters’ restaurant chain for its
refusal to hire men to work as servers. After the company mounted a public relations campaign
against the EEOC, the agency dropped the investigation. See Hooters Chain Is Freed of Job Bias Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at B10. See also infra text accompanying note 555.
91. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores v. American Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d 619, 630–31 (6th Cir.
2002).

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

BRANDED

31

enforcement of employee dress and grooming rules: all other things being equal,
the employer whose employees deliver the brand image best, measured by strict
conformance with its appearance rules, will be the employer who attracts the
most customers. Moreover, regardless of whether aspects of an employer’s trade
dress are protected from infringement by common law or statutory trademark
law, the notion that service employees’ dress and appearance (as regulated by
the employer’s rules) are part of the company’s brand means that employers
have a property-like interest not simply in their branded service, but in their
employees. The employer “owns” (or leases, for the duration of work time) the
rights to use the employee’s face, body type, manner, and even emotions in
service of pleasing the customer. The worker who is required to wear a
particular uniform, hairstyle, facial expression, or amount and style of
makeup—a “facial uniform”—is donating body space for the employer’s
branding objectives. Under the prevailing understanding of the employment
contract, workers are compensated for physical and mental labor, but not for the
“human billboard” function that they may also perform.
The law participates in this exchange by ignoring the value of the
employees’ autonomy and identity, while at the same time protecting
employers’ rights to use the brand standards that they have developed to extract
significant additional value from workers without compensating them for it.
Even where the Lanham Act or the common law does not confer trade dress
protection for the brand, the laws governing the employment relation protect
the employer against workers’ efforts to resist the imposition and effects of
branding. The primary source of protection is employment at will, but the
various legal regimes ostensibly designed to create or enforce workers’ rights—
including labor law, constitutional doctrine, the common law, and
antidiscrimination law—are generally interpreted to protect the employer’s
interests in branding as a part of its managerial prerogative to control
production. We turn next to an examination of the ways in which various legal
doctrines operate to protect the employer’s property-like interest in advancing
its brand whenever it conflicts with employee rights.
B. Appearance Regulation in the Workplace
Work law’s response to branding has been played out in cases challenging
employers’ uniform requirements, appearance codes, and grooming policies.
Many other commentators have reviewed the law’s treatment of appearance
92
regulations in the workplace, and we do not wish to cover the same ground.

92. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994); Paulette Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991); Mary Anne Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Reexamining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006); Karl E. Klare,
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992); Robert Post,
Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000); Gowri
Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch-22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless
Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005–06); Mary Whisner, Gender Specific Clothing Regulation: A
Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

32 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

Volume 14:13

2007

We summarize here a few of the major doctrinal bases for challenges, using
illustrative cases that highlight the role of branding in defending appearance
codes against legal challenge.
The cases arise in four arenas: (1) in the union context, either under the
93
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or pursuant to grievances subject to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements; (2) as constitutional
challenges brought by public sector employees; (3) as common-law privacy and
wrongful-discharge claims brought by private sector employees; and (4) as
discrimination claims. In all of these cases, employers defend the employment
practices that are linked to branding by showing the connection between their
property interest in managing and controlling the business and the brand’s
efficacy in conveying a particular corporate image to the public.
1. Cases in the Union Context
Cases under the NLRA deal with workers’ rights to organize and to
bargain collectively over conditions of work, including appearance codes. They
require the Board and the courts (or, in cases arising under collective bargaining
agreements, the arbitrator) to balance employers’ rights to manage and control
the operation of the business against workers’ statutory rights to engage in
concerted activity for the purposes of mutual aid or protection, which are
explicitly protected against employer interference by NLRA sections 7 and
8(a)(1). In addition, a unionized employer that promulgates a grooming or
appearance standard without first negotiating with its union violates NLRA
section 8(a)(5); grooming and appearance standards are changes in working
conditions and therefore are “mandatory” subjects of bargaining under the Act,
meaning that the employer must bargain to impasse with the union prior to
94
implementing the rule.
a. Cases Involving Union Insignia
The Supreme Court held early on that workers covered by the NLRA have
a statutorily-protected right to wear union insignia (e.g., buttons, pins) in the
95
workplace. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, the Court ruled that employers
may restrict the wearing of union insignia only where “special circumstances”
justify the restriction. The employer bears the burden of proof to establish that
96
special circumstances exist. Although cases from the manufacturing context
typically involve production or safety justifications, cases from the service sector
added an additional justification. Where workers have contact with the public,
the Board and courts give weight to the employer’s “image”-based justification,
Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147
(2004).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–188.
94. Transp. Enters., 240 N.L.R.B. 551 (1979); Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About
Appearance Codes?, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 521 (2007). Unions typically cede control over
appearance codes and other work rules to the employer through the vehicle of the “management
rights clause” that appears in most labor contracts. See Klare, supra note 92, at 1426.
95. 324 U.S. 793, 801–03 (1945).
96. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 378, 379 (2004).
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particularly where the image is adopted to render the business competitive. In
the image cases, employers who rigorously enforce dress and grooming codes
against all incursions are most likely to prevail because it is difficult to establish
anti-union animus; in addition, rigorous enforcement of the code supports the
employer’s argument that maintenance of its image through the branded
appearance of its workers is vital to its business interests.
In one of the earliest cases arising from a service sector environment, NLRB
98
v. Harrah’s Club, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s ruling that a
Harrah’s resort in Stateline, Nevada, had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by
enforcing a nonadornment policy that prohibited the wearing of union buttons
on workers’ uniforms. The court noted Harrah’s longstanding and strict
regulation of employee dress and appearance, as well as its consistent
99
enforcement of the policy through daily inspections by management personnel.
The policy was unrelated to union activity and was not limited to union buttons;
it was enforced rigorously against badges, pins, and buttons proclaiming
religious, political, or social affiliations. Moreover, no labor organizing
campaign was ongoing; indeed, workers at this facility were already unionized
and had a labor contract. The court reasoned that, although the wearing of
union buttons is generally a protected activity under section 7 of the NLRA, in
this case there was no evidence that the “several” workers wearing union
buttons had a protected purpose that fit within the “collective bargaining or
100
other mutual aid or protection” language of section 7.
The court also refused enforcement on the separate ground that, in striking
a balance between workers’ rights to self-organization under section 7 and the
employer’s right to operate its business, the Board had accorded too little
deference to Harrah’s right to “maintain discipline.” The court explained the
special deference that it felt was necessary to appearance codes and uniforms in
a service business that seeks to project a particular image:
Most business establishments, particularly those which, like respondent, furnish
service rather than goods, try to project a certain type of image to the public.
One of the most essential elements in that image is the appearance of its
uniformed employees who furnish that service in person to customers. The
evidence shows that respondent has paid close attention to its public image by a
uniform policy of long standing against the wearing of jewelry of any kind on
the uniform. Respondent should not be required to wait until it receives
complaints or suffers a decline in business to prove special circumstances.
Businessmen are required to anticipate such occurrences and avoid them if they
wish to remain in business. This is a valid exercise of business judgment, and it
is not the province of the Board or of this court to substitute its judgment for

97. The Board recently outlined the special circumstances that will typically justify deviation
from the rule as follows: “[Restrictions on union insignia are justified] when their display may
jeopardize employee safety, damage machinery or products, exacerbate employee dissension, or
unreasonably interfere with a public image that the employer has established, or when necessary to
maintain decorum and discipline among employees.” Komatsu America Corp., 342 N.L.R.B. 649, 650
(2004).
98. 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964).
99. Id. at 177–78.
100. Id. at 179.

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

Volume 14:13

2007

that of management so long as the exercise is reasonable and does not interfere
with a protected purpose. . . . We think that the regulation in question, under the
101
circumstances, is reasonable.

Service businesses are not automatically exempt from the requirement that
special circumstances be shown; however, an investment in and a commitment
to a distinct corporate image appears to be critical. An employer’s desire to
present to the public an image of a neatly groomed and uniformed driver may
not suffice—particularly where the employer allows other types of pins or
102
buttons unrelated to its business. Nor will the Board and courts countenance
restrictions where there is no showing by the employer that the button or
103
insignia interferes with customer service or patient care. However, where the
employer can show that its goal is consistent with improved customer service, a
valid business justification, courts generally allow the restriction. In Burger King
104
v. NLRB, for example, the court ruled that a fast-food chain could prohibit the
wearing of union buttons on employer-supplied uniforms; the chain had a right
105
to “project a clean, professional image to the public.”
106
In Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., the Board ruled that a San
Diego-based Starwood resort hotel was justified in prohibiting in-room, fooddelivery servers from wearing union buttons in public areas. The Board gave
great weight to the hotel’s efforts to project a “Wonderland” image, as expressed
through marketing campaigns that emphasized that guests could fulfill their
“‘fantasies and desires’” and get “‘whatever [they] want whenever [they] want
107
it.’” The hotel also adopted the host/guest metaphor, referring to its lobby as
its “living room,” and viewed itself as performing its branded customer service,
referring to its employees as “talent” or “cast members,” their supervisors as
108
“talent coaches,” and the hotel experience itself as “wonderland.” In an effort
to further its image, the hotel commissioned uniforms, at considerable expense,
that provided a “trendy, distinct, and chic look” for workers who have public
109
contact. It required workers to wear a small “W” pin on their upper-left chest
area and prohibited all other uniform adornments. In addition, the hotel
instructed workers to interact with guests by introducing themselves by name to
each guest and to make every interaction “Genuine, Authentic, Comfortable,

101. Id. at 180.
102. See United Parcel Serv., 312 N.L.R.B. 596 (1993), enforcement denied, 41 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir.
1994).
103. See Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 328 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (allowing wearing of
union buttons on uniforms of hospital workers); Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB, 130 F.3d 1209 (6th Cir. 2003)
(allowing wearing of union pins on uniforms of employees in retail store).
104. 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 1055. But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (2003) (employer violated
NLRA when it refused to allow an off-duty employee to wear a pro-union T-shirt in its retail store,
since no interference with the on-duty work environment was shown).
106. 348 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Sept. 29, 2006), 180 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1321 (NLRB 2006), 2006 NLRB
LEXIS 437.
107. 2006 NLRB LEXIS 437, at *4 (alterations added).
108. Id. at *30 (factual statement in decision of administrative law judge).
109. Id. at *4 (Board decision).
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Engaging, Conversational, with Personality, Fun.” The hotel’s goal was to
“create ‘an emotional attachment’ for guests, to move from ‘never say no to let
me work the magic,’ to look for opportunities to ‘grant wishes,’” and to make
111
the “W” experience “‘[a] dream come true.’”
Against this backdrop, the hotel argued that the union button was the
112
equivalent of “graffiti on the Mona Lisa.” The Board refused to second-guess
the legitimacy of the employer’s business plan to compete effectively with other
resort hotels, ruling that it had met its burden of showing special circumstances
justifying the prohibition. The combination of the employer’s investment in
developing its branded service and the employer’s painstaking efforts to enforce
the brand convinced the Board that the brand was sufficiently central to
promoting the employer’s corporate image to trump employees’ rights under
the NLRA to wear union buttons.
b. Refusals to Bargain over Appearance Codes
Although the law is settled that appearance and grooming codes are
mandatory subjects of bargaining, most unions (at least in the last twenty-five
years or so) seem to have accepted appearance and grooming codes without
113
objection at a collective level. Rather than challenging the codes themselves as
invasions of employee privacy or autonomy, unions shifted to grieving
individual cases where the codes were applied in inequitable ways or the
disciplinary sanction was disproportionate to the rule violation. This is
consistent with a more general reluctance by unions to mount collective
challenges to workplace rules as dignity invasions, at least when the rules are
consistent with prevailing social norms. Pauline Kim observed the same trend in
the context of challenges to workplace drug-testing rules: Although unions
initially brought workforce-wide challenges to drug-testing rules, over time the
disputes became both more individualized and more narrowly limited to
114
economic relief. Kim explains:
The early workforce-wide cases spoke in terms of basic human dignity and
fundamental rights, asking what types of interests were sufficiently weighty to
justify burdening these important rights. By contrast, the later cases hardly
speak at all in terms of privacy or dignity. Rather, they focus on compliance
with procedural safeguards and the protection of the material interests, for
example jobs and wages, of their members. Workers who felt aggrieved because
of the manner in which a test was administered, or by the intrusiveness of the
test itself, could not recover damages for dignitary harms, and those who
suffered no tangible job loss were essentially remediless under the collective
bargaining system. Thus, although the presence of a union undoubtedly insured
that its members received procedural protections they otherwise might not have
had and likely worked to check the worst abuses, collective resistance to

110. Id. at *4–5.
111. Id. at *31 (factual statement in decision of administrative law judge).
112. Id. at *42.
113. Cf. Klare, supra note 92, at 1396 (describing case from the 1970s in which worker resistance
to a ban on tank-top shirts inside a plant precipitated a lockout).
114. Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy: The
Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. REV. 1009 (2006).
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mandatory drug testing became routinized over time, focusing on consistent
application of the rules, rather than on protecting the dignitary and privacy
115
interests of workers.

There have been two deviations from this general pattern in the context of
corporate appearance codes. The first involves situations where the appearance
code imposes costs that could be readily monetized. In these cases, unions
demand bargaining over the costs of compliance with the codes (such as costs of
116
purchasing or laundering uniforms) and, when necessary, have brought so117
called donning and doffing claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act seeking
payment for time necessary to change in and out of uniforms, to put on and take
118
off safety gear, etc.
The second involves appearance codes that are imposed upon a unionized
workforce that was not previously exposed to such requirements. For example,
Disney’s American unions—bowing to the wishes of the majority of their
memberships, who had been indoctrinated by the Disney screening and training
process to accept Disney’s appearance code as a condition of employment—
119
tolerated Disney’s code as long as it was “reasonable.” However, unions at the
Disneyland Hotel raised challenges to the code when Disneyland was acquired
by Disney in the 1980s. Disney resisted, and the challenges were apparently
120
unsuccessful. A few workers did flaunt the appearance code by wearing union
buttons, and the unions apparently pressed the workers’ rights in these cases
121
before the NLRB.
Subsequently, some of Disney’s unions successfully
115. Id. at 1029.
116. In one interesting case, an arbitrator found that an employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement where it unilaterally implemented casual “dress down days” and mandated a
dress code for workers on those days. Because the mandated casual dress code was very rigid and
specified the color and type of clothing each employee must wear, it imposed significant costs on
workers who attempted to comply with it; accordingly, the arbitrator viewed it as violating the wage
provision in the collective bargaining agreement. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 112 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 58 (1999) (Kelly, Arb.).
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2004).
118. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
119. See Carla Rivera, Unions Vow to Fight Disneyland Hotel Code, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1988, § 1, at
3 (quoting union business representative for workers at a newly acquired Disneyland Hotel, who
commented, “We have no problem with a reasonable dress code, but this one is ridiculous and
outdated.”). Disney representatives maintained that they have never negotiated over the appearance
code with any union and they refused to begin in the 1980s at the Disneyland Hotel. Ted Appel,
Disney Employees Criticize Dress Code, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Mar. 22, 1988.
120. These unions represented workforces attached to business operations that had been
acquired by Disney, so that the employees had not been through the Disney screening and training
process and thus were not accustomed to the Disney appearance standards; they saw them as a
change in the rules. See Klein, supra note 71, at 2 (reporting that news of the Disney appearance code
upset employees of the newly acquired Disneyland Hotel, and union representatives for the
Operating Engineers reported plans to file grievances over the code); Rivera, supra note 119, at 3
(reporting planned union challenge to prohibition on mustaches, beards, heavy makeup, and long
fingernails). Union business agents demurred, however, when asked whether the union would use
the strike weapon to press its demands. Id.
121. See Andrea Ford, Disney Looks for the Union Label, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989, § 2, at 3
(reporting that one employee at the Disneyland Hotel had union lapel pins, commemorating the
worker’s number of years of union membership, made into earrings in an effort to conform to the
appearance code, but was ordered not to wear them because they were still “insignia”; the union
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negotiated for worker-friendly rules on uniform care and sought and obtained
compensation for the time spent changing into the costumes from street
123
clothes. French labor unions at Euro-Disney, accustomed to a culture and legal
context more protective of worker autonomy, have been far less tolerant; they
vigorously protested the appearance code, arguing that it represented an “attack
124
on individual liberty.”
c. Cases Arising Under Collective Bargaining Agreement Just-Cause-forDischarge Clauses
Arbitrators are frequently presented with cases where individual workers
are discharged or disciplined for failure to comply with employer appearance
codes. Appearance codes related to employers’ desire to project a particular
image to customers are generally considered to be within managerial
prerogative, particularly where the nature of the business is sensitive to the
125
image portrayed and the workers have contact with the public. However, the
right to regulate appearance is not absolute: Employers must establish the
relationship between the image that they seek to project and the need to regulate
126
employee appearance. Arbitrators are particularly sensitive to employer work
rules that extend beyond the work arena and encroach on workers’ private
127
lives.
Arbitrators follow the lead of the Board and courts in the union insignia
cases, requiring employers to produce evidence that workers’ failure to comply
with the grooming rule or appearance code will damage the business’s public
image or otherwise negatively impact customer service. Arbitrators in such
cases typically acknowledge the employer’s legitimate interest in constructing
and maintaining its public image, and uphold “reasonable” grooming, dress,
and appearance codes. However, most arbitrators hold the employer to a high
standard of proof to demonstrate the link between the policy and the image that
the employer seeks to portray.
Customer disapproval or complaints are significant in establishing the
justification for appearance codes and grooming policies. For example, in Pacific
128
Southwest Airlines, the arbitrator rejected the airline’s argument that its rule
requiring male flight attendants to be beardless was essential to convey a
conservative image, consistent with perceptions of competence and reliability.
The airline argued that its image constituted a vital asset in a competitive
industry. The arbitrator rejected that justification, finding no evidence that the
type of beard that the grievant wished to grow (one inch long, neatly trimmed)
challenged the code in this application even where it declined to challenge the facial hair
restrictions).
122. See Tim Barker, Disney, Union Agree on Underwear, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, June 8, 2001, at
A7 (describing Teamsters’ effort to negotiate for proper cleaning of undergarments).
123. See Labor Board Gets Disney Case, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan. 4, 2000.
124. A Disney Dress Code Chafes in the Land of Haute Couture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, § 1, at 1.
125. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1119–20 (6th ed. 2003).
126. Id. at 1117.
127. See Northwest Airlines, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 31, 34–36 (1977) (Bloch, Arb.); Badger
Concrete Co., 50 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 901, 908–09 (1968) (Krinsky, Arb.).
128. 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1209 (1979) (Christopher, Arb.).
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would damage the airline’s public image or its business activities. The absence
of customer complaints or statistical evidence supporting the airline’s beliefs
about customer perceptions was fatal. The arbitrator set a high bar for the
employer’s proof: “The Company was required to prove that if flight attendants
were allowed to wear neatly trimmed beards, passengers would choose not to
129
fly with PSA.”
Finding that the employer’s asserted justification was
“speculative,” the arbitrator voided the rule.
These references to the relevance of customer reaction show how important
cultural norms are in arbitrators’ assessments of the reasonableness of employer
appearance codes. Employer appearance codes are directly tied to social norms
regarding dress, hair length, and fashion trends. Because these trends shift over
time, employer appearance codes that are considered reasonable in one era may
130
not be so in another, particularly if they impact workers’ off-duty appearance.
For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, hair length and the presence of beards or
facial hair became associated with nonconformity and radical political views. In
an effort to project a conservative business image, many employers imposed
restrictions on men’s hair length or facial hair. Arbitrators enforced these rules
in some cases but were sensitive to their application outside the workplace in
other cases, often referencing cultural norms.
When the employer’s policy is consistent with cultural norms, arbitrators
have been more likely to view it as reasonable and related to the employer’s
131
interest in controlling its public image. For example, in Alpha Beta Co., the
arbitrator deferred to management’s judgment in enforcing a “good grooming”
rule against a clerk’s helper who had cut his hair in three different lengths (one
inch long on top of his head and tapered to a point on the back of his head,
cropped close to the scalp on the sides, and shaved along a thin six-inch line on
each side of his head). The arbitrator noted that the store was located in a small
farming community and that coworkers described the grievant’s hair cut as
132
“outlandish” and “bizarre.” Nevertheless, the arbitrator found that suspension
of the grievant was too severe a penalty when reasonable alternative job
133
positions not involving public contact were available.
134
By contrast, in Big Star No. 35, the arbitrator reinstated a supermarket
cashier and checkers who had been terminated for failure to maintain proper
hair length and for having “unkempt” or “messy” hair. The arbitrator found that
the employer had failed to establish a sufficient connection between hair length
and business necessity and expressed concern that the hair length rule would
affect the checkers’ appearance outside the workplace, requiring the young

129. Id. at 1213–15.
130. See, e.g., Springday Co., 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 627, 629 (1969) (Bothwell, Arb.) (observing
that “[c]ustom and fashion in dress and behavior change from time to time, and employees should
be permitted to conform reasonably with these changes”).
131. 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 855 (1989) (Horowitz, Arb.).
132. Id. at 857, 858 (noting that “considerable deference must be given to store management in
rural areas where local standards may not be the same as those in the more populated areas . . . .”).
133. Id. at 859.
134. 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 850 (1980) (Murphy, Arb.).
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grievants to “deviate sharply from the standards of their male and female
135
associates or sacrifice their jobs and tenure.”
Finally, in particular cases the arbitrator may accept the validity of the rule
itself but second-guess its application to the grievant, either because the grievant
136
as an individual seems sympathetic or because the disciplinary action taken by
the employer seems excessive or disproportionate to the offense under
traditional indicia of industrial due process imported into the collective
137
bargaining agreement through the just-cause-for-discharge clause.
2. Constitutional Challenges to Appearance Codes
In the public sector, employees have challenged appearance codes that
infringe their constitutional rights to liberty, speech, or expression. Courts in
these cases weigh the state’s interest as an employer in managing, controlling,
and directing its workforce to provide efficient public service, against the
employees’ constitutionally protected liberty and expression or speech interests.
138
In the seminal case, Kelley v. Johnson, the Supreme Court sustained a county
police force’s grooming code against a constitutional challenge. With the
139
support of his union, a police officer challenged the police department’s
grooming regulation requiring that an officer’s sideburns not flare beyond two
inches in width or connect to his mustache. The Court assumed arguendo that
public sector workers possess a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
matters of personal appearance, but nonetheless found that the grooming
regulation was justified by the police department’s interests in ensuring that
officers are recognizable to the public and in supporting the police force’s “esprit
140
de corps.”
Subsequent public employment cases have been fairly consistent in
sustaining grooming regulations and appearance codes in deference to a state’s
rights to manage and control its public service operations. Workers seeking to
challenge such rules have been required to show that the state’s regulations are
“wholly irrational,” thus erecting “a very powerful, almost irrebuttable

135. Id. at 855–56. See also Rome Cable Commc’ns, 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 28, 32 (1978) (Dallas,
Arb.) (refusing to accept company’s image justification where grievant’s hairstyle was “similar to the
hair styles worn by a large proportion of young men in his age group throughout the country” and,
therefore, was unlikely to negatively impact the company’s image or sales).
136. See, e.g., Dravo-Doyle Co., 54 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 604, 605–07 (1971) (Krimsly, Arb.)
(refusing to apply a rule barring long hair and beards to an employee who worked in an area where
there was only incidental contact with the public, and noting that, despite the grievant’s long hair,
sideburns, and short “Vandyke” beard, his general appearance was one of “cleanliness and
neatness”).
137. See, e.g., Alpha Beta Co., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 855, 859 (1989) (Horowitz, Arb.) (finding
that even though grooming rule’s application was valid, suspension was an excessive penalty in
light of reasonable alternative of requiring grievant to wear a hat until the hair grew back); see
generally Roger Abrams & Dennis Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in Employee Discipline Cases,
1985 DUKE L.J. 594.
138. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
139. The union that represented the officer, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, filed
an amicus brief arguing that the regulation was unconstitutional. See id. at 255 n.6.
140. Id. at 248.
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constitutional presumption that work rules devised by management” are
141
valid.
Judicial review is only marginally less deferential to managerial authority
when the desired worker “dress” takes the form of speech and is pro-union in
content, such as where workers wear union buttons in violation of
nonadornment codes. A recent union insignia case involved a public sector
employer; therefore, the NLRA was not applicable. In Communications Workers v.
142
Ector County Hospital District, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (sitting
en banc) confronted a First Amendment challenge to a hospital’s uniform
nonadornment policy brought by a carpenter who had been disciplined for
wearing a “Union Yes” button on his uniform while working in patient-care
143
areas of the hospital. The court first asked whether the button represented
speech on a matter of public concern, the threshold inquiry in First Amendment
144
145
employee-speech cases under Connick v. Myers and Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Taking judicial notice of the fact that Texas law prohibited collective bargaining
146
for political subdivisions (including county hospitals), the court found that the
union button “touched upon or involved matters of public concern only
insubstantially and in a weak and attenuated sense” and that the speech was not
made in a traditional public forum; rather, communication was incident to the
147
worker’s performance of his duties while wearing the hospital’s uniform.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to balance the interests of the employer
hospital in promoting efficient public service against the worker’s First
Amendment interests as a citizen in commenting on a matter of public concern,
and it found that the employer’s interests outweighed the worker’s speech
interests. The court sanctioned uniform requirements on the basis that they
“foster[] discipline, promote[] uniformity, encourage[] esprit de corps, and
increase[] readiness,” and noted that “standardized uniforms encourage[] the
subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall
group mission,” a permissible employer goal because of its efficiency-enhancing
148
tendency. In addition, uniform requirements provide a “neat and professional
appearance to members of the public served by the employer . . . and . . . allow
149
patients and visitors to identify the employees.” Allowing workers to adorn
their uniforms with buttons would undermine these purposes by signaling
141. Klare, supra note 92, at 1405.
142. 467 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2006).
143. The hospital’s dress code policy required all employees to wear a uniform while on duty
(gray work shirt and gray pants for carpenters, electricians, and plumbers) and specified that the
only pins permissible were professional association pins and current hospital service award pins.
The hospital made three other exceptions as a matter of practice: in conjunction with the annual
football game between two competing high school teams, employees were permitted to wear the
school colors of the school that they supported; pins relating to the “Great American Smoke Out”
encouraging cigarette smokers to quit smoking were permitted; and during blood drives, employees
were permitted to wear “donor” pins. These exceptions were justified on esprit de corps grounds.
144. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
145. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
146. Ector County Hosp., 467 F.3d at 433 n.10.
147. Id. at 437–38.
148. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 440.
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defiance against supervisors, exacerbating tensions between workers over an
emotional subject, and thus adversely affect “mission, discipline and esprit de
150
corps.” The court also worried about the slippery slope effect of allowing
union buttons on uniforms: “If ‘Union Yes’—and/or ‘Union No’—buttons are
allowed, so must employees be allowed to wear on their uniforms at work
buttons addressing other topics of equal or greater public concern, such as, for
example, ‘Abortion is Murder,’ ‘No Gay Marriage,’ ‘Deport Illegals Now’ and
151
the like,” that would “plainly be deleterious to the Hospital’s mission.”
Refusing to accord any deferential level of protection to labor speech, the court
deemed the hospital’s nonadornment policy “content and viewpoint neutral,”
152
and therefore sustainable.
3. Privacy-Based or Wrongful-Discharge Claims at Common Law
Common law claims made by nonunion workers squarely confront both
the employer’s property rights to manage its business and the presumption that
all employment is at-will. Whether framed as invasion of privacy claims by
current employees or as wrongful discharge claims by workers terminated for
refusing to comply with appearance codes, such claims are typically
153
unsuccessful. This outcome is not unique to the appearance code context; it
154
applies to most employer-promulgated workplace rules.
Appearance
regulation, however, directly links management’s property interest in shaping
and controlling its corporate image and its property-like interest in regulating
the appearance of its workers, particularly in a service sector business. This
linkage creates a powerful elixir of property interests that dictates the outcome
of employee challenges to workplace appearance codes.
In effect, appearance regulations signal the employer’s quasi-ownership of
the worker’s person. As Catherine Fisk observed when discussing George
Steinbrenner’s requirement that Johnny Damon cut his hair as a condition of
signing on with the Yankees, “[i]nsisting on adherence to the dress code says to
the world, ‘you’re my player now and I can make you wear your hair any way I
155
please.’” Corporate branding enforced through appearance regulation expands
the scope of managerial control over the workers’ bodies, in ways that
undermine individual autonomy and identity (such as Johnny Damon, whose
identity as a “marquee player” had become uniquely recognizable to the
156
public).
Nevertheless, because the employer’s property-based business

150. Id. at 447.
151. Id. at 441.
152. Id.
153. See Fisk, supra note 92, at 1127 (arguing for application of a privacy-based analysis to
workplace appearance codes, because imposition of such codes is as much about managerial power
over workers as a group as it is about gender discrimination, but noting that in most states
workplace privacy rights are “narrow and weak”).
154. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 114, at 1023–26 (discussing challenges by individuals to workplace
drug testing policies).
155. Fisk, supra note 92, at 1121. The difference between Johnny Damon and the workers upon
whom we focus in this Article is that, as Fisk points out, professional athletes are well-compensated
for enduring such infringements on their autonomy. Id.
156. Id.
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management and marketing interests intersect with its common-law right to
control and discipline its workforce, courts are likely to uphold such regulations,
even when the appearance regulation is unreasonable and extends substantially
157
beyond the practices of other businesses in the same industry.
The same combination of managerial interests combines to trump workers’
interests in job security, as the wrongful discharge case law demonstrates. In the
next Part, we further examine the common law’s response to appearance code
regulation through the vehicle of the wrongful discharge claims filed in Nevada
158
state court in the Jespersen case.
4. Statutory Sex Discrimination Claims
Statutory challenges to sex-based dress, grooming, and appearance policies
under federal and state antidiscrimination laws have occasionally been
successful. Nevertheless, as a general rule, the courts tend to uphold employers’
159
“reasonable” sex-based appearance regulations under a variety of theories.
Some federal courts have found that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
160
in employment either does not reach sex-specific dress and grooming rules at
161
all, or it does not reach appearance rules that impose only a de minimus
162
burden on one sex. Similarly, some federal courts have concluded that only
employer rules that are based on an immutable trait (such as sex or race) or sex
“plus” a fundamental right (such as religion or the right to marry) can be
challenged under Title VII, and that dress and grooming requirements do not
163
affect either immutable characteristics or fundamental rights. Moreover, sexspecific dress and grooming rules that reflect prevailing community standards
have been found not “discriminatory” under the rationale that an employer has
to take gender into account in order to treat men and women equally in devising
164
appearance regulations. More recently, several federal courts have ruled that
157. For example, one commentator noted that both state and federal courts upheld Harrah’s
right to enforce its sex-based grooming policy even though owners of other casinos and the
president of the Rhode Island Hospitality and Tourism Industry characterized Harrah’s employee
appearance standards as “offensive” and as going “overboard”—outside the norm of employerpromulgated appearance standards for the industry. See Scott Mayerowitz, Harrah’s Draws Criticism;
Employee Appearance Standards Go “Overboard,” PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), July 13, 2004, available at
http://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2004_3rd /Jul04_HarrahsPolicies.html. See infra note 190
and accompanying text (describing Harrah’s grooming policy).
158. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text (discussing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Co., 131 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2004) (unpublished table decision), No. 40587 (Nev. June 7, 2004) (on file
with authors)).
159. Many commentators have argued that the doctrinal approaches by the courts have
significant conceptual failings. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 92, at 1131–36 (discussing failings and citing
commentators). See generally ROBERT BELTON ET AL, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 380–94 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing Title VII challenges to
workplace dress, grooming, and appearance requirements).
160. Title VII § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
161. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc);
Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
162. See Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc. 488 F.2 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908.
163. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091; Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896–97 (9th Cir.
1974).
164. See Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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sex-specific appearance codes are discriminatory only if they impose “unequal
165
burdens” on women and men. The problem, of course, is in determining what
constitutes a “burden” and how burdens should be weighed and compared.
In examining the relative burdens of dress and grooming rules on male and
female workers, courts have sometimes scrutinized the sex stereotypes
underlying the employer’s regulation, upholding sex-specific rules based on
“common” but (presumably) benign stereotypes and invalidating rules based on
166
offensive stereotypes that are demeaning to women as a class. For example, an
employer’s even-handed enforcement of sex-differentiated “professional” dress
and grooming requirements that emphasized a pleasing appearance for both
167
male and female television anchors withstood a Title VII challenge. On the
other hand, it was found to be sex discrimination for a bank to require only
female workers to wear uniforms based on the employer’s sex-stereotyped
assumptions that women (but not men) are not likely to know how to dress in
168
an appropriate “professional” manner for work.
If a court finds that an employer’s express gender-specific dress and
grooming policy discriminates on the basis of sex under one of these theories,
the court will rule that the policy is an unlawful employment practice unless the
employer can defend it as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under
169
section 703(e)(1) of Title VII. The critical question is whether the employer’s
discriminatory policy is “reasonably necessary” to the “normal operation” of the
170
“particular” business—the “essence of the business” test. The Supreme Court
171
has construed the statutory BFOQ defense to sex discrimination “narrowly.” In
addition, the courts have ruled that customer preferences cannot be used as a
172
BFOQ defense to justify sex discrimination. Consequently, employers have a
major hurdle in litigation if they are required to prove that a female-only hiring
practice or a sex-based dress and grooming rule is a BFOQ.

165. See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1985). The EEOC Compliance Manual expressly permits different dress codes for men
and women as long as employers impose “equivalent” burdens on both sexes. EEOC Compliance
Manual § 619.4(d).
166. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality) (finding direct evidence
of an unlawful employment decision based on sex where an employer relied on sex stereotypes in
recommending that a female accountant would have a better chance of becoming a partner if she
would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry”).
167. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215–16 (upholding the district court’s view that a television station’s
“appearance standards were shaped only by neutral professional and technical considerations and
not by any stereotypical notions of female roles and images”); Judith Olans Brown, Lucy A. Williams
& Phyllis Tropper Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid
Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 511 (1996).
168. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
170. Id. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
171. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
172. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389 (“[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether sex discrimination was valid.
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act [Title VII] was meant to overcome.”).
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Defining what constitutes the “essence of the business” for purposes of a
BFOQ defense is not always easy, and these determinations implicate an
employer’s decisions about its business purpose as well as how it will market or
brand its products. For example, if the employer’s business consists of selling
sexual titillation or entertainment, such as in a strip club or Playboy Club, the
employer may discriminate on the basis of sex by hiring only attractive women
as strippers or Playboy “Bunnies” and requiring them, as a part of the job, to
dress and groom themselves (and to appear and behave) in a manner that will
173
be sexually provocative.
In these circumstances, sex-stereotyped (and
sexualized) “branding” of the worker is permissible. On the other hand, where
the “essence” of an employer’s business does not involve sex, the courts have
prohibited requirements that women workers wear provocative clothing or
revealing uniforms that subject them to unwelcome sexual harassment from
174
other employees or customers.
The difficult sex discrimination/BFOQ cases arise when employers hire
only young attractive women for certain service jobs or require female service
workers to wear sexually provocative clothing and glamorous makeup.
Assuming that a court finds the hiring practices or appearance regulations to be
discriminatory, the success of an employer’s BFOQ defense rests on discerning
whether the employer is primarily in the business of selling “sex” or is using
sexual allure to market other services and products, such as a restaurant meal
175
(served by buxom Hooters waitresses wearing tank tops and running shorts)
or airline travel (served by young, sexy female flight attendants in “hot
176
pants”). At least in principle, if not always in practice, sex discrimination
doctrine offers a means to restrain employer branding practices that sexualize
and demean women workers by requiring that they appear, dress, and groom
themselves in sex-stereotyped ways that are not necessary to perform their jobs.
We discuss these issues further below, in conjunction with our case study of
177
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.

173. See Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies, supra note 92, at 157; Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at
301.
174. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“While it may
well be a [BFOQ] for [an employer] to require female lobby attendants in its buildings to wear
certain uniforms designed to present a unique image, in accordance with its philosophy of urban
design, it is beyond dispute that the wearing of sexually revealing garments does not constitute a
[BFOQ].”).
175. For example, see the discussion of Hooters’ attempts to protect its “trade dress” interests in
its skimpy Hooters Girls’ waitress uniforms from a competitor, supra notes 87–90 and accompanying
text. A challenge to Hooters Restaurants’ female-only hiring policies for its front-of-the-house
serving jobs is discussed supra note 90 and infra text accompanying note 555.
176. Flight attendants’ challenges to airline female-only hiring policies, to restrictions on marital
status for female attendants, and to dress codes, appearance rules, and weight limits for female
attendants are discussed infra notes 618–64 and accompanying text.
177. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). See infra Parts IV.C, V.B, VII.B.
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5. A Case Study of Corporate Branding Accomplished Through Appearance
Codes and the Law’s Response
The law’s response to corporate branding has been highly contextual,
differing by industry and by employer practice. Accordingly, discussing
branding in the abstract risks missing the deeper insights available through
study of a more nuanced and contextualized factual setting. In the next three
Parts, we utilize a case study to inform our examination of how the corporate
branding process functions and how work law responds. We chose Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co. for several reasons. First, it has sparked a great deal of
interest among scholars. Second, it offers a useful factual context for assessing
how the practice of branding has evolved as corporations have morphed into
national and multinational enterprises in which both marketing and human
resources practices are centrally controlled, and how these shifts have affected
the gender composition of occupations. Third, Jespersen’s storied travels through
state and federal court offer an unparalleled window onto how the law responds
to individual efforts to resist branding, whether framed as a common law claim
or as an antidiscrimination claim. In addition, although Harrah’s Reno casino
(where Darlene Jespersen worked) was not unionized, other Harrah’s facilities
are. Because Harrah’s grooming code was applied on a corporate-wide basis, an
opportunity existed to frame the legal claims in collective terms, had Harrah’s
union chosen to intervene. These facts provide the foundation for our
consideration in the final section of this Article as to how, if at all, the law’s
response might be different were the resistance to occur at a collective level.
IV. THE JESPERSEN LITIGATION: AN INDIVIDUAL WORKER RESISTS
CORPORATE BRANDING
A. The Facts

178

In August 2000, Darlene Jespersen was terminated from her employment at
Harrah’s casino in Reno, Nevada, where she had worked for over twenty years
as a bartender in the sports bar. She was fired solely because she refused to
comply with a new company-wide grooming policy that required Harrah’s
female beverage servers, including female bartenders and barbacks, to wear
makeup consisting of foundation, blush, mascara, and lipstick. Men working in
these jobs were prohibited from wearing facial makeup of any kind.
Jespersen’s work history at Harrah’s was exemplary. After being hired as a
dishwasher in 1979, she was rapidly promoted to a job as a barback and then
bartender, a position she held until 2000. Her supervisors consistently praised
her work, and her customers wrote that her “excellent service and good attitude
enhanced their experience at the sports bar and encouraged them to come
179
back.” Although she had never worn makeup, she briefly tried using makeup

178. The following facts are taken from the en banc decision, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), the three-judge panel decision, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), the Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), and contemporaneous media
reports.
179. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
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at her supervisor’s request when Harrah’s first instituted a makeup requirement
for female employees in the early 1980s, but she abruptly stopped and never
wore it again. She testified in her deposition that wearing makeup had made her
feel “‘very degraded and very demeaned,’” that it adversely affected her
180
“‘credibility as an individual and as a person,’” and “‘forced her to be
181
feminine’ and to become ‘dolled up’ like a sexual object.” Subsequently,
despite the existence of an informal makeup policy, Harrah’s supervisors
relented and did not require her to wear makeup; Jespersen continued to receive
outstanding evaluations.
In early 2000, Harrah’s instituted a “Beverage Department Image
Transformation” (BDIT) program at twenty of its twenty-six casinos throughout
182
the nation, including the Reno casino where Jespersen worked. “The goal of
the program was to create a ‘brand standard of excellence’ throughout Harrah’s
183
operations, with an emphasis on guest service positions.” The BDIT program
initially had grooming and appearance requirements for beverage servers, called
the “Personal Best” program, which mandated “unisex” uniforms for all
bartenders—consisting of “black pants, white shirt, black vest, and black bow
184
tie” —as well as some sex-based grooming standards about hair, nails, and
185
186
makeup for all beverage servers, which Jespersen agreed to follow.
Harrah’s required the beverage service employees to undergo “Personal
187
Best Image Training” before their final fittings for their uniforms. Following
the training, Harrah’s took both a portrait and a full-body photograph of each
188
employee looking his or her “Personal Best.” These two photographs were
placed in each employee’s personnel file, to be used by supervisors each day “as
189
an ‘appearance measurement’ tool’” to monitor whether the employee was
living up to the new standards. In April 2000, relying on the advice of an image
consultant, Harrah’s amended the “Personal Best” policy to require that all

180. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Jespersen’s deposition testimony).
181. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Jespersen’s deposition testimony).
182. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 7.
183. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
184. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107. The en banc majority in Jespersen referred to the bartenders’
uniforms as “unisex.” Id. at 1112.
185. Id. at 1107. The text of these standards are quoted in Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077 n.1.
186. The policy prohibited male bartenders and barbacks from wearing “[e]ye and facial
makeup,” but said nothing about makeup for female bartenders and barbacks. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at
1077 n.1 (alteration added).
187. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078.
188. Id. Harrah’s “Personal Best” photographs of Darlene Jespersen are available on the Web site
of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/
documents/record2.html?record=1614 (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). In an interview after she was
fired, Jespersen described how she was photographed for her “Personal Best” photos: “I go there
with no make-up. They put on some clear lip gloss. They also wanted to put some powder on my
face so I wouldn’t shine in the photo and I agreed to that because they had done that to some of the
guys for their photos.” Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, GenderPAC National News Interviews
Darlene Jespersen, GPAC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2001 (quoting Darlene Jespersen), available at http://www.
gpac.org/archive/news/notitle.html?cmd=view&archive=news&msgnum=0273 [hereinafter GPAC
Interview with Jespersen].
189. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078.
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female beverage servers—including female bartenders—wear foundation, blush,
190
mascara, and lipstick at all times. Jespersen continued to work without
makeup, and on July 30, 2000, Harrah’s sent her home for violating the
191
“Personal Best” policy, giving her thirty days to apply for another job in the
192
company. Over the next month, she was unable to find another position at
Harrah’s Reno properties that she was qualified to fulfill, that did not require
193
makeup, and that offered compensation comparable to her bartender job.

190.

The amended “Personal Best” policy provided, in part:

All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and
responsive to our customer’s needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the
essential factors of the job as set forth in the standard job descriptions. They must be well
groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with
maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform. Additional factors to be
considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall body contour, and degree of
comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform.
***
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines:

• Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female):
o
o
o

Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire.
Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted;
no large chokers, chains or bracelets.
No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.

• Males:
Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No
colored polish is permitted.
o
Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
o
Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.
Females:
o
Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down
at all times, no exceptions.
o
Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee’s skin tone. No
runs.
o
Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or length.
o
Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.
o
Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
complimentary [sic] colors. Lip color must be worn at all times. (emphasis added).
o
o

•

Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added by court).
191. Jespersen later said, “I was told it was because of the lighting, that the (casino) lighting
washed my face out. . . . But the men didn’t have to do it.” Peter Schelden, Gay, Transgendered Seek
Workplace Equality, SPARKS TRIB. (Nev.), Mar. 17, 2005, available at http://www.nevadalabor.com/
unews/jesprallytrib.html (last visited June 21, 2005). Jespersen argued on appeal that Harrah’s
“has . . . [not] explained how its lighting conditions could operate differently on the faces of male
and female employees.” Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 33
(alteration added).
192. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078.
193. GPAC Interview with Jespersen, supra note 188. According to a news account of a televised
interview on “CBS This Morning,” with Jespersen and Jan Jones, Harrah’s vice president for
communications and government relations, Jones, told the CBS anchor that Harrah’s had “‘over 74
positions’ . . . available to Jespersen which paid the same but did not require makeup. Jespersen
twice refuted [Jones], stating ‘I was reassigned back to personnel. I had 30 days to find another job.
For those 30 days, I was not being paid. None (of the jobs) would support me and makeup would be
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194

Harrah’s terminated her employment on August 10, 2000. Jespersen
subsequently brought two lawsuits against Harrah’s, one in Nevada state court
based on tort and contract law and the other in federal court based on
antidiscrimination law.
B. The State Lawsuit: Common Law Claims
195

Other than a few Nevada newspaper reports, little attention has been
paid to the legal claims that Jespersen pursued in Nevada state court
concurrently with her federal discrimination lawsuit. Jespersen brought three
claims in Washoe District Court against Harrah’s Operating Company: tortious
discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied contract of
continued employment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
196
fair dealing. The district court ruled in favor of Harrah’s motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, following a de novo review, a three-judge panel of the
Nevada Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the lower court
197
in an unpublished decision issued on June 7, 2004.
198
Following Nevada precedent, the Nevada Supreme Court refused to
allow a tort claim for violation of Nevada’s public policy of prohibiting
199
discrimination on the basis of sex where “the Legislature has provided an
200
adequate remedy for injuries of this type.” Moreover, going beyond its
statutory preemption analysis, the court refused to recognize a tort claim for
what must have seemed a rather novel legal claim asserted by Jespersen’s
counsel—that Nevada should recognize “a public policy against gender
stereotyping or generally against employers terminating employees for violating
201
a company policy.” The court observed that Jespersen had not alleged a
“retaliatory” discharge and the “circumstances of Jespersen’s termination are
not so ‘rare and exceptional’ as to warrant recognition of a tortious discharge

an issue again,’ she politely noted.” Andrew Barbano, The True Face of Nevada Gambling, SPARKS TRIB.
(Nev.), Oct. 8, 2000, available at http://www.nevadalabor.com/barbwire/barb00/barb10-8-00.html.
194. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 7.
195. See, e.g., Ed Vogel, Nevada Supreme Court: Court Upholds No-Cosmetics Firing, LAS VEGAS REV.J., June 8, 2004, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2004/Jun-08-Tue-2004/
news/24055099.html.
196. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 131 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2004) (unpublished table
decision), No. 40587, slip. op. at 1 (Nev. June 7, 2004) (on file with authors).
197. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court reviews all cases that are appealed from the trial courts in
nine judicial districts. Since 1999, most cases are reviewed by three-judge panels rather than the full
court of seven judges, which reviews cases en banc twice a year. See The Supreme Court of Nevada,
Overview of the Nevada Supreme Court, http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/info/about/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
198. The Jespersen court cited Chavez v. Sievers, 43 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2002), for the proposition that
the state antidiscrimination statute, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330, “provides a remedy for
employment discrimination to the exclusion of any claims for tortious discharge, at least when the
employee has already recovered tort damages under the statute.” Jespersen, No. 40587, slip op. at 3.
199. Jespersen, No. 40587, slip op. at 4 n.7 (noting that NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233.010 “states that
Nevada’s public policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex”).
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id.
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202

claim in this case.” In other words, employers are generally free to fire or
otherwise retaliate against at-will employees who violate company rules, even if
those rules stereotype employees on the basis of gender. The underlying
assumptions are that gender stereotyping in the workplace is common and not
unlawful, that company rules—regardless of how personally offensive, silly,
stupid, or unlawful they might seem to an employee—are meant to be obeyed
except in (undefined) “rare and exceptional” circumstances, and that a request
that a woman either put on makeup or lose her job, in the circumstances
Jespersen described, was not one of those “rare and exceptional” cases. What the
Nevada Supreme Court described is the essence of employment at will: The
employee must take it (the job on the employer’s terms) or leave it.
Even employment at will can be modified in Nevada by an implied
contract of “continued employment” found in the “circumstances of
203
employment” or “established policies and procedures.” The Nevada Supreme
Court wrote:
Jespersen does not assert that Harrah’s promised to forgo enforcing a
makeup requirement during the entirety of her employment, or not to change or
modify its policy, or that her employment would be terminated only for cause,
or that she would have employment for life or for a specified period of time.
Thus, even if the non-enforcement of the policy did create an expectation that
Jespersen would be continually allowed to forgo wearing makeup, this
expectation is insufficient to convert an at-will employment into one allowing
204
termination only for cause.

Jespersen’s mere “expectation” that the company’s makeup rules did not apply
to her, even considered in light of the facts that led her to form the expectation
in the course of her more than twenty years of employment at Harrah’s, was not
sufficient, as a matter of law, to alter her status as an employee at will. Her
“expectation,” although based on past practices, did not give rise to legal rights.
In addition, because Jespersen’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing depended on a finding that she had an implied
contract of continued employment, that legal claim also failed as a matter of
205
law.
C. The Title VII Lawsuit: Discrimination Claims
1. The Complaint
On October 18, 2000, Jespersen filed a sex discrimination complaint with
206
the EEOC and the Nevada Equal Rights Commission. On July 6, 2001, after
exhausting her administrative remedies, Darlene Jespersen filed a federal civil
rights complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5, 6.
Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 7.
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against her former employer, Harrah’s Operating Company. Jespersen claimed
208
that Harrah’s had engaged in unlawful employment practices under Title VII
by intentionally discriminating against her on the basis of sex. Jespersen’s claim
for disparate treatment was framed under three interrelated theories with
different legal and factual bases. First, she alleged that Harrah’s policy requiring
women, but not men, to wear makeup was “discriminatory per se” because it
imposes different “terms and conditions of employment” on male and female
employees on the basis of their sex, and because it “requir[es] that women
209
conform to . . . sex-based stereotypes as a term and condition of employment.”
210
Second, Jespersen alleged the classic elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case of sex discrimination—that she was a female who “performed her job
satisfactorily” and that she was terminated from employment and replaced by a
211
male who was “as qualified or less qualified” than she was. And third,
Jespersen alleged that Harrah’s had “engaged in intentional discrimination” by
enforcing its makeup policy against her “because of [her] gender and because of
212
its stereotypical views concerning [her] gender.” She asked the court to declare
Harrah’s sex-based grooming policy in violation of federal law and to enjoin its
enforcement. For herself, she sought backpay and frontpay, compensatory and
213
punitive damages, and attorneys fees.
2. The District Court Decision
The district court granted Harrah’s motion for summary judgment on all of
214
her Title VII claims. The court had three rationales for denying her claims for
disparate treatment on the basis of sex. First, noting that “grooming and
appearance standards that have different but equal requirements for men and
women are not violative of Title VII,” the court concluded that Harrah’s
grooming policy “imposed different but equal burdens on both sexes,” because

207. Complaint & Jury Demand, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp.2d 1189 (D.
Nev. 2002), http://www.nevadalabor.com/unews/jespersuit.html [hereinafter Jespersen Complaint].
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
209. See First Claim for Relief, Jespersen Complaint, supra note 207, at 2.
210. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
211. See Second Claim for Relief, Jespersen Complaint, supra note 207, at 3. This claim also
alleged that men who were “similarly situated” to her “were not required to comply with the same
policy, and thus did not suffer the same adverse employment action.” Id.
212. See Third Claim for Relief, Jespersen Complaint, supra note 207, at 3.
213. See id. at 2–3.
214. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1195 (D. Nev. 2002). Jespersen’s
remaining claims were either withdrawn or dismissed and not appealed. Jespersen alleged that
Harrah’s makeup policy had a disparate impact on female employees in violation of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). In response to Harrah’s motion for the court to reconsider its denial of
summary judgment on this claim, the district court on December 4, 2002, dismissed this claim as a
matter of law. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. Jespersen’s Title VII claim of retaliation for both
opposition and participation conduct was voluntarily withdrawn by the plaintiff. Id. at 1190 n.1. In
addition, in response to Harrah’s motion for summary judgment, Jespersen’s pendent state law
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for negligent supervision and training were
dismissed by the district court as a matter of law because of lack of evidence supporting the claims.
Id. at 1194–95.
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“prohibiting men from wearing makeup may be just as objectionable to some
215
men as forcing women to wear makeup is to [Jespersen].”
Moreover, the
policy “allowed women to wear their hair up or down without restriction on
length, but prohibited men from having their hair reach below the tops of their
216
shirt collars.” Second, the court also cited holdings from 1970s circuit court
cases for the “premise” that it is only a violation of Title VII for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of “immutable characteristics,” not aspects of
appearance such as hair styles, dress, or grooming that the employee can control
217
and alter. Finally, the court rejected Jespersen’s claim that, because Harrah’s
grooming policy “negatively impacts women by portraying them in [a]
218
stereotypical manner,” it was unlawful under the sex discrimination analysis
219
adopted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Citing recent Ninth Circuit case law,
the court concluded that Price Waterhouse does not extend to sex-based dress,
220
appearance, and grooming standards.
3. The Ninth Circuit Panel Decision
Jespersen appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the
grant of summary judgment to Harrah’s on her Title VII disparate treatment
claims. In late 2004, a three-judge panel issued a decision affirming the
judgment of the district court, although the majority disagreed with some of the
221
analysis of the lower court and one judge dissented. First, the court agreed
222
with Jespersen’s argument that the district court’s reliance on 1970s cases
holding “that Title VII only prohibit[s] discrimination based on ‘immutable
characteristics’ associated with a worker’s sex” was not a correct statement of
223
the law. The court acknowledged that its “later cases recognized . . . that an
employer’s imposition of more stringent appearance standards on one sex than
215. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192, 1193 (alteration added).
216. Id. at 1192–93.
217. Id. at 1192.
218. Id. at 1194.
219. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
220. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864
(9th Cir. 2001)). The district court in Jespersen articulated the “rule” in Price Waterhouse as being “that
employers cannot discriminate on the basis of sex stereotyping.” Id. There is now a debate in the
federal courts and among legal academics about whether the plurality’s analysis of sexual
stereotyping in Price Waterhouse was a “ruling” of the Court, providing a separate (and rather broad)
basis for a sex discrimination claim, or whether it was merely a statement that evidence of sexual
stereotyping, as a part of an employer’s decision-making process that results in an adverse
employment action, may be used as direct evidence of unlawful discriminatory intent. See, e.g.,
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). For a scholarly critique of the
stereotyping theory, see Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 467, 472–79 (2007).
221. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Judge Wallace Tashima,
joined by Judge Barry Silverman, issued the opinion of the court, and Circuit Judge Sidney Thomas
filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 1083. For a description of the background of the judges in the panel
decision, see Devon Carbado et al., The Story of Jespersen v. Harrah’s: Makeup and Women at Work, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 127–28 (Joel W. Friedman ed. 2006).
222. See Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 12–19.
223. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1080.
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the other constitutes sex discrimination even where the appearance standards
224
regulate only ‘mutable’ characteristics such as weight.”
The “later cases” of the Ninth Circuit that the court relied on were two
class-action sex discrimination claims brought by female flight attendants who
successfully challenged airline sex-based weight restrictions: Gerdom v.
225
226
Continental Airlines and Frank v. United Airlines. The court noted that in both
cases “it was apparent from the face of the policies . . . that female flight
227
attendants were subject to a more onerous standard than were males.” The
Jespersen court concluded that employers violated Title VII only when they
adopted different sex-based appearance standards that impose unequal burdens
228
on each sex. A grooming code that was more burdensome for one sex than the
other constituted disparate treatment that is unlawful unless it is justified as a
229
BFOQ.
The court concluded that Jespersen had not produced sufficient admissible
230
evidence to raise a jury question on the “unequal burdens” test. The court
wanted admissible evidence of “the cost and time necessary for employees of
231
each sex to comply with the policy.” Moreover, the burden of the makeup
policy for women had to be measured in relation to the burdens of all the
grooming requirements for both sexes, “beyond the requirements of generally
232
accepted good grooming standards.”
Jespersen had submitted no evidence to the district court of the cost of
makeup required for a female bartender under Harrah’s policy or the time it
233
would take for her to apply, maintain, and remove the makeup each day.

224. Id.
225. 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
226. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
227. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1080. In Gerdom, the weight limitation applied only to women, and not
to men, because at the time the rule was adopted and enforced, only women were allowed to be
flight attendants. See Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 604. In Frank, the airline, using insurance company sexbased height and weight tables, required female attendants to maintain the “medium” build for
women, but allowed male flight attendants to maintain a “large” build for men. Frank, 216 F.3d at
848.
228. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1080.
229. Id. Because this was a de novo review of the district court’s granting of a summary judgment
motion, the Ninth Circuit panel reevaluated the evidence that had been submitted by the parties
below. Id. at 1079.
230. Id. at 1081–82. The evidence in the record consisted of the grooming policy itself; a letter
from Harrah’s Food and Beverage Manager to its Reno employees; Jespersen’s deposition testimony
about her personal reactions to the makeup requirement; Harrah’s positive performance reviews of
her work over the years, including a 1996 award for “outstanding” work; letters and notes from
Harrah’s customers praising her work; and signed declarations by several members of Harrah’s
management and by the image consultant who had developed the grooming policy. See, e.g.,
Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1191 (D. Nev. 2002) (overruling Jespersen’s evidentiary objections to
declarations submitted by Harrah’s). The letter and declarations were prepared by Harrah’s
employees, Greg Kite and Brent F. Skidmore, Harrah’s Food and Beverage Manager, and the image
consultant, Reimi Marden, the president and owner of The Winning Edge. See Corrected Opening
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 7, 30, 33.
231. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081.
232. Id. at 1081 & n.4.
233. Id. at 1081.
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Although Jespersen’s appellate brief had cited published academic literature
234
that analyzes the high cost of cosmetics and the time it takes to apply them, the
court refused to take judicial notice of this generalized data in the face of no
record evidence of the comparative time and cost burdens of the company’s
policies on male and female bartenders as compared to “ordinary good235
grooming standards.” Nor would the court allow the question to go to a jury
to resolve it based on “simple common sense,” where Jespersen had produced
236
no admissible evidence in support of her factual assertion.
The Ninth Circuit panel majority did not address Jespersen’s appellate
argument that she satisfied the “unequal burdens” test as articulated in Carroll v.
237
Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, a case that the Ninth Circuit had
238
cited with approval in Frank v. United Airlines. Carroll held that a bank that
required female employees to wear uniforms but allowed male employees to
dress in professional attire had discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of
Title VII. The bank’s uniform requirement for only female employees was found
239
to be “demeaning to women” because it was “based on offensive stereotypes.”
Jespersen had argued that Harrah’s, like the employer in Carroll, was requiring
that women “must don a ‘uniform’ consisting of a facial makeover applied with
exacting detail to present an approved image of feminine attractiveness, while
240
men are deemed sufficiently professional and attractive in their natural state.”
Again, before the three-judge panel, Jespersen argued that even if Harrah’s
sex-based grooming policy was valid under an “unequal burdens” test, it was
241
unlawful under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins because it required Darlene
Jespersen to conform to a “stereotypical feminine beauty: a rosy cheek, a
242
darkened eyelash, a fair complexion, a captivating lip color.” Like the district
243
court below, the panel, citing Ninth Circuit precedent, held that Price
Waterhouse gender-stereotyping analysis applied to sexual harassment cases, but

234. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 28 n.4 (citing NAOMI
WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH 120–21 (1991)).
235. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081.
236. Id.
237. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
238. Frank, 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000). For Jespersen’s argument relying on Carroll, see
Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 19–25.
239. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33.
240. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 21.
241. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
242. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 39. A partner at Price
Waterhouse told Anne Hopkins that she could improve her candidacy for partnership in the
accounting firm if she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. The
Supreme Court found this to be evidence of unlawful sex discrimination. Id. at 251. See supra note
166 and accompanying text.
243. In Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), a male waiter whose
behavior did not conform to traditional male stereotypes was permitted to sue his employer for
same-sex sexual harassment under the reasoning of Price Waterhouse. The Nichols court observed,
however, that “[o]ur decision does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII occasioned by
reasonable regulations that require male and female employees to conform to different dress and
grooming standards.” Id. at 875 n.7.
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not to cases involving only grooming and appearance standards. The court
concluded that the “unequal burdens” test was the only test adopted by the
245
Ninth Circuit for sex-based grooming codes.
Judge Thomas dissented, arguing that Jespersen had raised a triable issue
of fact on two theories: (1) that Harrah’s had acted on the basis of unlawful sex
stereotypes, and (2) that the makeup policy “imposed unequal burdens on men
and women, because the policy imposes a requirement on women that is not
only time-consuming and expensive, but burdensome for its requirement that
246
women conform to outdated and impermissible stereotypes.” The dissent was
concerned, in part, about the distinctions of social class that followed from the
majority’s attempt to distinguish Harrah’s use of sex-based grooming standards
from the sex-stereotyped assumptions about grooming that were found
unlawful in Price Waterhouse: “The distinction created by the majority opinion
leaves men and women in service industries, who are more likely to be subject
to policies like the Harrah’s ‘Personal Best’ policy, without the protection that
247
white-collar professionals receive.” Under an unequal-burdens analysis, Judge
Thomas would require an examination of the comparative burdens of each sexbased rule, not a comparison of the effects of the overall standards on men and
women. Significantly, he would prohibit employer dress and grooming
248
standards “that rest upon a message of gender subordination,” not just those
that cost more in time and money.
4. The Ninth Circuit En Banc Decision
On May 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered a
rehearing en banc in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., and, on June 22, 2005,
249
eleven circuit judges heard oral arguments in San Francisco. On April 14, 2006,
the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc decision, with four judges dissenting in two
250
separate opinions. The majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Mary
Schroeder, affirmed the determinations of both the district court below and the
panel majority that Jespersen had not presented sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment under an “unequal burdens” test of Harrah’s grooming
251
policy. But the majority disagreed with the conclusions of the lower court and
the panel majority that sex stereotyped appearance standards can never violate
Title VII. Rather, the court ruled:

244. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1086.
249. Rehearing en banc was ordered in Jespersen, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). At oral argument
before the en banc court, Jespersen’s counsel, Jennifer Pizer, senior counsel of the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., argued, among other things, that “her client was androgynous,
and it was an affront to her to wear makeup.” David Kravets, Court Argues If Employers Can Demand
Women Wear Makeup, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/06/22/state/n170801D13.DTL&hw=jespersen&sn=001&sc=1000.
250. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); id. at 1113
(Pregerson, J. dissenting); id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 1106 (majority opinion).
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With respect to sex stereotyping, we hold that appearance standards, including
makeup requirements, may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for sexual
stereotyping, but that on this record Jespersen has failed to create any triable
issue of fact that the challenged policy was part of a policy motivated by sex
252
stereotyping.

In applying the “unequal burdens” test, the court ruled that, to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory intent in cases involving an employer’s sexbased appearance standards, the plaintiff must produce evidence of the
disparate effects that the policy—considered in its entirety—has on men and
253
women. The court distinguished Jespersen’s situation from the Gerdom and
254
Frank cases, which had invalidated weight restrictions for female flight
attendants, on the grounds that these involved policies that on their face
255
burdened only women. Moreover, whereas the weight restrictions in Gerdom
had also been found to be facially discriminatory because they attempted “to
256
create a sexual image for the airline,” the Jespersen court made the (conclusory)
assertion that Harrah’s “Personal Best” requirements were not “on their face . . .
more onerous for one gender than the other” because they “appropriately
257
differentiate[d] between the genders.” The court also refused Jespersen’s
invitation to take judicial notice of the different burdens for men and women—
in terms of time and cost—of meeting Harrah’s grooming requirements. Because
Jespersen had presented no evidence on this issue, she failed to meet her burden
for purposes of opposing Harrah’s motion for summary judgment.
Jespersen similarly failed to defeat summary judgment on her theory of sex
stereotyping, although the court did “not preclude, as a matter of law, a claim of
258
sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes.” The court
distinguished the facts underlying Jespersen’s sex-stereotyping claim from the
259
facts in Price Waterhouse, by emphasizing that Harrah’s policy “[did] not single
out Jespersen,” and the policy applied to both male and female bartenders, who
all wore the same “unisex” uniforms “while interacting with the public in the
260
context of the entertainment industry.” In addition, the court concluded that—
unlike the situation in Price Waterhouse where a female accountant was expected
“to be aggressive and masculine to excel at her job, but then was denied

252. Id.
253. Id. at 1109.
254. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Frank v. United Airlines,
216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
255. Jespersen, 444 F.3d. at 1109–10.
256. Id. at 1109.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1113. The recognition of the validity of a theory of sex-stereotyping in Jespersen was a
significant change in the Ninth Circuit’s approach to sex-based dress and grooming codes, which
Jespersen’s attorney, Jennifer Pizer, described as a “silver lining” in the court’s decision, which was
“actually a step forward” from its analysis in its panel decision and in prior cases. Analysis of the
Humpty Dumpty Decision from Jespersen Attorney Jenny Pizer: Addendum to the 4-16-2006 Barbwire,
“Humpty Dumpty Justice,” BARBWIRE, Apr. 14, 2006, available at http://www.nevadalabor.com/barb
wire/barb06/docs/barb4-16-06pizer.html.
259. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
260. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12.
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partnership for doing so because of her employer’s gender stereotype” that she
261
should appear and behave “more femininely” —
[t]here is no evidence in this record to indicate that the policy was adopted to
make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image
of what women should wear. The record contains nothing to suggest the
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.
The only evidence in the record to support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen’s
262
own subjective reaction to the makeup requirement.

In response to Jespersen’s argument that the makeup requirement “invites
263
sexualized attention from the public,” the court responded that “[t]his is not a
case where the dress or appearance requirement is intended to be sexually
provocative, and tending to stereotype women as sex objects. . . . Nor is this a
264
case of sexual harassment.” First, because Jespersen was “asked only to wear a
unisex uniform that covered her entire body and was designed for men and
women,” Harrah’s overall dress and grooming policy did not “on its face,
265
indicate any discriminatory or sexually stereotypical intent.” Second, unlike
266
the situations in the Rene and Nichols cases, where the plaintiffs made
actionable Title VII claims based on the “sexual harassment of an employee
because of that employee’s failure to conform to commonly-accepted gender
267
stereotypes,” Jespersen did not allege that Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy
subjected her to a hostile work environment. The court concluded that—faced
with only “the subjective reaction of a single employee” and “no evidence of
stereotypical motivation on the part of the employer”—it could not let
268
Jespersen’s case go to trial under a theory of sex-stereotyping.
Judge Pregersen’s dissent, joined by Judges Kozinski, Graber, and W.
Fletcher, agreed with the majority that Jespersen had failed to produce sufficient
evidence under an “undue burdens” analysis and that dress and grooming

261. Id. at 1111.
262. Id. at 1112. When the en banc majority in Jespersen articulated its views on Jespersen’s
subjective response to wearing makeup, it implicitly invoked both “slippery slope” and “floodgates”
metaphors:
We respect Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and to the image that she wishes to
project to the world. We cannot agree, however, that her objection to the makeup
requirement, without more, can give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title VII. If
we were to do so, we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming,
apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in
conflict with his or her own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.
Id.
263. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 25.
264. Jespersen, 444 F.3d. at 1112.
265. Id. The court distinguished Harrah’s bartender uniforms from the revealing uniform the
female lobby attendant was required to wear in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), which subjected her to offensive stares and sexual comments from men using the building
lobby.
266. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
267. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. See generally id. at 1112–13.
268. Id. at 1113.
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standards motivated by sex-stereotyping can be challenged under Title VII.
Nevertheless, he believed that Jespersen had presented sufficient evidence to
support a claim of sex-stereotyping: Harrah’s fired her for refusing to wear “a
facial uniform (full makeup)” that was required only for female bartenders, and
the company’s image consultants “created a facial template for each woman”
270
and “dictated how and where the makeup had to be applied.” Moreover,
Harrah’s reliance on sex-stereotyped cultural assumptions about whether and
how women should use cosmetics to achieve a “professional appearance” was
sufficient evidence of its discriminatory intent to defeat a summary judgment
271
motion.
In a separate dissent joined by Judges Graber and W. Fletcher, Judge
Kozinski agreed with and joined in Judge Pregersen’s dissent, except for its
conclusion that Jespersen had not produced sufficient evidence of “undue
272
burden” to create a triable issue of fact. Asking “Is there any doubt that
putting on makeup costs money and takes time?,” Judge Kozinski concluded
that the court “could—and should—take judicial notice of these incontrovertible
273
facts.” He also believed it was inappropriate for the court to dismiss
Jespersen’s “discomfort” about wearing makeup as “unreasonable or
274
idiosyncratic.” Judge Kozinski wrote:
Women’s faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable without
makeup: it is a cultural artifact that women raised in the United States learn to
put on—and presumably enjoy wearing—cosmetics. But cultural norms
change . . . . [A] large (and perhaps growing) number of women choose to
present themselves to the world without makeup. I see no justification for
forcing them to conform to Harrah’s quaint notion of what a “real woman”
275
looks like.

V. BRANDING, SEX STEREOTYPING, AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW IN JESPERSEN
A. Creating and Defending the Harrah’s Brand
Why would Harrah’s Operating Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Harrah’s Entertainment (which, by 2006, was “the largest casino operator in the
276
world”), choose to litigate the Jespersen case through several appeals when, at
277
any point, it could have easily made a substantial monetary settlement offer to

269. Id. (Pregersen, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 1114.
271. Id. at 1116–17. See also infra text accompanying notes 449–52(discussing Judge Pregersen’s
dissent).
272. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1118.
276. Peter Edmonston & Michael J. de la Merced, $15 Billion Deal for Harrah’s May Put Other
Casinos into Play, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at C3. See also infra note 355 and accompanying text.
277. To put a potential monetary settlement with Jespersen in perspective with other expenses a
major gaming operator like Harrah’s would have, it is interesting to consider what Harrah’s
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one former service employee? For Harrah’s both the costs and risks of litigating
were high, but the stakes were worth the gamble: Harrah’s Entertainment was
determined to protect its ability to create, maintain, and improve the Harrah’s
brand by regulating the dress, appearance, and grooming of every frontline
service worker. From the beginning of the lawsuit, Harrah’s and its industry
278
supporters in the sales, service, entertainment, and hotel industries viewed the
case as a threat to corporate branding. Harrah’s 2003 brief to the Ninth Circuit
argued that the company’s dress and grooming program “was a comprehensive
initiative to improve the overall service performance of the Beverage
Department, which included the creation of a national brand standard. If one
279
employee failed to comply, the brand standard failed.”
1. “If one employee failed to comply, the brand standard failed.”
The notion that one employee’s failure to wear makeup could destroy
Harrah’s corporate brand, which on its face seems hyperbolic, is explained by
the history of how the brand was created (and is enforced) and how its meaning
has evolved with changes in the form and structure of the corporate
organization. Darlene Jespersen, positioned near the bottom of Harrah’s
corporate hierarchy and bound to the company by her own notions of loyalty
and her pride in her abilities to serve her customers, could scarcely have
understood how her bare, clean face could threaten the Harrah’s brand.
At Harrah’s, the company brand was initially created in 1937 by the
founder of the company, Bill Harrah, and enforced primarily through personal
loyalty to him and his philosophy, but also by the bureaucratic rules and
hierarchies of management he created to run his casinos. After his death in 1978,
and during a period of expansive growth and corporate reorganization, the
bureaucratic ethic and loyalty to the norms and rules of the corporation replaced
280
personal dependence on the founder. By 1998, the enterprise—now a giant
ordinarily spends on “comps” in order to earn and maintain the loyalty of valued customers.
Business writer Robert L. Shook reported that “[i]n the year ending 2002, Harrah’s comped an
estimated $300 million to customers, or about 7.5 percent of the company’s gross revenues . . . .”
ROBERT L. SHOOK, JACKPOT! HARRAH’S WINNING SECRETS FOR CUSTOMER LOYALTY 288 (2003). See also
infra note 371 and accompanying text.
278. Three amici curiae jointly authored a brief in support of Harrah’s Operating Company
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Brief of Counsel for Employment Law Equity
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22340442. The Council for Employment Law Equity
(“CELE”) is a nonprofit organization of major employers in sales and service operations. Id. at 1. The
other two organizations, the American Hotel and Lodging Association and the California Hotel and
Lodging Association, are national and statewide associations that promote the interests of the hotel
and lodging industry.
279. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 34, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22716702. The fact that Harrah’s offered Jespersen her job back
without requiring her to wear makeup belies Harrah’s claim about the effect of one employee’s
noncompliance with the makeup rule on its brand. See infra notes 561–62 and accompanying text. See
also Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (Pregersen, J., dissenting) (noting that “there is little doubt that
[Harrah’s] ‘Personal Best’ policy is not a business necessity, as Harrah’s quietly disposed of this
policy after Jespersen filed suit”).
280. See CHARLES HECKSCHER, WHITE-COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN AN AGE OF
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 19–21 (1995).
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entertainment business—had a new leader, Gary Loveman, an outsider brought
in from the Harvard Business School, who introduced new technologies and
marketing strategies, fired long-time managers and replaced them with
281
professional managers, thereby breaking old ties to the Harrah’s bureaucracy.
What Loveman demanded of his managers and service employees was complete
282
fealty to the corporate mission of creating customer loyalty. Branding, and
enforcing the brand through regulation of service employees, became central to
that mission. Loveman assumed that uniform appearance of the service workers
283
added value to the services they delivered to customers. Moreover, the
assumption underlying the new grooming rules was that they also pleased the
employees, aligning the interests of corporation, customer, and employee for the
284
profit of the corporation.
2. The Cult of Personal Loyalty: Bill Harrah’s Image—Honest, Clean, and
Trustworthy
The company that Darlene Jespersen sued in 2001 was quite different from
the company that hired her as a dishwasher in 1979 and shortly thereafter
promoted her to bartender. The transformation of Harrah’s from an owneroperated local bingo parlor into the world’s largest gambling corporation—
which overlaps, in part, with the twenty years of Jespersen’s tenure as a
Harrah’s bartender—helps explain the disjunction between the views of the
plaintiff and the defendant in the Jespersen lawsuit about the nature of the
employment relationship, about gender relations in the workplace, and about
management prerogatives and employee autonomy. Her story begins not long
after the death of its founder, Bill Harrah, and ends after a number of significant
transformations. During this time, Jespersen was unwittingly caught up in, and
subjected to, changes in corporate operating and marketing strategies, in
technology, in financing and investment, and in management style. All of these
changes were facilitated by changing legal regimes that expanded legalized
gambling outside of Nevada—throughout the United States and on Native
American lands. Many of the changes were underway in the late 1970s, but the
next two decades witnessed significant alterations in the way that Harrah’s ran
its business and managed its employees.
The transformative nature of these developments was perhaps felt most
strongly at Harrah’s Reno casino where Jespersen worked. After opening a small
bingo parlor in Reno, Nevada, in 1937, William F. (“Bill”) Harrah began to build
his gaming and entertainment empire in earnest in 1946 with the opening of his
285
first casino in Reno. Within a decade, Harrah expanded his gaming operations

281. See infra text accompanying notes 360–62, 368–71.
282. See, e.g., SHOOK, supra note 277, at 174.
283. In this, Loveman was following the lead of many other corporate service providers such as
Disney and McDonald’s. See, e.g., KARL ALBRECHT, AT AMERICA’S SERVICE: HOW CORPORATIONS CAN
REVOLUTIONIZE THE WAY THEY TREAT THEIR CUSTOMERS 130 (1988) (discussing the value of
employee appearance at Disney theme parks).
284. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 174.
285. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 11, 21, 315. For a biography of Bill Harrah, see LEON MANDEL,
WILLIAM FISK HARRAH: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A GAMBLING MAGNATE (1981).
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to Lake Tahoe, and by 1962, he had added a 400-room hotel to his Reno
287
casino. The financial success of these expansions was to a great degree assured
288
by the Nevada monopoly on legalized gambling. Unlike the rapidly growing
casino operations in Las Vegas, Bill Harrah’s northwestern Nevada gaming
operations had never been associated with criminals or with underworld
financing, and he had a personal reputation of being honest, meticulous, and
289
above-board in his accounting practices. The enhanced regulatory regime that
Nevada adopted in the 1950s leveled the playing field for casino operators like
Bill Harrah who did not use their casinos to launder money from illegal criminal
activities elsewhere and who eschewed skimming and violent debt collection
290
tactics. Significantly, the Harrah’s name and image was built on the personal
reputation of a man who had no taint of crime and no link to the notorious
291
Italian and Jewish mobsters who made their fortunes on the Las Vegas Strip.
From the beginning, Bill Harrah relied on the image of honesty and
292
respectability he cultivated at his casinos in order to expand his customer base.
Harrah was a strict disciplinarian when it came to punctuality, honesty, and fair
293
treatment of customers. In 1975, he told the new Harrah’s president, Lloyd
Dyer, “[T]he three things I want done are: I want the customer treated properly;
I want the employees treated properly—if we do that we won’t have to worry
294
about unions; and I want the place maintained and clean at all times.” As
Harrah’s company grew, it was able to build on the early reputation of the
Harrah’s name, stressing the distinctions between respectable gaming with
honest employees in the clean, well-lighted environment of his casinos and
crooked gambling with sleazy dealers in the dark casinos that were typical in
295
the early years of Nevada gambling. To increase customer confidence in his
employees, Harrah tended to hire “wholesome young people form places such
296
as Idaho and Utah [who] would present a more trustworthy image.” During
the early years when Harrah’s Lake Tahoe casino was only a summer resort and

286. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 57, 315.
287. Id. at 21, 315.
288. The Nevada monopoly effectively resulted from the 1950 anti-gambling crusade of Senator
Estes Kefauver. See, e.g., DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, SUBURBAN XANADU: THE CASINO RESORT ON THE LAS
VEGAS STRIP AND BEYOND 68–72 (2003); SHOOK, supra note 277, at 112.
289. See, e.g., SHOOK, supra note 277, at 28, 30–31.
290. Nevada established tighter regulatory controls over casinos with the establishment of the
Gaming Control Board as part of the Nevada Tax Commission in 1955, followed by the Nevada
Gaming Commission in 1959. See, e.g., SHOOK, supra note 277, at 41, 112–13.
291. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 103 (“[F]or many observers, Harrah stood out favorably, in
stark contrast to operators of Jewish and Italian extraction with ‘tarnished’ images.”).
292. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 28.
293. Id. at 30–33.
294. Id. at 28 (quoting from interview with Lloyd Dyer, president of Harrah’s from 1975 to 1980,
about Bill Harrah’s “philosophy”).
295. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 29 (quoting Lloyd Dyer about how the “physical atmosphere
of Harrah’s was different than other casinos”); see also id. at 28 (discussing Bill Harrah’s refusal to
hire “shills”—“casino employees who played alongside the real customers”—because even if the
shill did not cheat, “customers might feel that the shills could hurt their odds” and, “[t]o Bill Harrah,
customer perception of other customers mattered a lot”).
296. Id. at 34.
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the Reno casino business surged in summers, Harrah would staff his service jobs
with college students because they were “bright and eager” and “their clean-cut
297
looks presented a sense of trust.”
To create the right look, the appearance of Harrah’s employees was highly
regulated. Business writer Robert Shook observes,
Everyone [on the casino floor] was required to wear a pair of black pressed
slacks and a clean white shirt. The keno girls wore black skirts, and it was
imperative for their stocking seams to be straight. Bill Harrah also insisted that
his people having contact with customers be in good physical condition.
Employees who were excessively overweight were told to shed some pounds or
risk being let go. . . . When senior managers reported to work each morning,
they were required to “weigh in.”
....
It was always easy to spot a new Harrah’s employee on a break from
casino floor because that was the person constantly studying a notebook of
company’s training rules and regulations. In addition to dress codes,
notebook outlined details about hairstyle and the use of cosmetics. Men,
example, were not permitted to have beards.

the
the
the
for

....
The rules were strict, but there were few complaints. . . . Being employed by
Harrah’s was viewed in the community as being somebody special. Harrah’s
employees held their heads high—they were among the elite of casino
298
workers.

Employee appearance reinforced Bill Harrah’s brand message that gaming
at his properties was clean, honest, and reputable. As Harrah’s industry
supporters wrote in their amici curiae brief in the Jespersen case:
From times past there is a perception—more properly a misconception—that
within the gaming industry there is an image often cast in the media as
unsavory. The gaming industry has worked tirelessly to change this image, in
part through dress and grooming standards for its employees that reflect a
professional norm. The cities of Reno and Las Vegas, and employers in the
gaming and resort industries, have made extensive efforts to distance
themselves from the antiquated and archaic perception of gaming
establishments.
....
Harrah’s is a respected name in the casino entertainment industry. It has
carved a niche for itself at the top. Although there may be a lesser expectation of
professionalism at some gaming establishments, there are higher standards of
professionalism, responsibility and appearance for employees at an established,

297. Id.
298. Id. at 35. Harrah’s no longer prohibits facial hair on male beverage servers or bartenders. See
supra note 190 (quoting Harrah’s amended “Personal Best” policy). See generally Harrah’s Operating
Co., Brand Standard Grooming and Appearance, Def.’s Ex. E, at 79, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,
280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (2002) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Harrah’s Brand Standard].
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respected property, such as Harrah’s. Customers expect, and are more
299
comfortable with, employees who reflect such standards.

Bill Harrah’s solid reputation and sound business practices enabled the
company to begin public trading of its shares in the early 1970s, the first “pure
300
gaming company” to do so. Like other casinos that were then corporatizing
301
and merging with national hotel chains, Harrah’s shifted from a privately-held
proprietorship to a publicly-traded corporation in order to raise money for
302
expansions and renovations. Although the ownership of Harrah’s Corporation
was diluted through the public sale of its stock, Bill Harrah continued to be the
303
majority shareholder and exerted his own personal management style and
304
authority on the running of the company and the operations of his casinos.
When Bill Harrah died in 1978, he left a legacy of sorts. In his casinos,
Harrah had both demanded and rewarded the loyalty of his employees. When
Darlene Jespersen began working for Harrah’s Reno Casino in 1979, many of the
managers and supervisors that Bill Harrah had hired and trained when he was
the on-site owner were still employed there. The cult of personal loyalty and the
employment practices he encouraged would have been very much evident in
the behavior and attitudes of the managerial and supervisory employees
305
throughout the casino hierarchy. This cult of loyalty was cemented through
306
the company’s adoption of favorable employee benefits,
routinized,
rationalized management practices, oral promises of “lifetime” job security to
307
managers, written employee handbooks establishing fair procedures for

299. Brief of Council for Employment Law Equity et al., supra note 278, at 18.
300. Harrah’s first sold shares to the public in 1971. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 61–62. This was
made possible by Nevada’s enactment of the Corporate Gaming Acts of 1967 and 1968, which
loosened restrictions requiring all stockholders in gaming establishments to have gaming licenses.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 160; see also SHOOK, supra note 277, at 41. In 1973, Harrah’s was the
first casino to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 62, 315.
301. At the same time, other Nevada casinos were being acquired by major hotel chains. For
example, in 1971, Hilton Hotels, “the first major hotel chain to move into the gaming industry,”
acquired the Las Vegas casino properties belonging to Kirk Kerkorian, including the Flamingo and
the International. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 162. See also SHOOK, supra note 277, at 72.
302. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 114.
303. At the time of his death, Bill Harrah owned eighty-six percent of the company’s stock.
SHOOK, supra note 277, at 73.
304. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 162 (“William Harrah in Reno . . . retain[ed] control over this
operations while offering shares to the general public. Public ownership did not necessarily mean
any major changes in the management or personnel of casinos.”) (alteration added).
305. The cult-like devotion of Harrah’s employees to their company has been compared to that of
Disney World’s and Nordstrom’s employees. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 170–71.
306. In 2000, Harrah’s senior vice president of human resources said: “We pay people well, give
them excellent benefits, and treat them fairly. We also recognize good performance and reward them
for it.” Interview by Robert L. Shook with Marilyn Winn, Senior Vice President of Human Resources,
Harrah’s Entertainment (May 13, 2000), in id. at 274, 313.
307. See, e.g., Yeager v. Harrah’s Club, Inc., 897 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Nev. 1995) (holding that
plaintiff’s “uncorroborated assertions” of oral promises by Bill Harrah and other Harrah’s executives
“that his employment would continue until retirement unless he was terminated for cause” are not
sufficient for purposes of a summary judgment motion to “overcome the presumption of at-will
employment” in Nevada).
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308

discipline, as well as its practice of hiring from within the company, with wellpublicized examples of managers who had worked their way up through the
309
enterprise. As sociologist Charles Heckscher has observed, these paternalistic
corporate structures and practices—”personal dependence” on an “autocratic[,]
. . . successful founder,” “near-guarantees of employment security,” bureau310
cracy, and internal labor markets —both create loyalty from middle managers
311
in corporations and, paradoxically, can lead to instability in the organization.
By the year 2000, when Jespersen was fired, many, but not all, aspects of the
paternalistic norms of loyalty to Bill Harrah’s image and philosophy had given
way to new styles of management and new assumptions about the relationship
between service workers, the customers, and the company.
3. Bill Harrah’s Feminization of Casinos: “A Safe Place to Visit”
Jespersen’s rapid advance from a lowly dishwasher to a position as a
bartender was not unusual for a woman, neither within the culture of Harrah’s
company nor within the community of Reno, but it would have been somewhat
312
unusual in one of the major casinos in Las Vegas at the time. Jespersen worked
as a dishwasher at Harrah’s for about six months and then as a barback for
about six months before her promotion to bartender. During this time, she
313
attended bar school and began her acculturation into the job of a bartender
and the organization of the casino. The operational hierarchy of most casinos at
that time was generally gendered from top to bottom. The casino managers,
shift managers, dealers, pit bosses, floormen, bartenders, and security guards
were invariably men; and women were either entertainers (showgirls), cocktail
314
waitresses, or “change girls,” who made change for the slot machines. In the
1970s, the casinos on the Strip in Las Vegas finally lifted their ban on women
315
dealers. Nevertheless, historian David G. Schwartz notes that “[o]pportunities
for women, as for minorities, began to expand in the 1970s, but it would take
316
years for these changes to become readily apparent.”
The situation for women in Reno was quite different. Schwartz writes that,
in Reno,
308. Id. at 1097 (discussing plaintiff’s claims that his reliance on “written promises in the
employee handbook converted his employment status into termination only for cause”).
309. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 181–86 (discussing the company’s long practice of “hiring from
within”).
310. HECKSCHER, supra note 280, at 19, 20, 24. For a helpful summary of the literature on internal
labor markets, see KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 51–63 (2004).
311. HECKSCHER, supra note 280, at 11.
312. For a discussion of the feminization of the occupation of bartending generally, see infra Part
VI.
313. See Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen, at 12, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. May 22, 2002) (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECR-VPC), available at http://www.
lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/365.pdf.
314. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 57.
315. Id. at 171. See also Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to
Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 65, 67 n.10 & accompanying text (2006) (discussing the
ban on female blackjack dealers in Las Vegas).
316. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 171.
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women made up the bulk of the dealing corps and handled most daily patroncasino interactions. Most contemporary accounts depicted Reno women as
mundane and unglamorous. In [Las Vegas’s] Strip resorts, by contrast, women
employees made their strongest impressions onstage, and they were usually
317
depicted as exotic, desirable, and quite possibly attainable.

Bill Harrah was instrumental in breaking down the gender barrier in Reno
casinos. In his book about Harrah’s business successes, Robert L. Shook writes
that Harrah began hiring women dealers during the 1950s after he noticed that
318
female dealers were working in a competitor’s gambling club. Shook reports
that Harrah responded to the protests of his “old-time employees,” who
“claim[ed] that women couldn’t deal or keep control of the game,” with a
business rationale:
[T]he big thing with women and the reason I did it, was because tourists would
look in, but they wouldn’t come in. I overheard people say that there were no
women in there. We did have cocktail waitresses, but they’d look in and see all
these men standing at the tables and it was kind of scary. But when they looked
in Harold’s Club they could see ladies there, so in they’d go. They figured that if
women were working in the casino, it was a safe place to visit. As far as I was
319
concerned, that’s what convinced me.

So, female employees were good for business, as were fresh-faced, young
employees, hired and retained for their personal qualities of honesty,
320
trustworthiness, and ability to relate to customers. Darlene Jespersen, hired in
her twenties, would have fit these requirements. She would have been
comfortable working as a female bartender in a casino with female dealers on
the floor. Her personal qualities would have been highly valued for a bartender
position. Beverage industry managers generally look for employees who are
“motivated, open-minded, and enjoy working with people,” but above all,
321
322
honest. The fact that she is a big, tall woman no doubt helped her win her
entrée into the bartender position, where her height and physical presence
would be an asset in dealing with intoxicated customers. Her pleasant, cleanscrubbed, open face would have been reassuring and inviting to bar patrons of
323
both sexes. A study of beverage management practices reported that “[o]ne
industry executive looks for, ‘Qualities that cannot always be taught. I push for

317. Id. at 57–58. See also David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5
NEV. L.J. 240, 240 (2004) (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 57–58).
318. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 35.
319. Id. (quoting Bill Harrah).
320. See id. at 193 (discussing Harrah’s “long history of selecting friendly people with a desire to
serve people”). Female dealers were also good for business because they would work for lower
wages than male dealers. McGinley, supra note 315, at 67 n.10.
321. DAVID K. HAYES & JACK D. NINEMEIER, BAR AND BEVERAGE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
63 (1987).
322. Darlene Jespersen has been described as being “big and tall” with “strong hands” and
“project[ing] the calm, commanding, but friendly, presence of an old-fashioned barkeep.” Jon
Christensen, Rouge Rogue, MOTHER JONES, Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 22, available at http://web.ebscohost.
com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=120&sid=79e9fc34-ba19-4fb2-ad09-99ebe4296c00%40sessionmgr105.
Jespersen reports that she is “5 feet 9 1/2 inches” tall. Id.
323. Jespersen has been described as having a “naturally ruddy, clear complexion.” Id.
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speed, efficiency, and courtesy. . . . I also judge them by their appearance. If
324
they’re unkempt, they’re not for us.’” At Harrah’s Reno casino, Jespersen was
not exceptional in being a woman doing a “man’s job,” and she had the qualities
necessary to deliver on the quality of customer service promised by the Harrah’s
name.
Nevertheless, even with Bill Harrah’s feminization of many of the
traditionally male casino jobs, the industry remained highly gendered in Reno
and elsewhere. A study of cocktail waitress jobs in Reno casinos conducted from
1988 to 1995 concluded that the sexualized environment of casinos, including
325
dress codes, contributed to “gender hegemony.” Significantly, the study found
that, although “[b]artending has historically been a male job in the United
326
States” —and by the 1980s feminization of bartending throughout the country
327
328
was well underway, “Reno casino bartenders [were] predominantly male.”
Thus, within the local Reno job market, Jespersen would have been viewed as
holding a “man’s job,” distinguishing her work and status as a bartender from
the predominantly female “beverage servers”—the casino cocktail waitresses.
4. The Rise of the Bureaucratic Ethic and Corporate Loyalty: “A Cookie-Cutter
Employment Policy”
Why would Harrah’s allow Jespersen to ignore its makeup rules for female
beverage servers for so many years and then, suddenly, demand compliance in
329
2000, even if it meant losing a valued employee? A sociological perspective
takes into account the changes in Harrah’s size, structure, management,
marketing, and operations between 1980 and 2000. Charles Heckscher’s 1995
330
study of management loyalty, White-Collar Blues, offers a framework for
understanding this history. He writes, “The historical patterns of motivation, at
least those identifiable in business organizations, are three: personal
dependence, the bureaucratic ethic, and corporate loyalty. The first two have
largely been relegated by their limitations to the waste heap of history; but the
331
third remains dominant in most large corporations.”

324. HAYES & NINEMEIER, supra note 321, at 63.
325. Lorraine Bayard de Volo, Service and Surveillance: Infrapolitics at Work Among Casino Cocktail
Waitresses, 10 SOC. POL. 346, 359–61 (Fall 2003).
326. Id. at 361.
327. See infra Part VI (discussing the feminization of bartending).
328. Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 361.
329. Catherine Fisk has suggested that the answer may lie in an attempt by Harrah’s
management to exert more control over its employees. See Fisk, supra note 92, at 1116–17. Mitu
Gulati observed that this effort was specifically targeted at its unionized facilities in Las Vegas,
where workers were less malleable and more difficult to discipline. Conversation with Mitu Gulati,
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, in Chapel Hill, NC (June 2006). If this account is
true, it is only a partial explanation, which describes a particular response to a local situation. It is
also not very satisfactory in explaining why Jespersen, who worked in Reno, in a casino that was not
unionized, was fired. There is no suggestion that Jespersen was part of an incipient union organizing
campaign. In fact, firing a well-liked, loyal employee like Jespersen might invite an organizing
campaign, which may explain why Harrah’s offered to rehire her and waive its makeup requirement
in her case.
330. See generally HECKSCHER, supra note 280.
331. Id. at 18–19.
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In 1980, not long after Jespersen was hired, Harrah’s was acquired by
332
Holiday Inns, then “the largest lodging company in the world,” which was
333
building a casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Holiday’s acquisition of
Harrah’s company was a logical marriage of its well-established national hotel
business with the burgeoning gaming business. For the next decade, however,
the Harrah’s headquarters stayed in Reno. During this period, the culture of
Harrah’s Reno casino would continue to maintain a degree of local autonomy
within the Holiday Inn corporate structure, balancing the inevitable passing of
the personal style of on-site ownership and management characterized by Bill
Harrah and his loyal, job-trained team of managers against the impersonal
dictates of a distant parent corporate board dealing with multiple properties
throughout the United States with professional managers drawn from both the
334
casino and hotel industries. Inevitably there were clashes between the
corporate cultures of Harrah’s and the much larger Holiday Inns—Holiday Inns
was “more structured . . . , and because of its sheer size, the company had
335
become bureaucratized.”
It was during the early 1980s that Darlene Jespersen, then still a young
woman in her twenties, first encountered Harrah’s grooming code. One
commentator has written that the company “always had a cookie-cutter
employment policy” and that Bill Harrah himself “promulgated appearance
336
rules.” Whether Bill Harrah required or encouraged female beverage service
337
employees to wear makeup is not clear. What is certain is that in 1980, by the
time Jespersen began working at the Reno casino, Bill Harrah was no longer
alive to enforce his appearance rules for frontline service workers and the
merger with Holiday Inns may have affected the way mid-level managers and
frontline supervisors enforced bureaucratic rules. This might have made a
difference when Jespersen was required to get a makeover for work to
demonstrate how makeup would improve her looks, and then, just a few weeks
later was permitted to come to work without makeup. In her Nevada state court
lawsuit, Jespersen alleged that “she had worn makeup for a brief period earlyon in her employment,” but the policy was not enforced even though the “the

332. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 87.
333. Id. at 67–68, 73–74, 315. On February 29, 1980, Holiday Inns acquired Harrah’s, buying out
the six million shares then held in Bill Harrah’s estate for $213 million. Id. at 73. At the time, Holiday
Inns owned 1,600 hotels and was expanding into the gaming business in Atlantic City and Las
Vegas. Id. at 67, 73–74, 315.
334. For example, Schwartz describes “the managerial and operational splicing between hotel
corporations and ‘casino people’ that went on in the 1970s” when Hilton acquired the Flamingo and
other Las Vegas properties. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 162.
335. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 88. See generally id. at 87–91 (describing differences between the
corporate culture of Harrah’s and Holiday Inns in 1980).
336. Barbano, supra note 193.
337. Shook reports that Harrah’s employees were given a “notebook [that] outlined details about
hairstyle and the use of cosmetics.” SHOOK, supra note 277, at 35. The Jespersen en banc decision states
that Harrah’s “maintained a policy encouraging female beverage servers to wear makeup. . . .
[H]owever, . . . the policy was not enforced until 2000.” Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444
F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration added).
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makeup policy had been in place for over ten years.” Indeed, one of the
theories of her state law suit was that “by allowing her to forgo wearing makeup
for over twenty years despite the alleged existence of a handbook policy
requiring its use, Harrah’s impliedly promised not to fire her for noncompliance with a makeup requirement, and she relied on this promise by
339
continuing to work for Harrah’s.”
Rather than an enforceable promise, however, sociologist Charles
Heckscher would describe Harrah’s complicity in Jespersen’s rule breaking as
an example of the workings of the bureaucratic ethic which would permit the
local casino managers and supervisors to interpret bureaucratic rules flexibly in
340
light of the particular situations they encountered. The creation and evolution
of Harrah’s gaming “brand” were critically dependent on the forms of loyalty
Heckscher describes. Today, Harrah’s management ethos could be described as
being in an uncomfortable transition—abandoning total reliance on corporate
loyalty, as well as other forms of paternalistic control, and, in part, embracing
scientific norms that Heckscher refers to as characterizing a “professional”
community, one that is “moving from an inward focus on building capacity to
341
an outward focus on meeting the needs of markets and customers.”
The Nevada Supreme Court, with no prompting from sociologists, of
course found that “even if the non-enforcement of the policy did create an
expectation that Jespersen would be continually allowed to forgo wearing
makeup, this expectation is insufficient to convert an at-will employment into
342
one allowing termination only for cause.”
Under employment-at-will,
employees should understand that managerial consent to deviations from
bureaucratic rules are not promises upon which employees can rely, but are
rather evidence of the smooth functioning of the bureaucracy and the efficacy of
the bureaucratic ethic. Moreover, while Jespersen may have viewed her refusal
to wear makeup as a form of individual resistance to employer control, from a
338. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 131 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2004) (unpublished table decision),
No. 40587, slip. op. at 1 (Nev. June 7, 2004) (on file with authors).
339. Id. at 5.
340. See generally HECKSCHER, supra note 280, at 20–23. Heckscher writes,
The great advantage of the bureaucratic form of loyalty is that it directs members’
attachment not toward an individual, but toward an impersonal task. It therefore allows a
great expansion of the scope of coordination. It requires neither emotional reinforcement
from the leader—the satisfaction comes from a job well done rather than from personal
rewards—nor detailed dictates. The loyal bureaucrat figures out how to carry out the
directions received. . . .
. . . The bureaucratic ethic, in short, leads the employee to do anything asked by the
leader that is proper (by the rules), but not anything that is improper.
Id. at 21.
341. HECKSCHER, supra note 280, at 145, 173. Heckscher writes,
The ideal image in the dynamic companies [which he studied] . . . is a voluntary
coming together of individuals with commitments and an organization with a mission. This is
the relationship that I have referred to as a “professional” one, forming a community of
purpose. It is not a full reality anywhere, but it is in some places an ideal shaping
definitions of who owes what to whom.
Id. at 145 (alteration added).
342. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 131 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2004) (unpublished table decision),
No. 40587, slip. op. at 1 (Nev. June 7, 2004) (on file with authors).
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management perspective, her resistance was co-opted in the 1980s and
transformed into an opportunity for the corporation to display the flexibility
and autonomy of the local managers and to cement her loyalty to the company.
From 1980 to 1990, Holiday Inns, now renamed Holiday Corporation,
343
expanded its hotel business into the all-suite and extended-stay hotel market,
while Harrah’s looked for new markets in order to remain competitive in the
344
now-corporatized casino industry. In 1990, further corporate reorganization
345
resulted in Harrah’s coming under the umbrella of Promus Companies.
Shortly thereafter, Harrah’s relocated its headquarters from Reno to Memphis,
346
the “birthplace and hometown of Holiday Inns.” Under the leadership of the
new president and CEO of Promus, Philip G. Satre—an attorney who joined
Harrah’s shortly after Bill Harrah died, Harrah’s reasserted its competitive
posture in the Las Vegas gaming market by renovating the Holiday Casino in
347
1992 and renaming it Harrah’s Las Vegas. With the loosening of anti-gaming
laws in other states, Harrah’s then began a period of unprecedented expansion,
building new casinos throughout the South and the American heartland,
348
wherever state gaming regulations and local politics permitted. Even the
Native American gaming market, which other casino operators viewed as
unwelcome competition, drew Harrah’s interest: Between 1994 and 1998,
Harrah’s opened casinos in partnership with Native American tribes on their
349
lands in Arizona, North Carolina, and Kansas. In the midst of this rapid
expansion, in 1995, Promus spun off its hotel assets into a new corporation and
350
renamed the remaining Harrah’s assets Harrah’s Entertainment. In addition to
building new casinos, Harrah’s Entertainment continued its growth through
351
acquisitions of other casinos. Through the 1990s Harrah’s went from owning

343. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 316.
344. In 1988, Harrah’s opened a new casino in Laughlin, Nevada, defying the trend of building
up and out in Las Vegas and along the Strip, and of locating casinos in destination locales. Id. at 103,
139–40.
345. Holiday Corporation sold its Holiday Inns hotel business to Bass PLC, and placed its
remaining properties—including Harrah’s, Embassy Suites, Hampton Inn, and Homewood Suites—
under a new entity, Promus Companies. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 140, 316. For a history of the
Promus Companies, see generally TAKIA MAHMOOD & STEPHEN P. BRADLEY, HARV. BUS. SCH., CASE
STUDY NO. 9-795-039: THE PROMUS COMPANIES (1995).
346. Harrah’s headquarters remained in Memphis until 1999. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 161.
347. Id. at 70, 316.
348. Harrah’s opened a riverboat casino in Joliet, Illinois, and casinos in Vicksburg and Tunica in
1993; casinos in Shreveport and North Kansas City in 1994; a second casino in Tunica in 1996, a
second riverboat casino and hotel in North Kansas City in 1996; and a riverboat casino in Missouri in
1997. See id. at 317; see also MAHMOOD & BRADLEY, supra note 345, at 3–5.
349. In 1994 Harrah’s opened Harrah’s Ak-Chin casino on Indian land outside Phoenix. This was
followed in 1997 by Harrah’s Cherokee Smoky Mountains on Native American land in North
Carolina and in 1998 by Prairie Band outside Topeka, Kansas. See SHOOK, supra note 277, at 317–18;
see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 182–83, 186–92; SHOOK, supra note 277, at 115–16 (discussing the
effect of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on development of new casinos).
350. Once again, as in 1980, the Harrah’s name was listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
SHOOK, supra note 277, at 97.
351. Harrah’s Entertainment acquired Showboat in 1998, which then owned casinos in Atlantic
City, New Jersey; East Chicago, Indiana; Las Vegas; and Sydney, Australia. SHOOK, supra note 277, at
147, 318.
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five to fifteen casinos, and from managing 5,000 to 30,000 employees, putting
further strain on the enterprise.
In 1999, Harrah’s Entertainment again moved its headquarters, this time
from Memphis back to Nevada, to the heartland of the gaming industry, Las
353
Vegas.
Through these periods of growth, transition, and geographical
dislocation, the Harrah’s brand—linked to the gaming enterprise built by Bill
Harrah—risked being diluted and submerged by competing demands for
employee loyalty to different corporate entities with different missions designed
to serve different consumers. To succeed, a mid-level manager would have to
follow the corporation, moving to new communities and submerging his or her
354
individual identity into the corporate image. Jobs of service employees, too,
could become casualties of the rise of corporate loyalty as supervisors and
managers were fired and replaced, both diminishing the significance of ties of
personal loyalty up and down the hierarchy and devaluing the importance of
the experience and local knowledge possessed by long-time frontline service
workers.
When Darlene Jespersen began working for Harrah’s in 1979, the company
owned just two casinos in northern Nevada and was run very much in the way
it had been during Bill Harrah’s lifetime. The company’s headquarters was in
Reno. Not long after she became a bartender, the significant changes in
corporate ownership had begun—the buyout by Holiday Inns, the move of its
headquarters to Memphis, the Promus merger, followed by the rapid
nationwide expansion of new Harrah’s casinos during the 1990s. By the time she
was fired, in 2000, the company owned twenty-six casino properties in thirteen
states and one foreign country. Her employer, now Harrah’s Operating
Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Harrah’s Entertainment, had been
bought, submerged within a larger corporation, repackaged, and disbursed
throughout the nation. Though Harrah’s Entertainment was not yet the largest
gaming corporation in the world, it was then well on its way to that outcome,
355
which occurred in 2005, when Harrah’s bought Caesar’s Entertainment.
Harrah’s went from local and personal ownership with on-site
management and control to disbursed, impersonal ownership with

352. VICTORIA CHANG & JEFFREY PFEFFER, STAN. GRAD. SCH. BUS., CASE STUDY NO. OB-45: GARY
LOVEMAN AND HARRAH’S ENTERTAINMENT 3 (2003).
353. At the time, Harrah’s Entertainment acquired the Rio All-Suites Casino in Las Vegas “with
the intention of owning one of the premier resort casinos in Las Vegas.” SHOOK, supra note 265, at
253.
354. Heckscher, drawing on the work of other sociologists, such as William Whyte in The
Organization Man, describes the “mechanisms” that corporations use to enforce corporate loyalty,
which include the following: “policies of frequent geographic transfers, which had the effect of
weakening competing ties to other communities and friends; codes of presentation that defined the
‘right’ kind of behavior; rituals of passage that reinforced the company image; an ideology of being a
good ‘member of the team.’” HECKSCHER, supra note 280, at 24.
355. According to Wikipedia, “[t]he merger [with Caesar’s] made Harrah’s the largest gambling
company with over 4 million square feet (370,000 m2) of casinos, almost 100,000 employees and over
40 casinos.” http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrah%27s_Entertainment (alteration added)
(last visited Aug. 11, 2006). At the time of the merger, the prior year’s combined revenue of the two
corporations was $8.75 billion. Daniel McGinn, From Harvard to Las Vegas, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 2005,
at 32.

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

70 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

Volume 14:13

2007

geographically distant, professionalized management and control. These
changes would have necessarily reduced the autonomy and power of the
managers of individual casinos. As the corporation grew and added new
properties, the consolidation and centralization of human resources and
marketing decisions would inevitably reduce the distinctiveness of each casino
in these areas. In particular, the idiosyncratic workplace culture of Harrah’s
Reno Casino where Jespersen worked—which once reflected the personality of
its founder, Bill Harrah, the character and history of the city of Reno and its
casinos (in opposition to Las Vegas and the Strip), and the attitudes of a devoted
(and nonunion) workforce—would be subject to pressures to conform to the
new reality of a massive, national (even global) corporation selling a branded,
homogenized product that looked the same from Topeka to Tunica, or from
Lake Tahoe to Atlantic City.
During Harrah’s rapid expansion, the company tried to improve the
Harrah’s brand and attract new customers. A 1995 Harvard Business School case
study of Promus Companies observed, “Each Harrah’s property was quite
different. . . . In 1994, Harrah’s developed brand standards for the signage,
356
entryways, safety features, and the overall feel of its properties . . . .” Then, in
2000, Harrah’s adopted and began to enforce new, stricter brand standards for
the appearance of its frontline service workers, a shift in marketing strategy that
flowed from further changes in the corporate leadership, structure, and mission,
as well as uses of technology. Quality customer service has always been a
significant component of the Harrah’s gaming experience, but employee
appearance, like signage, also delivers the corporate brand to customers.
Branding means holding supervisors and managers accountable for the hiring
and retention of employees based on their “brand delivery competence”—not
only their ability to perform their jobs, but also whether they are “the type of
357
person who will best deliver the brand’s promise.” Darlene Jespersen was
fired because Harrah’s assumed that, without makeup, she could not deliver the
uniform, professional brand of gaming experience promised by the Harrah’s
name.
5. Technology and Marketing: Gary Loveman Focuses on Harrah’s Branding
Technology and innovative marketing strategies implemented in the late
1990s speeded up the change in how Harrah’s ran its casinos, as well as how it
thought about and treated its customers and employees. In 1997, Harrah’s began
358
its “Total Gold” program, a computerized database that permitted the casinos
to track customer gambling activity and offer rewards to patrons at various
levels of play at all Harrah’s gaming locations—similar to receiving “free” miles

356. MAHMOOD & BRADLEY, supra note 345, at 11.
357. BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 13, at 158. Barlow and Stewart describe the practice of
Abercrombie & Fitch of hiring “good-looking and young” college students “who look like its catalog
models” as an “extreme” example of hiring for “brand delivery competence.” Id. See supra notes 44–
46 and accompanying text.
358. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 318; see generally id. at 216–43 (discussing Harrah’s use of
technology for customer tracking). In 1998, Harrah’s received a patent on its Total Gold tracking
program, which it called its “National Customer Recognition System and Method.” Id. at 318.
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from an airline “frequent flyer” program or points toward awards for using a
359
particular credit card. This tracking and reward system was taken to a new
level of sophistication after Gary Loveman joined Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc.,
360
in 1998 as its chief operating officer. Unlike the Harrah’s managers who came
up through the gaming industry, Loveman, an M.I.T.-trained economist, left a
position as an untenured associate professor at Harvard Business School, where
he had taught Service Management, consulted for large businesses like Disney
361
and McDonald’s, and wrote about how corporations could improve profits in
362
service industries.
Harrah’s became a giant laboratory for Loveman to test out his marketing
and management theories: He would be managing “15 casinos with more than
363
10,000 hotel rooms, and over 35,000 employees.” In 2000, Loveman recalled his
decision to move from academe to industry:
[A]fter nine years of telling people how they ought to do something that I’ve
never done myself, I had the desire to see if I could actually do it and make it
work. [Harrah’s] offer was the right challenge, because the company wasn’t
doing what I thought it should do, so now I had the opportunity to do the job
364
right.

Doing it “right” meant, in part, implementing ideas in an article he co-authored
365
at the Harvard Business School: “Putting the Service-Profit Chain to Work.”
The thesis of the article was that successful service managers of the 1990s
“understand that in the new economics of service, frontline workers and
366
customers need to be the center of management concern.” Drawing on
examples from successful service companies like Southwest Airlines and Taco
Bell, the article demonstrates how “innovative measurement techniques” can
quantify the relationship between “employee satisfaction, loyalty, and
367
productivity” and “the value of products and services delivered.”
In order to improve Harrah’s “service-profit chain,” Loveman “overhauled
Harrah’s marketing, replacing the industry veterans with customer-relationship-

359. See id. at 144–45.
360. See id. at 318.
361. Id. at 175.
362. Loveman received a B.A. in economics from Wesleyan University and was an Alfred Sloan
Doctoral Dissertation Fellow at M.I.T. where he earned a Ph.D. See Corporate Governance—
Biography—Gary Loveman, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and President, http://investor.
harrahs.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84772&p=irol-govBio&ID=143793 (last visited Aug. 8, 2006); CHANG
& PFEFFER, supra note 352, at 2; see also Julie Schlosser, Teacher’s Bet, FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 8, 2004, at
19 (cataloguing Loveman’s educational history).
363. CHANG & PFEFFER, supra note 352, at 1.
364. Interview by Robert L. Shook with Gary Loveman, CEO, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., (July
18, 2000), quoted in SHOOK, supra note 277, at 178, 307.
365. James L. Heskett et al., Putting the Service-Profit Chain to Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr.
1994, at 164.
366. Id. at 164.
367. Id.
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management ‘rocket scientists.’” He also transformed the Total Gold program,
which he described as “a customer-recognition rewards program,” into the Total
Rewards program, which he described as “a loyalty program” that created
“loyalty incentives” for customers to do more of their gaming at Harrah’s
369
properties. One aspect of the transformation of the Total Gold program in 2000
into the Total Rewards program was to take away from individual property
managers and certain other casino employees the discretion to “comp” guests.
In 1999, Loveman believed the way of dealing with the “fickleness of gamblers”
who, “[w]hen they are on a losing streak[,] . . . tend to head for the exits to try
their luck elsewhere,” was “to stem the exodus by giving even low-level
employees the authority to dole out coupons for free drinks, chips and the
370
like.” But Loveman understood the risks of placing the discretion and
judgment about the amount of comping within the authority of Harrah’s
employees, particularly low-level employees. In a 2000 interview, Loveman said:
There’s an emotional attachment between a purchaser and a provider that exists
with great brands in the automotive, cosmetics, garment, and pharmaceutical
industries. We want the same sort of thing to exist with all of our brands in our
business. Each year, we give back in excess of $300 million to our customers in
what is referred to as reinvestment, or, in this industry, comps or givebacks.
This process is rife with lack of sophistication. It’s done in a careless and costly
fashion. Our objective is to improve it, and by doing so, we can make
371
considerably more money.

With the growth in both the number of casinos under Harrah’s ownership
and management, and the increase in the number of customers served, Loveman
believed that to compete effectively in the gaming industry, Harrah’s needed to
rationalize comping. In effect, the Total Rewards program took information
about each customer’s age, sex, home address, gaming habits and history, and
their consumption preferences—for restaurants, hotel accommodations, spa
treatments, golf, whatever—away from employees and placed it under control
of the corporation. Harrah’s customer database grew from 5.3 million customers
372
in 1995, to 23 million customers in 2000, and 26.6 million customers in 2002.
Business writer Robert Shook described the significance of this shift:
Under the old business model that was used in the casino industry for years,
customer relationships were limited to individual employees who worked with
a small number of key customers. However, with the growth and increase in
number of Harrah’s properties, that business model no longer worked. The old
method had still another flaw—customer loyalty was to an individual employee

368. Interview by David O. Becker with Gary Loveman, CEO, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc.,
quoted in David O. Becker, Gambling on Customers, MCKINSEY Q., Feb. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.marketingpower.com/content17906.php (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
369. Id.
370. Roy Furchgott, Private Sector; Practicing What He Preaches?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, § 3, at 2.
371. Interview by Robert L. Shook with Gary Loveman, CEO, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (Sept.
28, 2000), quoted in SHOOK, supra note 277, at 292, 313.
372. Becker, supra note 368, at Ex. 3.

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

BRANDED

73

as opposed to the company. Today, the customer receives value from the
373
company that is delivered by employees.

This approach to comping enables Harrah’s to spread incentives and
rewards to customers at all levels of play—from the high roller playing baccarat
in Las Vegas to the grandmother playing the dollar slot machines in East
374
Chicago, Indiana —and at all Harrah’s properties. The technology also
permitted another Harrah’s innovation: “cross-marketing” of Harrah’s brand. In
an interview in 2000, Phil Satre recounted what he and Harrah’s head of
strategic marketing had learned from their player tracking data collected in the
late 1980s:
First, we had customers who gamble at multiple locations. Our Atlantic City
customers come to Las Vegas. Our Reno customers go to Lake Tahoe, and so on.
Second, . . . we estimated 25 percent of our regular Atlantic City customers make
an annual pilgrimage to Las Vegas. This planted a seed that there was an
opportunity to create a loyalty marketing program to establish relationships
375
with customers who bridge multiple gaming environments.

When he became chief operating officer in 1998, Gary Loveman worked on
building the Harrah’s brand by “orienting the company toward influencing
376
consumer choice.” Loveman described gaming branding:
I’ve always been fascinated by the power of brands to influence consumer
decisions. The gaming business is a service that provides deep enjoyment.
People are very caught up in gaming. . . . [I]t’s every bit as personally rewarding
as fragrances, fashion, automobiles, resort destinations . . . . We could step up by
creating a national gaming brand, and no one else could. We operate 26 casinos
in 13 states, and with a brand we could influence players to visit a casino close
377
to them or to come visit us anywhere, coast to coast.

With cross-marketing and branding, Harrah’s was attempting to create a
distinctive, predictable, uniform experience at every Harrah’s casino through the
delivery of a certain type and style of customer service that would be instantly
recognizable at every Harrah’s property, despite the differences in the niche
markets that they had historically tended to serve. In the past, the general
manager of a particular casino would have attempted to build on the
distinctiveness of his own casino and its geographic location, treating his casino
as a profit center for himself (as well as the company) by nurturing customer
378
loyalty to him, his staff, and his casino. Loveman wanted to break these
373. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 226.
374. Harrah’s research on its customers identified its target market as an “avid experience
player” or “AEP,” who “typically has an annual budget of $1,000 to $5,000 to payroll his recreational
gaming activities.” Id. at 138.
375. Interview by Robert L. Shook with Phil Satre, CEO, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (July 18,
2000), quoted in id. at 142.
376. Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra note 368.
377. Id.
378. The use of male pronouns here is intentional. Harrah’s did not hire a female general
manager until 1994, when Janet Beronio became manager of the Harrah’s Ak-Chin casino, one of the
Native American casinos that it partnered with. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 182. By the time Loveman
was on board, the managers were no longer all male, but a female general manager was a rarity and
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personal ties to particular persons and locations, and replace them with ties to
the Harrah’s brand—the gaming experience at any Harrah’s location in the
nation. The transformation required that Loveman bring his general managers
into line with the new way of looking at customer loyalty, so he replaced a few
general managers, including the manager of Harrah’s Reno casino where
379
Jespersen worked. Reflecting on his many changes in management personnel,
Loveman later commented: “We also proved to the property general managers
that our approach would work, starting with the early experiments we ran in
December 1998. As operators, property managers are greedy buggers. If
something works and they can make more money, they’ll get on it at some
380
point.”
The role and authority of the casino general manager changed in other
ways as well. Previously, the general manager of a particular casino essentially
“ran his own show,” in part because “the consensus was nobody knew his
381
customers better than the boss who worked every day in the trenches.” Even
under Phil Satre’s leadership of Harrah’s from 1993 to January 2003, the
management of each casino was still somewhat decentralized.
Although everything [in 2002] is centralized, the casino general manager is still
boss of his own show. He may receive his orders from the home office, but he’s
clearly in charge of his property. In this respect, corporate management plays an
advisory role, providing support in areas such as human resources, law,
382
marketing, public relations, and technology services.

Loveman and his Total Rewards program challenged these assumptions. In an
interview in 2003, Loveman, by then the CEO and president of Harrah’s
Entertainment, said,
We . . . collect a tremendous amount of information on what players do with
us. We know when you arrive at a casino, what you do there, and when you
leave. We have information on 26 million customers. And we measure
everything. . . . When our employees use the words “I think,” the hair stands up
on the back of my neck. We have the capacity to know rather than guess at
383
something because we collect so much information about our customers.

Under Loveman, compensation for general managers became linked to the
384
results of surveys of customer satisfaction at their casinos. More importantly,
final authority and autonomy in hiring and firing decisions was shifted from the
general manager to corporate headquarters in Las Vegas. Loveman said,
no woman was heading up any of the major corporate-owned casinos. Id. As of October 2006,
however, three of the ten senior vice presidents of Harrah’s Entertainment were female: Jan Jones,
Senior Vice President, Communications and Government Relations; Ginny Shanks, Senior Vice
President, Brand Management; and Mary Thomas, Senior Vice President of Human Resources. See
Harrah’s Entertainment, Corporate: Investor Relations—Management Team, http://investor.
harrahs.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84772&p=irol-aboutusManage (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
379. CHANG & PFEFFER, supra note 352, at 9.
380. Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra note 368.
381. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 161.
382. Id. at 161–62.
383. Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra note 368.
384. Becker, supra note 368.
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I wanted to instill the notion that jobs didn’t belong to people; jobs belong to a
company.
....
. . . I had a lot of bloody battles where I’d have to tell a general manager to
fire this person tomorrow or I would do it myself. It was ugly. I mean, for a long
time there was a lot of antipathy among a lot of people, and it continues to some
degree to this day. It was a big change in the history of Harrah’s. People say this
used to be a safe, family company, and now that damned professor has turned
this into a place where nobody can feel safe. And there’s an element of truth to
385
that, because it is results that make any of us safe.

The diminution in the authority of the general manager at each casino had
consequences throughout the supervisory hierarchy. When Darlene Jespersen
was fired, her supervisor was just carrying out orders. Jespersen said,
The supervisor said this was a corporate decision. I said this has nothing to do
with my job, and I’m not doing it. It’s degrading. I said, I’m 44 years old and I’m
tired of being told how to look and dress. I’m tired and I’m not doing it, not
after you let me do this for 20 years. I could tell the supervisor was concerned
386
about my job.

Jespersen’s supervisor may have been “concerned” about her job and may
have been reluctant to enforce the Harrah’s new “Personal Best” policy, but the
Harrah’s management structure under Loveman would not have permitted a
supervisor to make exceptions to corporate policies. Ironically, the personal
loyalty that had developed between Jespersen and her customers, as
demonstrated by the fact that some of them referred to the sports bar in
387
Harrah’s Reno Casino where she worked as “Darlene’s Bar,” was precisely the
type of personal loyalty that Loveman was trying to break down and replace
with loyalty to the Harrah’s brand. Employees had become commodified as part
of the product that Harrah’s sold—a particular type of gaming experience—as
well as part of the delivery system for that product. As Loveman said: “[W]e
focus on just one thing: a great gaming experience. We are not primarily for
families or for destination getaways. We’re a gambling joint. We’re there for
388
people who want to gamble, and that’s where we wanted to center the brand.”
Because of the importance of cross-marketing between Harrah’s properties, it
was therefore important that employees in certain positions—delivering the
branded experience through certain services—have a uniform look at all
389
locations in addition to uniform training.
385. Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra note 368.
386. Gender Public Advocacy Coalition interview with Darlene Jespersen (Jan. 17, 2001), quoted
in Serafina Raskin, Sex-Based Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition
Against Gender Stereotyping, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 258 (2006).
387. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 5.
388. Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra note 368.
389. Regarding training of service employees, Loveman noted that, under his leadership, he
instituted a company-wide training program “for the first time in the company’s history,” which
“every single employee attended,” including tipped employees who were paid their “tipped wages”
in order to create incentives to attend. The training programs were run “24 hours a day” to
accommodate employees on all shifts. Loveman said: “At the Rio, in Las Vegas, for example, we ran
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Consultant—

To achieve the appropriate look for its employees, Harrah’s turned to an
outside expert, much as it had turned to outside experts to transform its
390
approach to marketing and operations. Harrah’s contracted with The Winning
Edge, a Las Vegas company, which advertises on its Web site that it is “one of
the leading image consulting and corporate training firms in the gaming and
391
hospitality industry.” The company, founded by its owner Reimi Marden in
392
1991, is one of hundreds of companies throughout the world that now offer
image consulting to individuals and business, for fees that in 2006 could range
up to $350 an hour for an individual consultation and up to $10,000 for a full393
day seminar. The Harrah’s “Personal Best” makeovers for its beverage servers
394
and bartenders were “supposedly worth $3,000 each.” Whatever amount
Harrah’s paid on its contract with The Winning Edge in 2000 per employee or
per casino for developing its appearance policy and training employees, it was
clearly substantial, and the corporation no doubt viewed the expense as a
worthwhile investment in improving its brand as part of Harrah’s strategy to
gain a competitive advantage in the gaming industry. Moreover, Harrah’s
corporate headquarters would likely have viewed any single employee’s refusal
to conform to the new grooming rules as evidence of disloyalty and even as
grounds for discipline or discharge.
Harrah’s, to be sure, has been enormously successful in its marketing and
operating strategies. Its investment in intellectual property—e.g., its patented
Total Rewards program—rather than in themed casinos like Circus Circus has
given it a significant competitive advantage in the gaming industry. Even its
“Harrahized” employees—deskilled, uniformed, constantly monitored and
measured—have seemed rather content with their good pay, good benefits, and
200 sessions with 20 people in each to get through 4,000 employees in just five months. At the end of
the program, you had to pass a test—otherwise you could not keep your job. You can imagine the
anxiety that percolated through the system.” Becker interview with Loveman, quoted in Becker, supra
note 368.
390. See id. (“We get field and corporate people together with outside experts, build the stuff,
and than make it mandatory throughout the company.”). See also supra text accompanying note 368.
391. See The Winning Edge, About The Winning Edge, http://www.the-winning-edge.com/
about.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter About The Winning Edge]. Harrah’s “Grooming
and Appearance” policies include the following: “Brand Operations has contracted with The Winning
Edge, a national Image Consulting firm located in Las Vegas, to set up and monitor Personal Best
image training for each property including a ‘Train the Trainer’ element to develop property
Personal Best Image facilitators.” See Harrah’s Brand Standard, supra note 298. For The Winning Edge
clients, see The Winning Edge, Client List, http://www.the-winning-edge.com/clients.php. The list
includes properties owned by Harrah’s major gaming competitors, MGM Grand Hotel & Casino,
Bellagio Resort & Casino, and the Mirage Hotel & Casino, as well as the U.S. Army, Nevada Power
Company, Nevada Welfare Division, and various other firms, including a Washington, D.C., law
firm, several major banks, auto dealers, manufacturers, and a high school faculty.
392. See About The Winning Edge, supra note 391.
393. See Association of Image Consultants International (AICI), Finding Image Consultants,
http://aici.org/find/finding.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
394. Barbano, supra note 193. According to a news report, in 2000 female employees at Harrah’s
St. Louis casino “were given $50 in gift certificates for makeup and salon services.” Mayerowitz,
supra note 157.
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395

Employee turnover, which is
opportunities for internal advancement.
396
generally high in casinos and in the food and beverage industry, dropped
397
under Gary Loveman. To low-skilled workers with no or limited post-high
398
school education, Harrah’s frontline service positions may look like very good
entry-level jobs.
The story of the changes in Harrah’s marketing and operations between
1980 and 2000, and their effects on the Harrah’s service employees, is not new. It
recalls the consequences of the deskilling of work in the steel industry in the
early twentieth century and the introduction of scientific management, new
technologies, and new workplace rules throughout manufacturing and retail
businesses, all of which reduced worker autonomy and control. Gary Loveman’s
mock horror at the idea that his employees might have the discretion to “think”
is reminiscent of how Frederick Taylor might have reacted a century ago to Big
Bill Haywood’s trenchant observation that “the manager’s brains are under the
399
workman’s cap.” Harrah’s goal of replacing customer loyalty to individual
Harrah’s employees with loyalty to its brand is being accomplished by creating
a uniform and gendered “Harrah’s” look for frontline service workers, by
removing discretion to award even small comps from its low-level employees
and replacing it with the technologically sophisticated Total Rewards program,
by discouraging its employees from “thinking” rather than “knowing,” by
reducing the autonomy of general managers to run their own casinos, and by
400
limiting supervisors’ discretion in hiring and firing.
Data, technology,

395. A 1996 study by Arthur Andersen found that in 1995 casino employees earned on average
$26,000 a year, which was higher than the average wages earned by employees performing similar
types of work in related fields. Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV.
181, 184 & n.16 (2002) (citing National Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report (1999)). Casinos in
general offer their employees “tremendous opportunities to advance within the company” and
“tend to promote from within, through in-house training programs.” Id. at 184. Aronovitz notes that
in 2002 Harrah’s advertised on its website that it provides “one-to-one mentoring, ongoing skills
training, and outstanding opportunities for advancement.” Id. at 184 n.20.
396. SHOOK, supra note 277, at 174. See infra note 496 and accompanying text (reporting data on
job tenure for food and beverage workers).
397. Harrah’s annualized employee turnover dropped from forty-five percent in 1998 to twentyfour percent in 2001. Becker, supra note 368.
398. In 1980, when Harrah’s merged with Holiday Inns, many casino employees in the industry,
even at management levels “grew up in the business . . . [and] didn’t have a strong educational
background.” SHOOK, supra note 277, at 90. While lack of formal education is still not a barrier to
entry-level jobs at Harrah’s, Loveman made it clear that he is looking for highly educated,
sophisticated managers: “He shook up Harrah’s culture with a new human-resources approach that
valued brainpower and leadership over industry experience.” Becker, supra note 368. One of the first
things he did as COO was to replace “practically the entire corporate marketing department” with
“the kind of people we have now, who have the horsepower to do this kind of [mathematical]
work.” Id. The result is a widening of the gap between managers (who are generally highly
educated) and frontline service workers (who may have limited post-secondary education).
399. MONTGOMERY, supra note 34, at 9 (citing FRANK BOHN & WILLIAM D. HAYWOOD, INDUSTRIAL
SOCIALISM 25 (1911)). See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Taylorism as
routinization).
400. Leidner describes how service workers are expected to personalize routines so that
customers do not resent them. LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK, supra note 23, at 35–36. Harrah’s
collects extensive information about customers’ preferences in food, wine, lodging, and
entertainment and requires its service workers to utilize this information in serving its customers.
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surveillance, and rules have replaced human relationships built on
401
communication, memory, experience, and trust. The knowledge about the
customers that service workers are expected to utilize to satisfy the customers’
402
needs is knowledge that resides in a computer memory—in bits and bytes. The
result is a dehumanized workforce in which the individual frontline service
worker is treated as a product or delivery system—robotized, homogenized, and
fungible.
B. Commodification: Sexualizing Female Bartenders
1. Wearing Makeup: Branding Darlene Jespersen—”I was a sexual object.”
Darlene Jespersen’s brief experience wearing makeup in the 1980s was
memorable for her. During a deposition in 2002 pursuant to her discrimination
suit, in response to questions by Harrah’s counsel, Jespersen recounted the
circumstances when she first learned how she felt about wearing makeup:
Q: And after he applied makeup on half your face and left the other half
normal, did there come a time when you looked in the mirror?
A: Yes.
Q: And tell me your reaction.
A: I felt very degraded and very demeaning [sic]. I actually felt sick that I had to
cover up my face and become pretty or feminine in a sex stereotyping role to
keep my job or to do my job. I actually felt ill and I felt violated.
Q: Did you attempt thereafter to actually wear makeup and comply with your
employer’s desire that you have a makeup look versus your normal face?
A: Yes.
Q: How long did you try to wear makeup?
A: Just a couple of weeks.
Q: And what was that experience like?

See Harrah’s Brand Standard, supra note 298, at 83 (requiring, as part of their job description, that
Harrah’s bartenders “provide personalized service and use[] guest names”). In defending this
practice against claims that it “is intrusive and smacks of ‘Big Brother,’” Jan Jones, a Harrah’s senior
vice president, said “‘I look at it as being smart marketers.’” SHOOK, supra note 277, at 292 (quoting
interview by Robert L. Shook with Jan Jones, Senior Vice President, Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc.
(May 16, 2000)).
401. Shook reports that “[Bill] Harrah is . . . credited as the originator of the first ‘eye in the sky.’”
SHOOK, supra note 277, at 113. Hidden cameras and security guards are ubiquitous in casinos to
guard against theft and cheating, and have been mandated by gaming commissions. Id. at 113–14.
The hidden cameras can also be used to observe and record how employees appear. One scholar,
drawing on the work of Foucault, writes, “Casinos’ sophisticated surveillance mechanisms ensure
that subjects are never sure when they are being observed (or believe they are always being
observed) and thus discipline themselves.” Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 349.
402. Cameron Lynne Macdonald and Carmen Sirianni would describe this as “routinization and
scripting,” a “management approach [that] advocates the ‘substitution of technology for motivation,’
replacing spontaneous interaction with predetermined scripts and supplanting worker decisionmaking with management design. Proponents of this model argue that it provides both managers
and customers with a modicum of consistency and few surprises.” Macdonald & Sirianni, The Service
Society, supra note 22, at 6.
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A: It was—I felt that it—it prohibited me from doing my job. I felt exposed. I
actually felt like I was naked. I mean, I—I felt that I—was being pushed into
having to be revealed or forced to be feminine to do that job, to stay employed,
when it had nothing to do with the making of a drink. I felt that I had become
dolled up and that I was a sexual object.
Q: And how long did you then, even though feeling that way, attempt to
comply? How long did you make it?
A: I could only do it for a couple of weeks.
Q: And then what happened?
A: It—it was too harmful. It affected my self-dignity. It portrayed me in a role
that I wasn’t comfortable, that I wasn’t taken seriously as myself. I also feel that
it took away my credibility as an individual and as a person. I was—it
demanded that—that my job performance was based on how I look and not on
how I did my work.
Q: So what did you do? How did you stop?
A: I went—I just stopped. And I went home and threw the makeup in the
garbage.
Q: And when you showed back up for work after a two-week period of wearing
makeup and then came in not wearing makeup again, what, if anything,
occurred—
A: Nothing.
Q: —between you and your employer?
403

A: Nothing was ever said for several years.

This incident, occurring many years before Harrah’s adopted and began to
enforce its “Personal Best” grooming policy in 2000, determined both
Jespersen’s response to the new policy and her expectations of how she would
be treated. But her narrative of the incident raises several questions. Why would
a young, clean-scrubbed, fresh-faced, twenty-something woman, working as a
bartender at a casino in Reno, Nevada, in the 1980s, have had—and continue to
have—such a strong reaction to wearing makeup, even if it might cost her her
job? It is tempting to assume Jespersen abhorred wearing makeup because it
subverted her sexual identity as a lesbian and that her lawsuit was about the
404
rights of lesbians to express their sexual identity in the workplace. The focus
on Jespersen’s sexual identity as an explanation for her aversion to makeup,
however, draws attention away from the role of social class, sex, and sexuality in
the casino industry generally (and particularly at Harrah’s), in branding
employees along explicitly sexualized and heterosexual lines that enforce
subordination of female service workers.

403. Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen, supra note 313.
404. See generally Kirsten Dellinger & Christine L. Williams, Makeup at Work: Negotiating
Appearance Rules in the Workplace, 11 GENDER & SOC’Y 151, 160–61, 164 (Apr. 1997).
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2. Selling Sexuality: The Business of Casino Gaming
a. Showgirls
Casinos in Nevada and elsewhere sold, and continue to sell, the sexual
display of women’s bodies in elaborate staged shows and the allure of service by
405
beautiful and skimpily clad cocktail waitresses on the casino floor. Patrons
arrived at casino resorts with the expectation that part of the experience might
include sexual relations with a companion, a colleague, or a stranger who might
be a waitress, a showgirl, or even a prostitute. As historian David Schwartz
reported:
[B]y the late 1940s, casino resorts were inexorably identified in the public mind
as a landscape of sexual possibility—no coincidence, since casino publicists
relentlessly peppered the popular press, visitors, and anyone who got near with
visions of off-duty showgirls lounging by the pool or fluttering about the craps
406
tables.

Beginning in the late 1950s, shows on the Las Vegas Strip featured topless
407
female dancers in elaborately staged productions. These stylized shows
408
409
became “a staple of the Strip” that is only now in decline. They are being
replaced in casinos on the Las Vegas Strip and elsewhere with “Broadway
musicals on one end of the spectrum and sexually explicit female revues on the
410
other.”
Bill Harrah’s Reno and Lake Tahoe casino shows, however, were always
slightly more modest than the topless shows of the Las Vegas Strip. The head of
entertainment at Harrah’s casinos in the 1960s and 1970s described Bill Harrah’s
views:
We had a policy that no act could appear at Harrah’s that couldn’t be viewed
on television. . . . This meant no nudity or obscene language. Bill didn’t want

405. See Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 347.
406. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 58–59.
407. Id. at 94. Schwartz writes, “[s]hows like this defined casino resort entertainment for a
generation: gala topless French-themed extravaganzas became a sine qua non of a Strip vacation.” Id.
at 95. Schwartz notes that installation of a casino show could cost “over $5 million by the early
1960s.” Id. Despite their high initial production cost, semi-nude female revues proved to be relatively
less expensive than contracting with star performers. Id.
408. Id. at 94.
409. One of the last surviving major shows, “Jubilee,” just completed its twenty-fifth-year
anniversary at Bally’s Las Vegas casino resort, a property now belonging to Harrah’s Entertainment.
The New York Times review of the show offered this description:
Just as in the old days, the show features 3,000 gallons of water spilling from a sinking
Titanic; a hypersexed Samson and Delihah doing a balletic duet in G-strings; girls in
baroque but brief costumes floating down from the ceiling on platforms above the
audience’s head. The show culminates with a “Presentation of Our Grand and Glorious
Beauties,” who plume with ostrich- or pheasant-feather headdresses, some on scaffolds as
wide as their arm spans.
Erika Kinetz, The Twilight of the Ostrich-Plumed, Rhinestone-Brassiered Las Vegas Showgirl, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2006, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1.
410. Id.
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any of his customers to ever come in and be embarrassed by a show. He didn’t
411
think you should take your wife out and have her be offended.

Historian David Schwartz notes that, as casinos became corporatized
during the 1970s, “casino operators continued to use sex to sell the casino resort
412
experience.” Las Vegas, as always, led the way: “Seminude revues continued
to be the extravagant centerpieces of Strip showrooms, the Las Vegas News
Bureau persisted in churning out ‘cheesecake’ photos of smiling nubile young
women in Las Vegas, and promotional advertisements and brochures, if
413
anything, became racier in the corporate years.” By 1980, Harrah’s, now
owned by Holiday Inns and moving into the Atlantic City market, would have
felt pressure to compete with the entertainment found in Las Vegas showrooms.
These shows, with their glamorous but untouchable showgirls, were
ubiquitous in the Nevada casino industry that Jespersen entered in the 1980s.
Erika Kinetz writes that “what’s changed since [the early 1980s] are attitudes
toward women’s bodies, naked bodies in particular. Once upon a time the
chance to gaze at these inaccessible beauties was rare enough to be titillating,
414
while still respectable enough to bring the missus to.” On-stage, the showgirls
were (and are) beautiful, but it is an artificial and exaggerated beauty achieved
415
with heavy use of cosmetics—liquid eyeliner, false eyelashes, blush. By 2000,
when Harrah’s changed its grooming code for female bartenders, the nudity and
sexuality in “adult” casino revues was becoming more and more explicit, with
416
no pretense of being “respectable.” Kinetz notes, “Today . . . the sight of
topless women is no longer so shocking: they are a common enough sight in
417
movies and on cable television.”

411. Interview by Robert L. Shook with Holmes Hendricksen, Vice President, Harrah’s
Entertainment, Inc. (Sept. 21, 2000), quoted in SHOOK, supra note 277, at 51, 299; see also id. at 36
(identifying interviewee).
412. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 166.
413. Id. at 166. Schwartz offers the following example of the nature of the advertising: “A 1977
Aladdin promotional brochure, for example, featured an attractive, bikini-clad woman emerging
from a swimming pool and lounging on a bed.” Id.
414. Kinetz, supra note 409, at 20.
415. Id. at 1 (describing the transformation of a self-described “plain” dancer in the “Jubilee!”
troupe into a “showgirl” through the use of cosmetics).
416. For example, Harrah’s official Web site, www.Harrah’s.com, advertised sexually explicit
“adult” revues showing at two of Harrah’s casinos during October, 2006. At Harrah’s Reno Casino,
the show Rock My Ride was described as “the solution for guests looking for something steamy. . . .
With sexy choreography and high-energy music, . . . this late-night adult revue may be ‘every
working man’s fantasy.’” See http://www.harrahs.com/EventsDetail.do?locationCode=REN&detail
Name=rock-my-ride-detail&eventTitle=Rock%20My%20Ride (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). Harrah’s
Las Vegas Casino was featuring the revue, Bareback, described as “a rowdy, wild and sultry show
[which] is sure to have both men and women dancing in their seats. Beautiful, scantily clad cowgirls
and handsome strapping cowboys electrify the audience with racy renditions of new country
music’s most popular hits . . . . Ladies will love ‘The Wild Bunch,’ a group of 4 hunky Cowboys who
get up close and personal.” See http://www.harrahs.com/EventsDetail.do?locationCode=LA&
detailName=bareback-detail&eventTitle=Bareback (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
417. Kinetz, supra note 409, at 20.
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b. Prostitutes
Legalized prostitution in Nevada’s licensed brothels is a sexually
provocative backdrop to the explicit sexual display of women’s bodies in casino
418
revues. To the audience at a casino show, a dancer—the original showgirl—
419
could be an object of desire, remote and unattainable. To the passerby in the
streets outside the casinos in Nevada, reading a flyer or business card, a
420
“showgirl” might mean a prostitute.
True “showgirls” were and are
421
“entertainers and not prostitutes,” but even the reputable, corporate-owned
casinos have benefited from the tantalizing ambiguity of whether showgirls are
sexually accessible or off-limits.
The fact that prostitution is not legal in either Clark County or Washoe
422
County, Nevada —where the major Las Vegas and Reno casinos are located—
has not hampered but rather helped casino operators in those cities. In
complying with the law by strictly banning known prostitutes from their
premises, the casino resorts can promote their entertainment venues as ideal
sites for both conventions and family vacations. And no casino in Las Vegas or
Reno can gain a competitive advantage by offering sex for sale next to the craps
tables and slot machines. Yet, sexual services can readily be purchased from
423
licensed, inspected prostitutes in adjacent counties—a limousine ride away —

418. See generally McGinley, supra note 315, at 83–84 (describing the work of prostitutes in
Nevada brothels).
419. “Even when they’re down to G-strings and pasties, which is the farthest the most daring of
them go, these skilled dancers are otherworldly, untouchable, too beautiful, too quick and too much
in the light for the mere mortals watching them.” Kinetz, supra note 409, at 20.
420. See, e.g., id. at 20 (describing the men on the Las Vegas Strip who “purport to be trafficking
in showgirls” and the women who sell their sexual services in “the free full-color publication called
Adult Informer: Déjà Vu Showgirl News”). Newsstands along the Strip display print advertisements
for escort services and entertainers. See 2005 photo of newsstands on Las Vegas Blvd., Las Vegas,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostitution_in_Nevada (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). Shook writes:
On any given day or night, a single man walking down the Strip will be approached by
solicitors who pass out X-rated leaflets advertising the services of women who will make
room calls. These explicit brochures tout everything from full-body massage to totally
nude dancing in the privacy of a customer’s room. They leave little to the imagination.
SHOOK, supra note 277, at 46.
421. SCHWARTZ, supra note 288, at 58. Schwartz writes that “after the final show, [the dancers]
mingled with casino patrons. Contrary to legend, the showgirls were not required nor even
requested to sleep with high rollers[,] . . . but were intended to ‘decorate the casino.’” Id. Most
showgirls then, as now, “were working in fields typical to unmarried middle-class women, usually
as secretaries or receptionists, although some were models . . . .” Id. See, e.g., Kinetz, supra note 409, at
20 (describing a Las Vegas show dancer who works a second job as a mortgage broker during the
day).
422. Nevada permits licensing of brothels in counties with population less than 400,000. NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345(8) (West 2005). Counties smaller than 400,000, can choose to prohibit
brothels. See Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 626 (Nev. 1980) (finding that “[Nevada’s] legislature
did not intend to deprive counties of the power to ban brothels completely”). Clark County in 2005
was the only Nevada county with population greater than 400,000, but brothels are also illegal in
three other counties, including Washoe County. See Wikipedia, Prostitution in Nevada,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostitution_in_Nevada (last visited Dec. 20, 2006); see also McGinley,
supra note 315, at 83.
423. According to Shook, “[m]any out-of-county bordellos provide round-trip limousine
services.” SHOOK, supra note 277, at 46. See also McGinley, supra note 315, at 84, n.139.
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and prostitutes may even be available or tolerated in casinos (as in hotels nearly
everywhere) when they are clandestine and unobtrusive, and particularly when
424
they are in the company of guests. The ubiquity of advertising by sexy
“entertainers,” nevertheless, conveys an unmistakable message: Sex in Nevada
culture is a commodity, like gambling, a fancy meal, a luxurious hotel room, or a
ticket to see an exciting show.
c. Cocktail Waitresses
Harrah’s amended “Personal Best” grooming rules explicitly treated female
bartenders the same as other female beverage servers—specifically, cocktail
waitresses. Within the hierarchy of the casino or hotel bar, the status distinction
425
between a bartender and a cocktail waitress is significant. Jespersen had
achieved her authority as a bartender with her customers and co-workers by
dint of her personality and hard work and without the aid of a cosmetic mask
defining her as a “pretty” (and possibly sexy or sexually available) woman. A
female bartender, like Jespersen, who had never worn makeup could have
reasonably understood the makeup requirement—imposing on her the same
grooming requirements as the cocktail waitresses—as lowering her status from
bartender to barmaid.
Although Harrah’s management may not have self-consciously set out to
make its female bartenders into “barmaids” in 2000, it was certainly conscious of
the sexy image of the cocktail waitress in American culture, in general, and in
426
the casino industry, in particular. The link between showgirls, cocktail
waitresses, and prostitution has a well-known history in Las Vegas casinos:
Vegas had a reputation for providing free sex for its best customers. During the
days of the Mob, a high roller had only to suggest that he wanted female
company, and a pit boss or casino host would have a bevy of girls lined up to

424.

Shook writes:

In today’s Las Vegas, sex for sale is available but it’s not like the old days. The major
casinos don’t allow prostitutes to solicit in their properties because it’s against the law. For
the same reason, casino employees don’t provide sex to high rollers. They simply won’t do
anything to jeopardize their gaming licenses. They have too much to lose. Security guards
and plainclothes officers at Harrah’s and other major casinos who spot a female soliciting
on the casino floor or in a lounge will promptly escort her out the door with instructions
not to come back. A photograph is taken so she will be easily recognized if she returns. If a
customer, however, is with a prostitute, as long as she’s his guest, that’s another matter.
“What we don’t want is people on vacation being solicited,” said a Harrah’s security
guard. “But a guy with a broad—that’s his business. Besides, who knows, she may be his
wife or girlfriend.”
SHOOK, supra note 277, at 45–46. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.030(1)(b) (West 2005) (prohibiting
“aid[ing] and abet[ting] any act of prostitution”).
425. See Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 349 (noting that “[b]artenders are at the top of a casino
bar hierarchy supported by a complicated gender hegemony”) (alteration added); id. at 361–62
(discussing wage and power distinctions between casino bartenders and cocktail waitresses). See also
Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 257, 262, 274 (2007) (discussing the gender hierarchy between female cocktail
servers and male casino hosts in Nevada casinos).
426. McGinley, supra note 425, at 262 (“Nevada casinos openly and self-consciously sell sexual
appeal by limiting cocktail serving jobs to women dressed in alluring outfits.”).
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accommodate him. Chorus girls and cocktail waitresses commonly volunteered
427
their services as a special favor to a casino manager.

During her participant observation of Reno cocktail waitresses in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, Lorraine Bayard de Volo found “no evidence, not even rumors,
that any waitress was involved in prostitution. Still, this is an apt description of
the popular image of casino cocktail waitresses outside of Nevada—a showy yet
unobtrusive appendage to the gambling atmosphere who is sexually available
428
for a price.”
Although Bill Harrah distanced himself and his casinos from many of the
more tawdry and illicit aspects of mob-run casinos, the sexual allure of the
429
cocktail waitress, who dispenses free drinks with a smile, has always been a
stock-in-trade of the gambling floor. In entering new gaming markets outside
the orb of Las Vegas and the Strip, Harrah’s, like other casino operators, has
struggled to negotiate delicately the boundary between commercially viable
sexiness and unpalatable (if not clearly illegal) sexual exploitation of female
service workers. One news account about a proposed casino in Rhode Island
reported that “[w]hen Harrah’s New Orleans casino opened in 1999, women
who wanted to be cocktail waitresses needed to ‘audition’ wearing a one-piece
430
French-cut swimsuit, sheer stocking [sic] and pumps with medium heels.”
Harrah’s senior vice president for communications and government relations,
Jan Jones, defensively and rather disingenuously attempted to distance Harrah’s
from this story, observing that Harrah’s was only a minority owner of this
particular casino in 1999: “‘The local partners were running all the hiring,’ Jones
431
said. ‘None of the employees actually worked for Harrah’s.’” Nonetheless, the
cocktail waitresses hired through this process all worked under the Harrah’s
name and were creating and selling the Harrah’s brand in New Orleans.
When Darlene Jespersen was asked to put on makeup for her job in
Harrah’s casino in the 1980s and again in 2000, makeup for a female service
worker in that hypersexualized environment would have connoted, at least in
part, sexuality and sexual allure. Bayard de Volo observed that “[a] waitress
could habitually serve drinks without a smile or pleasant conversation without
432
attracting much management concern, yet she had to wear makeup.” For a
woman like Jespersen who had never worn makeup, Harrah’s makeup
requirement could have been reasonably understood as an attempt to make her
appear more like the “other” women performing services for customers at the
casino—the semi-nude showgirls and attractive cocktail waitresses—as well as
427. Shook, supra note 277, at 45. See also Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 355 (“Casino
waitresses have also been portrayed as after-hours prostitutes, keeping the high rollers happy for the
casino and making extra money for themselves.”).
428. Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 355–56.
429. Id. at 364 (observing that “many [cocktail waitresses] donned unfamiliar smiles and
expressions that disappeared once they returned to the semiprivacy of the waitress station”).
430. Mayerowitz, supra note 157.
431. Id. As of December 2006, Jan Jones still held the same position in Harrah’s corporate
hierarchy. See Management Team: Biography, Jan Jones, Senior Vice President, Communications &
Government Relations, http://investor.harrahs.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84772&p=irol-aboutusMan
ageBio&ID=144675 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
432. Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 365.
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the women who advertised their sexual services outside the doors of the
casino—the prostitutes in the next county. The community activists who
publicly protested Harrah’s grooming rules “compare[d] them to those of the
Moonlite Bunny Ranch, a brothel whose owner calls himself the ‘pimpmaster
433
general of America.’”
3. Sexualized Branding: The “Harrah’s Look”
The restaurant and hotel industry has long understood the significance of
gender-specific appearance codes for creating a particular image for its
establishments. Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming rules as applied to Darlene
Jespersen can be characterized as an attempt to assure that its female bartenders
are as pretty as they can be within an environment that places a premium on
sexy, beautiful, painted women who have as part of their job descriptions to be
decorative and sexually alluring to men. Enforcing the rule imposes hardships
on any woman who chooses not to wear makeup, whether because of sexual
identity, politics, religion, allergies, or just personal expression. As Judge
Kozinski noted in his dissent in Jespersen, “a large (and perhaps growing)
number of women choose to present themselves to the world without
434
makeup.” But Harrah’s rules also limit the makeup choices of the majority of
women who prefer to wear makeup in both their private and their work lives.
Harrah’s grooming rules require a particular look, with particular types of
makeup—all dictated by image consultants who train the female employees
how to be “properly made-up,” after which their “Personal Best” image is
“captur[ed] in two photographs that are placed in their file and used on a daily
435
basis “as the appearance standard to which [the] employee will be held.”
Employees are even expected to use copies of these “Personal Best” photos as a
436
“visual aid while dressing for the floor.”
Harrah’s hired its image consultant, Reimi Marden, to define and
implement the “Harrah’s look.” In light of the fact that Marden had a
437
background in cosmetic sales and was being paid to improve and standardize
the appearance of Harrah’s frontline service employees, she could hardly have
been expected to conclude that Harrah’s employees—male or female—looked
just fine the way they were. The women, in particular, would need specific
guidance in use of makeup to achieve the proper look—pretty and feminine
(beautified), but definitely not cheap. Although the Ninth Circuit en banc
majority did not believe that Jespersen was “a case where the dress or appearance
requirement is intended to be sexually provocative, and tending to stereotype

433. Harrah’s Dress Rules Draw Protest, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 17, 2001, available at http://www.
reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2001/Feb-17-Sat-2001/business/15468450.html. The owner of the
Bunny Ranch insisted that at his brothel women have more choices about makeup: “[M]akeup is
optional, hair must be clean. Jeans are not allowed, nor are bare feet or house slippers. Everything
else goes.” Id.(alteration added).
434. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
435. See Harrah’s Brand Standard, supra note 298, at 80.
436. Id.
437. Marden was “Sales Director and National Trainer for BeautiControl Cosmetics, an
international image company.” About The Winning Edge, supra note 391.
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women as sex objects,” the court ignored the context of Jespersen’s work
environment and the fact that, as far back as the 1940s and 1950s, “beauty ads
439
[have] explicitly connected makeup and sex appeal.”
Harrah’s adoption of its makeup requirement for its female service workers
440
is, of course, all about gender, social class, and work status. Dress and
grooming rules have traditionally been used to restrain female service workers
from looking too much like the negative stereotypes associated with their class
and type of job. For example, cultural anthropologist Greta Foff Paules worked
at a New Jersey restaurant—apparently in the late 1980s—that had a dress code
for its waitresses specifying the length of uniform skirts (“‘no shorter than 1 and
1/2 inches above the knee cap’”), and prohibited “‘elaborate makeup,’” as well
as “dark hose, runs, dark-red or brown nail polish, visible hair roots, and ‘visible
441
tattoos.’” Paules writes:
These injunctions seem intended to ensure that waitresses will not appear
cheap, an important consideration in a line of work that has traditionally been
identified with promiscuity and even prostitution. Fifty years ago [in the mid1940s] a girl who left her hometown to become a waitress in the regional
metropolis was “generally assumed to have become a prostitute also,” and there
442
is evidence that for some categories of waitresses the stigma persists.

In 2004, Jan Jones, a Harrah’s vice president, defended Harrah’s dress and
grooming rules as “nothing more than human resource appearance guidelines
443
similar to what you’d find at any major company in America.” Moreover,
Harrah’s knew from its customer surveys that “[o]ur customers have said that
when they go to a casino, they’re looking for a night out and they want people
444
to be well-groomed and have standardized appearances.” The Harrah’s
makeup design would necessarily have to achieve a look that was classy and
attractive—just “sexy enough” to fit into the exciting, titillating casino

438. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
439. KATHY PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S BEAUTY CULTURE 249 (1998). Peiss
writes that, beginning in the late 1940s and 1950s, the advertising of beauty products sent this
message: “A woman acted upon her desire for a man by making herself beautiful, in order to catch
his attention and awaken his desire.” Id.
440. Judge Thomas recognized the role of social class in his dissent to the panel decision in
Jespersen. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004). See supra text
accompanying note 247.
441. GRETA FOFF PAULES, DISHING IT OUT: POWER AND RESISTANCE AMONG WAITRESSES IN A NEW
JERSEY RESTAURANT 103 (1991).
442. Id. at 103–04 (citations omitted). Paules offers this example: “A cocktail waitress interviewed
by Spradley and Mann [in the 1970s] . . . was initially hesitant about serving cocktails because she
had always associated bars with ‘loose living,’ and thought of ‘hardcore’ barmaids as ‘hustlers.’” Id.
at 104 (quoting JAMES P. SPRADLEY & BRENDA J. MANN, THE COCKTAIL WAITRESS: WOMAN’S WORK IN
A MAN’S WORLD 20 (1975) (alteration added)). See also DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT:
WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 24–26 (1991) (describing assumptions in
the 1920s that waitresses were “loose women” or prostitutes and the persistence of these
assumptions, “[d]ecades later, [when] waitresses still complained of male customers who
automatically assumed waitresses were sexually available”) (alteration added).
443. Mayerowitz, supra note 157.
444. Id. The results of Harrah’s “gambler focus groups” also led Harrah’s in 2001 to require its
cocktail waitresses to “wear their hair down” and to wear shoes with high heels. Id.
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environment—but that was not tacky or garish—not “too sexy” so that the
wearer looks like a cheap hooker.
Harrah’s image consultant might have anticipated that, in implementing
the “Personal Best” policies, Harrah’s would have more difficulty getting low445
wage, female workers to use less or different makeup than they normally used,
446
and in getting them to apply it in the standardized way required, than in getting
women—like Darlene Jespersen—to even apply makeup at all. Whatever the
expectations were, the psychological effects of the Harrah’s grooming
requirements fell on all female employees much more harshly than on any male
employee. Kirsten Dellinger and Christine Williams argue that, although
“women who wear makeup are seeking empowerment and pleasure,” “wearing
makeup does contribute to the reproduction of inequality at work,” and that
“institutionalized norms about appearance effectively limit the possibilities for
447
resistance.” The burden of a makeup requirement for women has less to do
with the time and cost of applying makeup (as opposed to not applying any
makeup at all), than with the class assumption that Judge Thomas recognized in
his dissent in the panel decision in Jespersen—that all women subject to the rule
were assumed to be “incapable of exercising professional judgment” about how
448
(or whether) to apply makeup at work. As Judge Pregersen acknowledged in
449
his dissent in the en banc Jespersen decision, analyzing the relative “burdens”
of Harrah’s grooming requirements in this way places the case squarely within
the sex stereotype and class-based analysis of Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings &
450
Loan Ass’n of Chicago. Judge Pregersen wrote: “Just as the bank in Carroll
deemed female employees incapable of achieving a professional appearance
without assigned uniforms, Harrah’s regarded women as unable to achieve a
neat, attractive, and professional appearance without the facial uniform
451
designed by a consultant and required by Harrah’s.”
But Judge Pregersen did not take his analysis far enough. While it is
undeniably true that, as he wrote, “[t]he inescapable message is that women’s
undoctored faces compare unfavorably to men’s . . . because of a cultural
assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that women’s faces are incomplete,
452
unattractive, or unprofessional without full makeup,” it is also true that there

445. For example, when McDonald’s began hiring women in the late 1960s, management policy
dictated that “[h]air styles had to be short and simple and makeup kept to a minimum. False lashes,
eye shadow, colored fingernail polish, iridescent lipstick, rouge, and ‘excessive use of strong
perfumes’ where prohibited.” JOHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD’S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 294 (1986)
(alteration added).
446. The study of women’s attitudes about wearing makeup in the workplace conducted by
Dellinger and Williams found that “[n]one of the women interviewed recalled a specific written
requirement for makeup use even when their workplace was regulated by a formal dress code
policy. Women said that they themselves—as opposed to formal regulations—determine what
constitutes an appropriately attractive appearance and whether they attempt to meet those
standards.” Dellinger & Williams, supra note 404, at 154, 156 (alteration added).
447. Id. at 153.
448. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004).
449. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
450. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
451. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116 (Pregersen, J., dissenting).
452. Id.
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is a cultural assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that lower-class
working women, left to their own devices, are likely to look “unattractive” or
“unprofessional” because they wear too much makeup or the wrong kind of
makeup. Thus, a specific makeup requirement, like the one adopted by
Harrah’s, relies on both class and gender stereotypes.
Kathy Peiss offered an historical perspective on the beauty industry from
the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century:
The connections between appearance, identity, and consumption, forged
initially by women beauty culturists at the beginning of the century, have
inexorably tightened at its end. Moreover, the cosmetics industry has hastened
to absorb and profit from the challenges mounted against it, even as it produces
the normative ideals of beauty for which it is criticized. If image and style have
long offered women a way to express cultural identities, now these identities
453
offer business a new set of images to sell.

Peiss’s reference to “business[es]” selling “images” refers, of course, to the
cosmetics industry. Yet the connections she describes go much deeper and
454
broader in society, as she recognizes, for the lone service worker is helpless to
resist whatever “images” of women the large corporate employer wants to use
to sell services to customers in its markets throughout the nation or even the
world. The professional image consultant, for a fee, mediates the relationship
between the beauty industry, the corporate employer, and the employee who is
both a consumer and is consumed as a commodity (being the product served up
to the employer’s customers). Whether collective action would alter this
dynamic is far from certain, as will be discussed below.
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Jespersen case “do[es] not
preclude, as a matter of law, a claim of sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress
455
and appearance codes,” it sets the bar for asserting such a claim very high. If
Darlene Jespersen’s case was not the “right” case for such a claim to get to trial
on the record presented because “it is limited to the subjective reaction of a
single employee, and there is no evidence of a stereotypical motivation on the
456
part of the employer,” how would one go about finding the test case that
addresses these supposed defects? Recasting her claim as objectively reasonable
in light of the context of the casino industry and the history of her employment
relationship with Harrah’s, and framing her harm as an injury to women of her
social class, might help. As would questioning where the grooming rule comes
from: Harrah’s grooming rules about makeup were prescribed by an image
consultant, whose job was to satisfy customer preferences about employee
appearance as determined by her assumptions about appearance, gender, class,
and cosmetics, as well as by information from Harrah’s surveys and focus
groups. If these grooming rules—deliberately and carefully designed to deliver

453. PEISS, supra note 439, at 269.
454. In the very next paragraph to the one quoted above, supra text accompanying note 453, Peiss
discusses the role of employer-mandated appearance requirements as but one of the “many
forces”—ranging from socialization by families, peers, and others to individual expressions of status
and identity—”shap[ing] the cultural practice of beautifying.” Id. at 269.
455. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113 (majority opinion).
456. Id.
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the Harrah’s brand—were not intentionally based on stereotypes about women,
it is difficult to imagine what would be.
Should a woman be denied the opportunity to work because her face does
not satisfy a culturally defined, historically contingent, class-biased, and genderstereotyped image of the “appropriate,” beautified, feminine face, when having
such a made-up face is not necessary to perform the job? Price Waterhouse
seemed to answer this in the negative; the Jespersen en banc majority says, in
theory, “maybe yes, maybe no,” but, in fact, we cannot even permit a court to
examine the facts of the issue on the basis of this meager record. Implicitly, the
court said that a company should not be denied the prerogative to fire an
employee because her face does not satisfy the company’s chosen brand image
for its female employees—which is a culturally defined, historically contingent,
class-biased, and gender-stereotyped image of the “appropriate,” beautified,
feminine face—regardless of whether having such a made-up face is necessary
to perform the job.
Darlene Jespersen’s strong reaction to being told to apply certain makeup
to her face in order to keep her job as a bartender must be placed within the
context of the gendered hierarchy of the casino industry in general and Harrah’s
commodification and deskilling of its workers in particular, of the sexualized
environment of casino shows and gaming floors, of the open and legalized sex
trade in Nevada, of the persistent myth of the cocktail waitress as a “loose
woman” or prostitute, of the ubiquity of image consultants and their cozy
relationship with the cosmetics industry, of the class-based distrust of women’s
judgment about using cosmetics, and of the story of the feminization of
bartending and the role that male-dominated unions and gender-based
assumptions played in keeping women from working “behind the bar” for so
long. Seen from this perspective, Jespersen’s aversion to having a painted face—
and the extreme psychological discomfort it caused her for the two weeks that
she wore makeup on the job—does not seem personal or idiosyncratic, or an
attempt to assert in the workplace her sexual identity as a lesbian, either as an
individual or as a representative of a group. Rather it seems an objectively
reasonable response in light of all of the circumstances—an attempt to preserve
her identity as a bartender and her dignity as a worker.
4. Property Rights in Work Law, Redux
Harrah’s could not have looked to trade dress law to prevent a competing
casino from adopting a dress and grooming code for bartenders identical to the
bartenders’ requirements in Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy. There is nothing
particularly distinctive or nonfunctional about the bartenders’ uniform or color,
and the makeup requirement, which is arguably nonfunctional, is hardly
distinctive. But Harrah’s could and did use its ability to fire at will to enforce its
dress and grooming rules in nonunionized casinos, and because of federal court
interpretations of Title VII law in this area—which legitimate the employer’s
sex-based branding efforts—the statute operates to facilitate exacting regulation
of employee appearance.
Neither unions nor (most) employees seem to comprehend the propertylike aspects of this intersection between branding and the law. Employees
undervalue what they are asked to give up in terms of autonomy—if they place
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a value on it at all—and employers, after their initial investment in developing
the branding concept and the rules to enforce it, are able at low cost or no cost
(because, in the case of makeup rules, the employee pays for the makeup and
applies it on her own time) to use the brand standards to extract significant
additional value from employees without paying them for this value.
Even if the employer pays its female employees for the cost in time and
money to purchase and apply makeup under a mandatory makeup rule for
women only—thus equalizing the cost and time burdens on each sex—the
employees would not receive compensation for the extra value that the made-up
face adds to the brand. By rigorously enforcing its employee-appearance brand
the employer receives and keeps the “free” added value of the brand. The laws
governing the employment relation, not the laws of unfair trade, protect the
employer against employee attempts to resist the imposition and effects of
branding. The primary source of protection is employment at will, but the
various legal regimes ostensibly designed to create or enforce employee rights,
including Title VII, are generally interpreted to protect the employer’s branding
interests whenever they conflict with employee interests.
Perhaps this should not surprise us. The law’s reverence for property rights
457
is well-established, especially in the context of work law. As James Atleson has
persuasively argued, a set of unarticulated assumptions structures American
labor law, including the notion that continuity of production must be
maintained, that workers will act irresponsibly unless controlled, that workers
are the junior partners in the management-labor partnership and are obligated
to respect and defer to employers, that the workplace is the property of the
458
employer, and that managerial rights are inherent and exclusive. These
assumptions, Atleson explains, trace back to the primacy of property rights in
459
American law. They undergird and structure not only the interpretation of
NLRA law, but also the common law doctrine of master-servant relations that
continues to guide employment law and employment discrimination law.
Atleson explains:
During the act of hiring, the employer technically concludes a contract, but,
essentially, it hires an asset that is expected to bring a return. Over the course of
the work relationship, the employer has the power to seek to enlarge the return.
The goal, of course, is to create the largest possible gap between the yield of this
460
asset and the terms of its hire.

But suppose the law required employers to pay workers for this added
value? Karl Klare proposed that the default rule in the appearance code cases be
shifted so that employers would be required to bargain for waivers to

457. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305
(1994). Almost as well-established is the law’s hostility toward group action and labor unionism. See
James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to
a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1738–41 (1999) (finding bipartisan drop in judicial support
for the legal positions taken by organized labor, and ascribing it to declining popularity of unions
and loss of political salience of union issues in the eyes of the general public).
458. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 7–9 (1983).
459. Id. at 9.
460. Id. at 14.
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discriminate against, discipline or discharge workers for their failure to comply
461
with personal appearance rules. The employer could thus purchase the right to
control worker appearance, but should be required to pay a premium in order to
obtain such control. However, changing the default rule on workplace
appearance codes would be unavailing as long as at-will employment continues
to structure the work relation and workers are bargaining individually with the
employer, because individual workers lack the leverage to resist the employer’s
power to contract out of the default. Shifting the default rule would be
meaningful only in a unionized workplace where workers have just-cause job
security and sufficient bargaining power to resist employer requests without
sacrificing their jobs.
However, labor unions are no panacea. First, the oft-discussed weakness of
the National Labor Relations Board’s remedial powers and the deference to
employers’ property rights to manage and control their businesses, evident in
both Board and court decisions under the NLRA, cabin workers’ collective
462
power. Second, as majoritarian institutions, unions are likely to be reluctant to
advance the interests of numerical minority groups or outlier employees in the
463
workplace. Claims like Jespersen’s, if not supported by a majority of the
workers in the bargaining unit, would not receive union support and thus
would have little influence on union bargaining positions. Accordingly, Title VII
protection is a vital complement to changes in underlying common-law default
rules and to efforts to shore up workers’ collective power at law under the
NLRA. Some aspects of appearance autonomy should be made nonwaivable
because of their relationship to Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate, including
employer regulations based on gender stereotypes or discriminatory customer
464
preferences, or that expose workers to sexual harassment or abuse.
Stereotypes, here, play a crucial role. Because brand images for sex-based
appearance codes are produced through market surveys of consumer tastes and
preferences, the results of these surveys are necessarily aggregates of consumer
tastes and demands—reflecting contemporary stereotyped assumptions about
gender, sexuality, social class, and power. Where corporate branding attempts to
capitalize on these stereotypes, the employer realizes a profit by perpetuating
the stereotypes. Similarly, the union’s role in an organized workforce is to assess
the competing interests of workers and to allocate its resources toward
advancing the desires and views of the majority. The majority position will
likely reflect prevailing community norms, which may in turn encode
stereotyped assumptions about gender and sexuality. Thus, unions cannot
necessarily be trusted to resist stereotyped branding that tracks community
norms.

461. Klare, supra note 92, at 1448.
462. See generally ATLESON, supra note 458; Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights
to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1978).
463. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks:” Privilege and the United Front
Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542 (1999).
464. Klare, supra note 92, at 1449.
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As the Jespersen case demonstrates, workers who lack both the protections
of Title VII law and the power of a collective voice through union representation
are doubly disadvantaged. Ultimately, women like Jespersen are put to a
Hobson’s choice: Sell their faces to serve the brand or resist and place their jobs
in jeopardy.
VI. THE FEMINIZATION OF BARTENDERS: FROM BARMAIDS
TO BARTENDERS TO BAR BABES
How does Darlene Jespersen’s challenge to Harrah’s use of makeup to
brand its female bartenders as “feminine,” fit into a larger historical, cultural,
and sociological narrative of women in bartending in the United States and the
role that gender stereotypes, sex-typed branding, law, and unions have played
in that account? Bartending in the United States was an almost exclusively male
calling until the 1970s, due in large part to the success of union efforts to
465
maintain a male monopoly on the occupation. Then, within less than two
decades, bartending was feminized more rapidly and extensively than any other
predominantly male profession, primarily because of changing attitudes that
466
challenged old stereotypes that had served to support the exclusion of women.
Federal antidiscrimination law led the way, but changes in community norms
about women—their work lives, their appropriate sex roles, and their
relationship to alcohol consumption and public morality—shaped both the legal
467
discourse and the behavior of male and female culinary workers.
In 1890, according to U.S. Census Data, less than one percent of bartender
468
jobs in America were held by women. Labor shortages during World War I
briefly created opportunities for women to work in bartending and serving
469
liquor, but by 1917, “twenty-six states and three territories were dry,” and in
1920 the Eighteenth Amendment decimated what was left of the legal
470
bartending jobs. Following the end of Prohibition in 1933, opportunities for
women bartenders grew only slightly. During this time, male members of the
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, known as
the Bartenders Union, played an important role in keeping women out of

465. See generally Dorothy Sue Cobble, “Drawing the Line”: The Construction of a Gendered Work
Force in the Food Service Industry, in WORK ENGENDERED: TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LABOR 216 (Ava Baron ed., 1991).
466. BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. ROOS, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES: EXPLAINING
WOMEN’S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 52 (Barbara F. Reskin & Patricia A. Roos eds., 1990).
467. Cobble writes that
where and when female food service workers drew the line also played a critical role in
shaping the gendered labor force. The elite position of men within the industry was
sustained in part by the reluctance of unionized waitresses to challenge men’s claim to
own both the waiting work in the fancier, more formal all-male houses and the coveted
work of mixing and pouring drinks.
Cobble, supra note 465, at 240.
468. Linda A. Detman, Women Behind Bars: The Feminization of Bartending, in RESKIN & ROOS, supra
note 466, at 241.
469. MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, UNION HOUSE, UNION BAR: THE HISTORY OF THE HOTEL AND
RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO 129 (1956).
470. Detman, supra note 468, at 242.
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bartender jobs in order to preserve a male monopoly. Initially, the Bartenders
Union adopted resolutions that imposed “blanket restrictions on women serving
471
liquor because it would morally corrupt them.” Waitresses, who wanted
access to the higher paying food and beverage service jobs in union
establishments where liquor was sold, eventually prevailed with the union
472
locals, but in exchange they relinquished their claim to bartender positions. As
Dorothy Sue Cobble has observed, “for many waitresses, to be a bartender was
473
not only unladylike, but also unwaitresslike.” These shared attitudes about
sex-appropriate craft divisions in the food service industry helped perpetuate
the traditional sex-segregation of unions of waiters, waitresses, and bartenders.
474
By 1940, women held a mere 2.5 percent of bartender positions, and most of
these jobs were in nonunion establishments.
With the onset of World War II, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International, by then the seventh largest union in the United
475
States, again faced labor shortages in the industry: 25,000 men and women
from the union joined the armed forces and about another 25,000 went to work
476
in war industries. The wartime demand for bartenders loosened union
restrictions on women working behind the bar. As an historian of the Bartenders
Union wrote, “The sturdy bartenders marched off to war, and barmaids often
477
replaced them.”
Following the war, many returning union veterans reclaimed their
bartender jobs, displacing the female bartenders who had been welcomed into
the union and into bars during the war. In many jurisdictions, locals of the
Bartenders International Union lobbied for and obtained state legislation that
banned females from the job of “barmaid,” unless the woman was the wife or
daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. Sex stereotypes
478
were used as “powerful justifications” in passing and upholding these laws. In
479
1948, in Goesaert v. Cleary, the United States Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s
statute against an Equal Protection challenge to its classification distinguishing
“between wives and daughters of owners of liquor places and wives and
480
daughters of non-owners.” Justice Frankfurter wrote for the majority:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar.
This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position of women. The
fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed
as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced,
does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes,
certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. The Constitution

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Id. at 243.
Id.
COBBLE, supra note 442, at 168.
Detman, supra note 468, at 241.
JOSEPHSON, supra note 469, at 284 n.
Id. at 297.
Id.
RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 466, at 52.
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Id. at 465.
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does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social
standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific
481
standards.

As for stereotypes about men’s and women’s roles, Justice Frankfurter had this
to say:
[B]artending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to
moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive
measures . . . . Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through
ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that
482
may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.

As for the role of bartenders’ unions in enacting such legislation, Frankfurter
concluded that “[s]ince the line [Michigan has] drawn is not without a basis in
reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this
legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize
483
the calling.”
Over the next two decades, Goesaert v. Clearly—and its sex-stereotyped
vision of bartending—buttressed union efforts to keep women out of bartending
through state laws and collective bargaining agreements. Between 1948 and
1960, the number of states that prohibited women from working as bartenders
484
increased from seventeen to twenty-six. As Cobble noted,
[b]artenders contended that barmaids lowered the standards of the craft by
working for less, were incapable of being “proficient mixologists,” and were not
“emotionally or temperamentally suited for the job.” They maintained that
women could not handle unruly customers without male support; that female
“moral and physical well-being” was endangered by exposure to alcohol. . . .
One union official went so far as to argue that “a bartender must be a good
conversationalist or know when or when not to talk, and you show me the
485
woman who knows that.”

The enactment of Title VII in 1964 changed everything. But it took some
time. The male monopoly over bartending continued until the early 1970s, when
state statutes—like the one upheld in Goesaert v. Cleary—were struck down
under Title VII challenges, as well as challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause and state constitutional grounds. An example was the 1971 California
486
Supreme Court case of Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, in which the Attorney General of
California defended the state statute on the basis of stereotypes—that female
bartenders could not “preserve order and protect patrons,” that women needed
to be protected from being injured by inebriated customers, and that hiring
female bartenders would lead to “improprieties and immoral acts” and be an

481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
COBBLE, supra note 442, at 166.
Id. at 166–67.
485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). See also Detman, supra note 468, at 245.
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“unwholesome influence” on the public. The California Supreme Court found
the law to be invalid, and the state bans on female bartenders began to lift.
Similarly, during the 1970s, sex-segregated locals for waiters and waitresses
within the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union
488
were found to be unlawful under Title VII. After sex discrimination lawsuits
broke down the legal and contractual barriers to women entering bartending,
489
“the female tide surged forward.” In their study of sex-segregation of jobs,
Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos concluded that “[t]he most dramatic effect of
490
Title VII on women’s access to male jobs occurred in bartending.” Cobble
noted that “[b]artending feminized more rapidly in the next two decades than
virtually any other occupation; by the end of the 1980s, a majority of bartenders
were women. After close to a century of resistance, the union opened its doors
491
to women mixologists.”
Today, although the vast majority of bartenders are part-time employees, a
substantial number work full-time: In 2004, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported that 197,000 individuals held jobs as full-time bartenders in the United
492
States, out of a total of 474,000 jobs in bartending. Of the full-time bartenders
493
in 2004, 95,000 were men and 102,000 were women. Bartenders’ earnings are
low: Nationwide, in 2004, full-time male bartenders earned $482 a week, while
494
full-time female bartenders earned $392 a week. Though the wage gap
between men and women in their median weekly earnings is substantial–
women bartenders earn about 80 percent of what men bartenders earn—it
closely approximates the difference between the median earnings of men and
495
women generally. Turnover for culinary workers is high: According to the
Current Population Survey, in 2004 the median years of tenure in jobs in “food
services and drinking places” was 1.6 years, compared to a median of 4.0 years

487. 485 P.2d at 533, 534, 541, 542.
488. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Evans, with sexsegregated union locals, the waiters were assigned lucrative bar and banquet service, while the
waitresses were assigned lower-paying jobs in the hotel restaurant. Id. at 184–86.
489. See COBBLE, supra note 442, at 170.
490. RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 466, at 54.
491. COBBLE, supra note 442, at 170.
492. For full-time jobs, see data on “Bartenders” in Table 2. Median Usual Weekly Earnings of FullTime Wage and Salary Workers by Detailed Occupation and Sex, 2004 Annual Averages, in BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2004, REP. NO. 987, at
10 (2005) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2004], available at http://www.bls.gov/
cps/cpswom2004.pdf. For all bartender jobs in 2004, see Food and Beverage Serving and Related
Workers, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK,
BULL. 2600, at 5 (2006–2007 ed.) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/print/ocos162.htm.
493. See employment figures for “Bartenders” in Table 2. Median Usual Weekly Earnings,
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2004, supra note 492, at 10.
494. See id. (giving median weekly earnings figures for “Bartenders”).
495. “In 2004, median weekly earnings for women who were full-time wage and salary workers
were $573, or 80 percent of the $713 median for their male counterparts. . . . In 1979, the first year of
comparable earnings data, women earned 63 percent as much as men did.” HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S
EARNINGS IN 2004, supra note 492, at 1.
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496

in jobs with all employers. Moreover, unionization of employees working in
these establishments is low: In 2004, only 4.7 percent of all employees in
occupations related to preparing and serving food were represented by
497
unions. By contrast, Cobble noted that “[b]y the early 1950s, more than a
quarter of all workers in eating and drinking establishments were organized
under the HERE [Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union] banner,
and in labor strongholds such as San Francisco, New York, and Detroit
498
unionization approached 80 percent.”
The fact that women now outnumber men in the job of full-time bartender
is no doubt in large part attributable to the changing legal regime of Title VII
and heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications in Equal Protection doctrine
that broke the state-sanctioned male monopoly on bartending jobs. Many
aspects of the job and industry, however, contributed to the rapid and extensive
feminization of bartending since the 1970s: the decline in real wages (partly
attributed to a 1966 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that allowed
499
bartenders to be paid less than the minimum wage as “tipped workers”), the
rapid growth in the number of new jobs (due in part to the expansion of
corporate-owned restaurant chains and franchises, hotels, and casinos, and the
500
decline in bars and restaurants owned by individual proprietors and partners),
the increase in female customers, the high turnover in jobs, the decline in union
membership and union representation in the industry, the decline in median
501
weekly hours worked and the increase in part-time work, the availability of
502
flexible hours,
the deskilling of bartending tasks through standardized
503
procedures and the introduction of liquor guns and other machines, the
504
proliferation of bartending schools and the easy availability of on-the-job
505
training for barbacks and cocktail waitresses, and the differential in wages and
506
status between waitresses and bartenders. Linda Detman would add to this list

496. Table 5. Median Years of Tenure with Current Employer for Employed Wage and Salary Workers by
Industry, Selected Years, 2000–04, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY (2006) [hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY], available at http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/tenure.t05.htm. The 2004 Employee Tenure Summary reports, “Nearly 31 percent
of workers age 25 and over had 10 or more years of tenure with their current employer in January
2004.” Employee Tenure Survey, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.
497. See data on “Service occupations: Food preparation and serving related occupations” in
Table 3. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, in CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (last visited
June 16, 2006).
498. Cobble, supra note 465, at 218.
499. Detman, supra note 468, at 251.
500. Id. at 249.
501. Id.
502. RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 466, at 63.
503. Detman, supra note 468, at 248.
504. RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 466, at 60–61; Detman, supra note 468, at 250.
505. RESKIN & ROOS, supra note 466, at 63.
506. Detman, supra note 468, at 251.
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“changing social attitudes about the acceptability of bartending for women, and
507
the growth of a sex-specific demand for female bartenders.”
Much of the “sex-specific demand” for “barmaids” and “bar babes” rather
than “bartenders” is clearly driven by gender stereotypes. One union official
“attributed women’s influx into bartending to their appeal to bar owners, who
believe that women enhance their trade, do not steal, are better equipped than
men to respond to an increased female clientele, and will work for less
508
money.”
The rapid and extensive feminization of bartending is also
attributable to the sexualization of the job of female bartenders. Some employers
have deliberately recast the nature and requirements of the job of bartending to
lure attractive (and, perhaps not coincidentally, lower-paid) women to jobs
behind the bar where their pleasing, feminine—and even sexy—appearance is as
509
important as their ability to mix a drink. For example, a July 2005 job posting
510
on the Internet sought a “sexy bartender for a metal bar.” The bar was looking
for “girls to bartender, you have to be 21+, open mind, energetic, sexy and like
511
metal music. . . . You have to dress sexy and black, wear make up.” Such ads
for female bartenders are ubiquitous in postings on Internet job sites. Popular
512
films such as Coyote Ugly
portray female bartenders as scantily-clad,
sexualized performers, dancing provocatively on the bar while preparing drinks
for cheering, inebriated male (and female) patrons. In justifying its 1971 Sail’er
Inn decision to abolish the state ban on female bartenders, the Supreme Court of
California wrote, “Today most bars, unlike the saloons of the Old West, are
relatively quiet, orderly and respectable places patronized by both men and
513
women.” The irony is, perhaps, that the “improprieties and immoral acts” that
the California Attorney General feared would result from hiring female

507. Id. at 252.
508. Id. at 253.
509. The following news account describes some female bartenders in New York City:
Shot glasses and bottles of liquor aren’t all you juggle when you’re a woman behind a
bar in New York.
On any night, countless men tell a female bartender how good she looks, why they like
her and exactly what they would like to do with her before they’ve even ordered a drink.
....
“We like to provide eye candy,” says Charles Milite, co-owner of Union Square’s
Coffee Shop. He estimates that 75% of his bartending staff is female.
....
But many women work at places where their job is to just serve drinks and make
chatter &- [sic] and no more.
They’re concerned that the R-rated antics at some of the wilder places lead men to
expect salacious theatrics from any woman mixing cocktails.
Rebecca Louie, Bar Babes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 23, 2003, available at http://www.nydailynews.
com/front/v-pfriendly/story/103205p-93398c.html.
510. Advertisement for “SEXY BARTENDER FOR A METAL BAR,” http://newyork.craigs
list.org/ (posted June 9, 2005, 12:49 EDT) (on file with authors). The ad also specifies that “the most
important part is that you are bi or willing to put on a show (lesbian show) we have to admit that
that shit sells.” Id.
511. Id.
512. (Buena Vista Pictures 2000).
513. Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 533–34 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
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bartenders in the early 1970s have become the reason that many bars today want
514
to hire them—the more “improper” and “immoral” the better.
Harrah’s Reno casino, however, did not hire Darlene Jespersen to be a
showgirl, a “coyote,” a “bar babe,” or even a cocktail waitress who was expected
515
to wear a revealing uniform. She was hired to be a bartender, a job that—
516
according to descriptions of the job functions found either on Harrah’s website
517
or in the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook —does
not require being either female or male, and certainly does not require being a
female who is beautified with makeup. Jespersen willingly wore a uniform
consisting of white shirt, black vest, black bow tie, black pants, and black,
nonskid shoes, which the Jespersen en banc majority described as “for the most
518
part unisex,” though it was the traditional uniform of the stereotypical male
bartender harking back to the days when male bartenders had a monopoly on
the craft. The uniform was functional, comfortable, and safe, enabling the
Harrah’s bartenders to perform their work efficiently. When Harrah’s added
standardized makeup as a new uniform requirement for female bartenders, it
attempted to get from these women service workers additional entertainment
value—to emphasize their feminine appearance as barmaids. In this sense, the
female bartenders’ faces were commodified and sold to the customers as part of
the Harrah’s branded service exchange. Not only did the female bartenders have

514. See supra text accompanying note 487.
515. Bayard de Volo commented that, at the Reno casinos she observed between 1988 and 1995,
Reno cocktail waitress uniforms vary yet tend to involve either a low-cut dress with a
short skirt or a low-cut glitter vest and leotard topped with a tuxedo jacket with tails
reaching mid-thigh in back. It is tempting to focus on how these uniforms objectify and
thus oppress women. They are designed with heterosexual male desires in mind and
imposed on female workers. Thus, they invite the male gaze, celebrate male leers, and
position women as objects, potential prizes to be won by the lucky (male) winners.
. . . [T]he waitresses in my study did not experience their uniforms as oppressive.
Sometimes, they expressed some sort of satisfaction and pride in their uniform.
Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 356 (alteration added).
516. A 2006 Harrah’s Internet job posting for bartender position in Reno, Nevada, describes the
job functions as follows:
Provides wine, liquor and related bar service to guests at assigned station, including
slot change for bars equipped with poker slot machines. Provides fast, efficient service and
courteous guest service. Mixes drinks according to prescribed recipes.
Maintains assigned station in a clean and sanitary condition. Keeps assigned station
stocked with all liquor, glasses and accessories necessary. Accounts for beginning cash
register bank, all cash, complimentary drink coupons and charge receipts.
Serves no minors or obviously intoxicated persons.
Must be at least 21 years of age. Successfully complete a Harrah’s Bartender school.
Fluent and literate in English. Excellent guest service interaction skills.
Harrah’s Employment, Search Jobs, http://harrahs.hodesiq.com/careers/job_detail.asp?JobID
=783702 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
517. OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 492, at 5. See generally BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE 2006–07 CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES, BULL. 2601, Food Services
and Drinking Places, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs023.htm.
518. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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to pay for the makeup—in unreimbursed cost and time —they were not paid
for the value their feminized looks presumably added to the Harrah’s brand.
Powerful male bartenders’ unions once actively and successfully fought,
sometimes with the complicity of unionized female waitresses, to keep women
out of bartending in the United States and preserve union hegemony; yet,
today’s much less powerful unions of food and beverage workers—no longer
segregated by sex—seem disinterested in fighting for dress, grooming, and
appearance codes that would ensure equal working conditions and
opportunities for both men and women workers in their industry. Title VII was
once a powerful tool used to challenge gender stereotypes underpinning laws
and contracts that kept women out of bartending jobs; yet, it is today a weak
and ineffectual law in the hands of judges who affirm corporate reliance on
“reasonable” gender stereotypes as a barrier to jobs opportunities for women.
The fact that there are now more women than men in bartending has not given
them more power and status, rather it has contributed to the sexualizing and
devaluing of their jobs nationwide. The history and demographics of the
bartending profession suggest that both unions and antidiscrimination law can
be important agents, both promoting and resisting change. If unions and jurists
defer meekly and unreflectively to the prerogative of corporations to
appropriate and sell gender stereotypes as part of their brands, the promise of
worker dignity and sexual equality will remain unfulfilled.
When male bartenders persuaded states to ban bartending jobs for women,
they relied on sex-stereotyped images of what attributes bartenders must
exhibit. These were masculinized images of strong, honest, level-headed
individuals—good conversationalists who could perform well as members of
the male club. Whether he was in a high-class gentlemen’s club, a middle-class
neighborhood tavern, or a low-class rowdy bar, the bartender ruled a male
domain. The introduction of females was always in a subordinate status—as
wife or daughter of the barkeep, as bar maid, bar girl (“B-girl”), or cocktail
waitress. When this gender hegemony was broken by Title VII, and women first
entered these traditional male jobs in large numbers, questions would inevitably
arise for each woman becoming a bartender: Would she be expected to perform
her job like a woman or like a man? Are the job functions essentially masculine
or only socially constructed to be masculine?
Darlene Jespersen initially fit Harrah’s image of a good male bartender in
all of her personal characteristics—her manner, her honesty, her friendliness, her
physiognomy, her size and strength; her ability to manage the bar, the money,
and mixing drinks; her ability to handle unruly customers and be a good
conversationalist. The only “problem” was that she was a woman. Critically,
even though for years Harrah’s recognized that she was very good at fulfilling
the functions of the job of a traditional (male) bartender—in ways that women
historically had been assumed to be incapable of performing—that was not
enough in 2000 when Harrah’s required that she wear makeup. At that point,
she also had to display conspicuously, to both her customers and her
supervisors, her identity as a female bartender. Being a bartender, which for her

519. See id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the reasons the court should give judicial
notice to the fact that “putting on makeup costs money and takes time”).
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twenty previous years at Harrah’s was a “unisex” (or no particular sex) job—
open to men and women on equal terms—had become “sexed up” and
“feminized,” meaning that the company used biological sex to segregate its
bartenders into male and female, and then imposed only on female bartenders
the sexual status marker of a mandatory, feminine makeup requirement.
Harrah’s enforcement of its “Personal Best” branding standard for female
bartenders thus turned history on its head, banning Jespersen from a job solely
because she was a woman who appeared and acted too much like a man,
despite that fact that she was hired precisely because she could do what had
traditionally been defined as a man’s job, just like a man (indeed maybe even
better because as a female bartender she would attract costumers who would see
her bar as “a safe place to visit”). Darlene Jespersen, like Ann Hopkins in Price
520
521
Waterhouse, was truly caught in “an untenable Catch-22” —required to
display what are considered strong masculine traits for her job and fired for
refusing to display a feminine, painted face that would undermine her
(masculine) authority in performing her job. Harrah’s’ sex-stereotyped “brand
standard” image for its female bartenders was just as pernicious, and just as
sexist, as the sex-stereotyped images of bartenders once used by male
bartenders’ unions, legislators, and courts to keep most women out of
bartending jobs altogether. Both then and now, sexual stereotypes—whether
used to rationalize and legitimate the sex-based line-drawing found in midtwentieth-century state statutes, constitutional law decisions, and union
contracts or in today’s corporate branding as reaffirmed by the courts—have the
same effect: They deny women the opportunity to work as bartenders because
of their sex.
VII. (RE)FRAMING JESPERSEN’S CLAIM: RESISTING BRANDING
Viewed from a pragmatic perspective, the Jespersen Title VII lawsuit seems
rather puzzling. Harrah’s offered to rehire Jespersen as a bartender and allow
her to work without makeup, but Jespersen turned down the offer because
Harrah’s refused to grant her backpay and also because they refused to abandon
522
their makeup requirement for all female beverage servers. Why would the

520. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
521. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111 (discussing the way Price Waterhouse placed Ann Hopkins in a
“Catch-22” because “the very traits that she was asked to hide were the same traits considered
praiseworthy in men” and distinguishing this from Harrah’s treatment of Darlene Jespersen); see also
Carbado et al., supra note 221, at 144–48 (discussing the analysis of the “double bind” (or “catch 22”)
theory in Price Waterhouse and the Jespersen panel decision and concluding that “one can argue, as
Jespersen herself has always maintained, that acting feminine simply has nothing to do with being a
great bartender”). Jespersen should have prevailed under either a narrower “Catch-22” theory of sex
discrimination or a broader gender nonconformance theory of sexual stereotyping. See Cynthia
Estlund, The Story of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES, supra
note 221, at 65, 91–103.
522. See Rhina Guidos, Fired Bartender Sues Harrah’s Over Makeup Policy, RENO GAZETTE-J., July 7,
2001, http://www.rgj.com/cgi-bin/printstory.cgi?publish_date=20010707&story=994571740; see also
Carbado et al., supra note 221, at 120.
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plaintiff—a single woman in her mid-forties, living in a double-wide trailer,
524
525
and surviving on retail service jobs —not accept this offer? Why did she
choose to oppose Harrah’s ability to impose its rules on other women service
workers? Who were her allies?
When Darlene Jespersen first challenged Harrah’s sex-based grooming
rules and was fired, a variety of circumstances—some historical, some
accidental, some inevitable, and some serendipitous—shaped the subsequent
decisions about how her claim was framed in her own mind, in her community,
in the media, by various public interest organizations, her lawyers, and,
ultimately, by the courts. Jespersen very early identified her claim as one
asserting collective rights for working women.
As her claim moved through the legal system, however, this notion of
collective rights was difficult to sustain, despite support from various local and
national public interest groups that assisted during the appeal of her Title VII
lawsuit in the name of workers’ rights, women’s rights, or rights for gays and
lesbians. Ultimately, Jespersen lost her opportunity to take her Title VII case to
trial because Harrah’s succeeded in convincing the court that she was an outlier,
supporting her legal case with evidence only of her own subjective,
idiosyncratic, individual claim, not of harms to women as a class.
After she lost her job at Harrah’s, Jespersen’s options were limited, and her
financial circumstances were dire. The beverage servers at Harrah’s Reno casino
were not unionized, so she could not bring a grievance to a union. She was an
employee at will, so she had no contractual guarantees of continued
employment. As a female challenging a sex-based grooming rule, she had a
tenuous discrimination claim under existing Nevada antidiscrimination law and
Title VII, and pursuing a lawsuit beyond administrative remedies would require
the assistance of a lawyer. Moreover, her former employer was one of the largest
casino operators in the nation, much less in Nevada, with enormous resources to
defend against any legal action she might bring.

523. In 2001, Mother Jones magazine reported that Jespersen was then living in a “double-wide
mobile home she shares with a menagerie of stray cats and dogs on the outskirts of Reno, Nevada.”
Christensen, supra note 322.
524. According to Kenneth McKenna, one of Jespersen’s attorneys, after she was fired from
Harrah’s and sued the company, she was “blackballed from working in the gaming industry and
now holds a job in a retail store.” Vogel, supra note 195. Jespersen reported that, after she was fired at
Harrah’s, she had to take jobs through “temp services” for two-and-a-half years before she obtained
“a real job.” Schelden, supra note 191; see also Carbado et al, supra note 221, at 120 (reporting the
“significant costs” Jespersen experienced as a result of losing her job at Harrah’s).
525. A Harrah’s spokesman, Gary Thompson, reported to the press at the time that Jespersen lost
her first appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that “Jespersen was later offered her job back, which she
declined, and Harrah’s has since modified its policy—although women are still required to wear
makeup.” Court: It’s OK to Fire Woman Who Wouldn’t Wear Makeup, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2004-12-28-makeup_x.htm. The dissent in Jespersen
noted that Harrah’s had “quietly disposed of [its ‘Personal Best’] policy after Jespersen filed [her]
suit.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (Pregersen, J., dissenting) (alterations added).
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A rational economic choice would have been to take her job back on the
526
terms offered. Jespersen was earning $30,000 a year when Harrah’s fired her.
As a long-time Harrah’s employee, she had received excellent benefits—
527
including five weeks of vacation a year and a 401(k) plan. Unable to find work
immediately after she was fired, she filed for unemployment insurance from the
State of Nevada. The Nevada Department of Employment, Training and
Rehabilitation first sent her a letter stating: “‘You have refused to wear makeup
because you feel that it is degrading and demoralizing.’ . . . ‘The employers [sic]
request was not unreasonable. Refusing to follow company policy is misconduct
528
in connection with work. You are ineligible for benefits.’” Two days later (and
rather inexplicably since she had not yet taken any action challenging the denial
of benefits), Jespersen received a second letter announcing that the Department
529
had reversed its prior decision and was granting her unemployment benefits.
This second letter asserted that she would be granted unemployment because
she had no record of insubordination for more than twenty years of working for
her employer and because “the employer changed the conditions of
530
employment.”
Not surprisingly, Jespersen did not object to this second determination. But
neither did Harrah’s: The company probably hoped that unemployment
compensation would mollify Jespersen until she found another job, and they
would not have welcomed the publicity an unemployment compensation
hearing might have provoked. Nevertheless, unemployment insurance could
531
not come close to replacing Jespersen’s full wages and benefits at Harrah’s.
And wages for other bartender positions in Reno—if she could obtain one—
would not be likely to compare favorably to her earnings and benefits at
532
Harrah’s. Even with the financial mitigation of the state-provided, incomesecurity safety net, to face unemployment after twenty years of rewarding work

526. Rhina Guidos, Reno Bartender Terminated Because She Wouldn’t Wear Makeup, RENO GAZETTEJ, Oct. 1, 2000, http://www.rgj.com/cgi-bin/printstory.cgi?publish_date=20001001&story
=970454561.
527. Id.
528. Id. (quoting from letter to Darlene Jespersen from State of Nevada Department of
Employment, Training & Rehabilitation).
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. For example, as of December 2006, the maximum amount an individual could receive under
the Nevada unemployment insurance system was $362 per week (or $18,824 per year). See Nevada
Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation, Unemployment Insurance Claim Filing
System, Frequently Asked Questions, How Much Is My First Check?, http://detr.state.nv.us/
uiben/faq.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
532. For example, in 2005, five years after Jespersen left Harrah’s, the mean annual wage of
bartenders for the Reno-Sparks area was $15,950. Even the ninetieth-percentile wage for this area
was $21,310. By comparison, in 2005 the national mean annual wage was $17,640, and the ninetiethpercentile wage was $26,480; in the Las Vegas-Paradise area the mean annual wage was $21,600, and
the ninetieth-percentile wage was $33,820. These estimates are found in the Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS FOR MAY 2005 FOR BARTENDERS
(SOC Code 353011), available at http://data.bls.gov/oes/search.jsp. The large disparity in mean
annual wages for bartenders between Reno and Las Vegas can be explained to a great degree by the
differences in the extent of unionization of food and beverage workers in the two cities, as discussed
infra Part VII.C.1, notes 534–605 and accompanying text.
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for a single employer would be difficult for anyone—a hard consequence for
refusing to wear makeup. Yet, the local newspaper reported that Jespersen “said
533
her dignity and self-esteem were worth more than financial comfort.”
Unemployed and seemingly alone in challenging a rule that no other female
534
beverage server at Harrah’s Reno Casino had publicly opposed, Jespersen told
535
a reporter in the fall of 2000, “This is about our civil rights.”
A. Finding Allies in Community Organizations: The Alliance for Workers’
Rights
Jespersen found her first ally in a local group of community activists, the
Alliance for Workers’ Rights (“the Alliance”), a relatively small public advocacy
536
organization in Nevada that is based in Reno. Early in 2000, the Alliance had
formed a coalition with two other community groups—the Nevada Empowered
Women’s Project and Planned Parenthood—to put pressure on Nevada casinos
to abandon mandatory dress codes that required cocktail waitresses to wear
537
high heels on the job. Concerns about the health risks of high-heel shoes for
538
women have long been raised by medical professionals, as well as by labor
539
scholars. However, the Culinary Workers Union, which represents most of the
cocktail waitresses on the Las Vegas Strip, had apparently never raised the issue
of mandatory shoe style for women in contract negotiations, although the union
540
had dealt with individual complaints about the policy. The union’s lack of
involvement in this issue is understandable: A lobbyist for the Nevada Resort
Association probably captured the union’s view when commenting that the
541
high-heel shoe issue was “much to do [sic] about nothing,” and indeed many

533. Guidos, supra note 526.
534. When the Harrah’s Reno female beverage servers were asked to sign Harrah’s amended
Personal Best policy, requiring all female beverage servers to wear prescribed makeup, Jespersen
was the only woman in the group who refused to sign. See GPAC Interview with Jespersen, supra
note 188. According to Jespersen’s attorney Jennifer Pizer, other female beverage servers at Harrah’s
Reno Casino found the “Personal Best” policy offensive but were afraid to express their views to
their supervisors. Conversation with Jennifer C. Pizer, Senior Counsel, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 20, 2006).
535. Guidos, supra note 526.
536. In its statement of interest in its Amici Brief, the Alliance claimed to have about 300
members in 2003. Brief of the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2004) (No. 03-15045), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/Lambda_PDF/pdf/361.
pdf. The significance of community-based organizations for workers’ rights has been explored by
Alan Hyde and Jim Pope. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Who Speaks for the Working Poor? A Preliminary Look at
the Emerging Tetralogy of Low-Wage Service Workers, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004); James
Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the
Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889 (1991).
537. David Strow, Casino High Heel Policies Targeted, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 11, 2000, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2000/feb/11/509835722.html.
538. See id.
539. See, e.g., Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness and
Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear Requirements for Female
Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295 (1997).
540. See Strow, supra note 537.
541. Id.
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cocktail waitresses do not object to wearing high heels on the job. For example,
one waitress asserted that high-heel shoes “are a part of the identity of
waitresses across Las Vegas,” that they “just make the uniform look better,” and
543
in Las Vegas “people want to see cocktail waitresses that look nice.”
The Alliance for Workers’ Rights perceived Darlene Jespersen’s dispute
with Harrah’s over its makeup rules as a corollary to the Alliance’s statewide
544
“Kiss My Foot” campaign protesting mandatory high-heel policies in casinos.
On February 16, 2001, the Alliance sponsored a demonstration in front of the
main entrance to Harrah’s Reno Casino publicizing Jespersen’s story and
545
protesting mandatory high-heel shoe requirements. Jespersen joined about
fifty Alliance members and other community activists and cocktail servers; some
of the signs they carried read: “Harrah’s Makes a Lousy Pimp” and “Harrah’s:
546
Stop Pimping Up Profits.” By this time, Jespersen’s story had come to the
attention of national media, starting her on her way to becoming a minor local
547
celebrity and eventually provoking other protests in front of other casinos in
548
Reno and Las Vegas. Her story was told in newspapers, on television, and on
the Web sites of a number of organizations devoted to rights for workers, for
549
women, for gays and lesbians. In June 2001, when about fifty Alliance
members and casino cocktail servers demonstrated in front of the Venetian in
Las Vegas, their signs read “Kiss My Foot” and “Dangerous Not Sexy.”
550
Representatives from the Culinary Workers Union were not present, but

542. A female HERE representative from Las Vegas, explaining the union’s opposition to the
community coalition spearheaded by the Alliance for Workers’ Rights, told one reporter that “‘A
nice heel slenderizes the leg. . . . Most waitresses are not opposed to wearing a heel. I personally
prefer wearing a heel.’” John Kass, “Consultant” Cash from Union Leaves Levar Well-Heeled, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 17, 2000, at 3N.
543. Strow, supra note 537.
544. See Bayard de Volo, supra note 325, at 370–71.
545. See Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, Darlene Jespersen Protest in Reno, Nevada, GPAC
NEWS, Mar. 30, 2001, http://www.gpac.org/archive/news/notitle.html?cmd=view&archive=news
&msgnum=0293 (reporting on Reno protest sponsored by Nevada Alliance for Workers’ Rights on
February 16, 2001).
546. Harrah’s Dress Rules Draw Protest, supra note 433. See also the photograph of Darlene
Jespersen with protesting cocktail servers holding signs, in Andrew Barbano, Humpty Dumpty Justice,
BARBWIRE, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.nevadalabor.com/barbwire/barb06/barb4-16-06.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2006).
547. See Barbwire by Barbano, Bulletin, Mar. 28, 2001, http://www.nevadalabor.com/bullet
ins.html#foxoff (discussing stories about the Jespersen lawsuit published in various national media,
including Mother Jones magazine (Mar.–Apr. 2001), People magazine (Dec. 11, 2000), and the website
of Oprah Winfrey’s Oxygen cable television channel), http://www.oxygen.com/oprah.
548. Guidos, supra note 522.
549. See, e.g., Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, http://www.gpac.org/; Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/index.html; Barbwire, http://
www.nevadalabor.com/barbwire/barbcontents.html.
550. Because of the nature of the signs used in some of these protests, the officials and members
of the Culinary Workers Union would have no doubt felt constrained by the limitations on product
disparagement imposed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), a legal constraint not faced by the community activists, as well
as questions about the purpose of the picketing, i.e., whether it was informational, organizational, a
secondary boycott, etc. See, e.g., NLRA §§ 8(b)(7), 8(b)(4), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(7), 158(b)(4)
(2000).
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Darlene Jespersen was. Although Harrah’s asserted that she was the only person
out of its 4,200 employees who had complained about its “Personal Best” dress
551
and grooming policy, by the time she filed her lawsuit, Jespersen’s challenge to
Harrah’s sexualization of its female beverage servers was part of a larger
dispute brought by community activists and female casino employees against
how the casinos generally used sexualized dress, appearance, and grooming
codes to exploit, harm, and demean female beverage servers. Whether they were
required to wear high-heel shoes, or makeup, or small-size, tight uniforms,
many women workers felt the casinos were “pimping” them.
B. Modes of Resistance at Law: Individual Lawsuits
1. The Administrative Process
In an interview with GenderPAC National News in January, 2001,
Jespersen described how she came to file a sex discrimination lawsuit against
Harrah’s Operating Company:
I felt it was wrong what Harrah’s was doing. I felt there had to be some legal
recourse. I spoke to the Nevada Equal Rights Commission . . . even before I got
terminated. . . . The Equal Rights Commission said it [Harrah’s makeup
requirement] was a reasonable request. I asked whether it was discrimination.
They said it had been tried in court and that it was decided that employers
could ask women to wear make-up because women were supposed to wear
552
makeup.

Given the difficulty of prevailing in legal challenges to sex-based dress and
grooming policies, it is not surprising that the Nevada Equal Rights Commission
saw Harrah’s makeup policy as nondiscriminatory and essentially tried to
discourage Jespersen from pursuing a claim against the company. Nor is it
unusual that the EEOC did not pursue Jespersen’s sex discrimination claim
against Harrah’s on its own initiative, or later intervene in her lawsuit when it
became clear that the case raised important interpretive and doctrinal issues
553
under Title VII. Michael Selmi has described many of the reasons that the
EEOC avoids initiating or intervening in controversial employment

It is difficult to fault the union for its failure to intercede given the Supreme Court’s clear message
in the Jefferson Standard case that workers’ sense of self-worth derived from the quality of the product
or service that they produce has no protectible value at law. See 346 U.S. at 476 (finding that the
workers’ attack on the quality of the television programming of their employer had nothing to do
with the labor dispute because it “made no reference to wages, hours or working conditions. The
policies attacked were those of finance and public relations for which management, not technicians,
must be responsible.”).
551. Peter Schelden, Appeals Court to Hear Harrah’s Gender Discrimination Case, SPARKS TRIB.
(Nev.), Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://www.nevadalabor.com/barbwire/barb03/tribjespg616.html.
552. GPAC Interview with Jespersen, supra note 188. Jespersen also said in this interview that she
had called the Nevada Labor Board and that they told her that Harrah’s “could fire [her] for any
reason because it’s a right-to-work state.” Id.
553. After the oral arguments before the en banc Ninth Circuit, EEOC General Counsel Eric
Drieband commented that “[t]he sex stereotyping issue may eventually go all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.” 23 Hum. Resources Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 735 (July 11, 2005).
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discrimination cases. As he notes in his examination of EEOC employment
cases from 1994 to 1996, all of the high-profile, class-action cases the EEOC
litigated in that period were originally filed by private attorneys, and the only
case the government initiated—the infamous Hooters Restaurant case—was
dropped after the agency faced embarrassing news reports and congressional
555
hearings. One can only imagine the uproar—in the media and Congress—that
would have been likely if the EEOC had intervened in what has come to be
556
known as the “Lipstick Lawsuit.” Yet Jespersen’s challenge to Harrah’s sexbased grooming policy was precisely the sort of difficult case—against a highprofile, wealthy defendant—that could have benefited from a sophisticated
class-action approach by a team of career attorneys backed by the resources and
557
expertise of the United States government. Of course no one, other than the
community activists who saw the connections between makeup and high-heel
shoes, conceptualized Jespersen’s case as a potential class-action sex
discrimination claim. Going forward on her legal claim as an individual, private
558
plaintiff meant that her case would be “notoriously difficult to win.”
2. The Plaintiffs’ Bar: The Solo Attorney Takes on Harrah’s
When Jespersen first called the Alliance for Workers’ Rights, it referred her
to a lawyer in Reno, Jeffrey A. Dickerson, a solo practitioner who specializes in
559
employment law and employment discrimination claims for plaintiffs. After
assisting her through the administrative process, Dickerson prepared her Title
VII complaint and filed it on July 6, 2001, in the United States District Court for
560
the District of Nevada. In settlement negotiations, Harrah’s again offered to
561
rehire Jespersen in her bartending job without requiring her to wear makeup.
But they also did not offer her backpay or agree to change their grooming policy
562
for other workers. She again turned them down. Reportedly, Jespersen
scrambled to find an attorney who could take her case to trial, and another solo
563
attorney in Reno—Kenneth J. McKenna—took over the file. He handled the

554. See generally Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1401 (1998).
555. Id. at 1429, 1439, 1444.
556. See Barbano, supra note 546.
557. Selmi, supra note 554, at 1475.
558. Id. at 1452. See also Christine Jolls, Public-Interest Organizations in the Enforcement of
Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144–47
(Richard B. Freeman et al., eds., 2005) (discussing the limited efficacy of private legal representation
in the employment law context).
559. Dickerson’s Internet site indicates that he practices in the areas of “Employment Law;
Sexual Harassment; Discrimination; Wrongful Termination; Civil Rights; Business Litigation.” See
http://jdickersonlaw.com/jsp2184799.jsp (last visited Aug. 25, 2006). See generally Carbado et al.,
supra note 221, at 120–21 (discussing Jespersen’s search for legal counsel).
560. See Jespersen Complaint, supra note 207.
561. Schelden, supra note 551.
562. See Carbado et al., supra note 221, at 120 (reporting that, in addition to being unhappy about
not receiving backpay, “Jespersen was worried about how her co-workers would react to her
receiving a special exemption. And, she was angry.”).
563. See id. at 121. McKenna’s name appears as Jespersen’s counsel on the 2004 Nevada Supreme
Court decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 131 P.3d 614 (unpublished table decision),
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case alone, opposing Harrah’s summary judgment motion with an evidentiary
record that no doubt seemed strong at the time, but later proved to be
inadequate as a matter of law. Moreover, the resources of a solo attorney in
Reno were vastly inferior to what Harrah’s could afford.
From the beginning Harrah’s was represented by Littler Mendelson, a large
law firm specializing in “defend[ing] employers in civil rights and wrongful
discharge litigation,” that boasts that “[b]y the end of the 1970s, . . . [it had]
acquired a reputation for aggressive representation of employer interests in
564
union-related matters and the emerging area of employment law.” By the
1990s, in addition to offices convenient for Harrah’s business in Las Vegas and
Reno, Littler Mendelson had offices throughout the country, with more than 150
565
attorneys. By 2006, when the Jespersen case ended, Littler Mendelson, “with
more than 485 attorneys and 36 offices in major metropolitan areas nationwide,”
could claim that it “is the largest law firm in the country exclusively devoted to
representing management in employment, employee benefits, and labor law
566
matters.” The fact that Harrah’s was represented throughout the course of the
Jespersen litigation by a major management-side employment law firm like
Littler Mendelson was particularly significant at the summary judgment stage of
567
the litigation, when Jespersen was represented by a solo practitioner. It was
perhaps less important once Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
568
stepped in to handle the appeals. In the end, however, the case was “lost”—in
terms of obtaining relief for Jespersen—in the district court at the summary
judgment stage, and the imbalance in the legal resources available to the parties
569
early in the litigation may well have been a factor.
No. 40587, slip op. at 7 (Nev. June 7, 2004) (on file with authors), as well as co-counsel on the
appellate briefs prepared by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and as counsel in the
published district court and en banc court of appeals decisions in her federal discrimination case.
See, e.g., Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178, at 53; Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. Nev. 2002); Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
564. See Littler Mendelson—The National Employment & Labor Law Firm, Firm History,
http://www.littler.com/aboutus/index.cfm?event=detail&childViewID=157 (last visited Dec. 20,
2006).
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Two Littler Mendelson attorneys, Patrick H. Hicks, a “founding shareholder of Littler
Mendelson’s Las Vegas and Reno, Nev. offices” and Veronica Arechederra Hall, “a shareholder in
Littler Mendelson’s Las Vegas office,” “represented Harrah’s Operating Company throughout the
legal proceedings in the case brought by Darlene Jespersen.” Patrick H. Hicks et al., Reasonable Dress
and Grooming Requirements Survive Court Scrutiny, 10 GAMING L. REV. 342, 342 n.a1 (2006).
568. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund did not begin representing Jespersen until after
she had brought her state law suit and after Harrah’s had prevailed on its motion for summary
judgment in federal district court. Conversation with Jennifer Pizer, supra note 534.
569. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), reprinted in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT
AHEAD? 11 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); see also Donald R. Songer et al., Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead Over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1925–1988, in IN LITIGATION, supra, at 86, 99 (confirming, in a study of decisions of the
federal courts of appeals, Galanter’s thesis that “repeat players”—including businesses—tend to
prevail over individual litigants who are “one-shot players,” and concluding that “parties that may
be presumed to be repeat players with superior resources consistently fared better than their weaker
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3. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund: The Discrimination Claim
570

In her appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
571
and subsequent petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, Jespersen was
represented by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (“Lambda Legal”), a
national not-for-profit organization dedicated to the rights of gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) individuals. Lambda Legal is what Christine
Jolls describes as a “national issue organization”—a public-interest legal
organization “that focus[es] on a particular set of issues or topics . . . and [is]
572
funded largely or exclusively by sources other than the government.” Like
other national issue organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lambda Legal
“tend[s] to focus on high-profile, publicly charged issues such as discrimination
and tend[s] to work on a few important or influential cases rather than a large
573
number of more day-to-day claims.” Lambda Legal agreed to take Jespersen’s
574
appeal after the ACLU turned her down. Jespersen’s case suited Lambda
Legal’s purposes well. The only problem was that, as is usual with nonprofit
organizations who undertake impact litigation, Lambda Legal did not take her
575
case from the outset; rather, it entered the case after Harrah’s had won its
motion for summary judgment in District Court.
Darlene Jespersen’s decision to keep appealing after every loss seemed to
be personal and idiosyncratic. It can be explained in part by her character and
principles, but also by Lambda Legal’s decision to take up her cause as its own.
Once Lambda Legal recast the case as being about a legal principle at the core of
protecting the rights of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders generally,
and not just about Jespersen’s job, her personal autonomy, or her financial wellbeing, Lambda Legal had no choice but to continue appealing and to continue
576
funding the costs of the appeals.

opponents and the disparity in success rates was greatest when the disparity in strength was
greatest”).
570. See Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 178; Reply Brief of Appellant
Darlene Jespersen, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045),
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/Lambda_PDF/pdf/360.pdf.
571. See Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing on Banc, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (No. 03-15045), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binarydata/Lambda_PDF/pdf/362.pdf.
572. Jolls, supra note 558, at 147.
573. Id. at 158.
574. See Carbado et al., supra note 221, at 125.
575. Jolls reports that, unlike government-funded legal service organizations, privately-funded
public-interest organizations do not provide direct legal advice to clients but focus on cases at the
appellate level. Jolls, supra note 558, at 163.
576. Citing the 1974 work of Marc Galanter, Catherine Albiston observes that
public interest organizations may better represent the collective interests of one-shot
employee litigants than individual one-shot players and therefore be less likely to trade
rule gain for monetary compensation. In addition, public interest organizations sometimes
engage in strategic litigation to further social change and occasionally engage in strategic
settlement themselves to avoid developing a negative legal precedent.
Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1999), reprinted in IN LITIGATION, supra note 569, at 168, 173.

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

BRANDED

109

Lambda Legal decided to represent Jespersen in her appeals because the
doctrinal treatment of gender stereotypes in Title VII cases is an issue of great
importance to the organization and its goals of improving employment
opportunities for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. Lambda
Legal correctly understood the significance of Jespersen’s case for the GLBT
community and for women generally, and the case’s legal significance did not
hinge on whether Jespersen was a lesbian who believed that makeup connotes
577
hetereosexuality—and thereby undermined her own sexual identity —or just a
woman (lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual) who did not like makeup or want to
wear it, perhaps because it connotes gender subordination. Jespersen was not
identified as a lesbian in any court documents; rather, she was described by her
own counsel as wishing to be “androgynous” in the workplace—in effect, she
578
chose to identify herself neither as a man nor as a woman. She was, however,
579
sometimes described as a “lesbian” in media stories about her case. To ascribe
the significance of Jespersen’s aversion to wearing makeup solely to her sexual
identity, however, is to dismiss her choices for how to present her appearance as
being at best purely personal or idiosyncratic and at worst deliberately
nonconforming or even deviant. It is also too simplistic in light of the complex
and highly diverse attitudes about cosmetics and appearance among women
580
generally and, in particular, among lesbians.
4. Individual Rights Versus Collective Rights: What Difference Does Framing
Make?
At the outset of her litigation—both her employment law action in state
court and her discrimination lawsuit in federal court—Jespersen did not identify
herself as lesbian or frame her case as an assertion of gay rights. The nature of
the legal claims shaped her understanding of her rights and the harms that she
had suffered. In state court—her direct challenge to employment at will—her
claim was cast in terms of broken promises that Harrah’s had implicitly made to
her individually. Her understanding of these promises was based on her

577. See Dellinger & Williams, supra note 404, at 160–61.
578. David Kravets, Court Argues If Employers Can Demand Women Wear Makeup, S.F. CHRONICLE,
June 22, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/06/22/state/n
170801D13.DTL&hw=jespersen&sn=001&sc=1000. Harrah’s attempted to use this as evidence that
Jespersen was making “an improper attempt to impose an androgynous identity on her female
coworkers.” See Appellant’s Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
at 2, Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045) (citing Appellee’s Answer at 3).
579. See, e.g., Ann Rostow, Court Hears Lesbian’s Gender Bias Case, PLANETOUT NETWORK, June 23,
2005, http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2005/06/23/3 (reporting that “Jespersen’s sexual
orientation was not at issue in the case, but the lesbian bartender did not feel comfortable with the
new regulations”).
580. Historian Kathy Peiss writes:
In the 1970s, many lesbian feminists adopted the natural aesthetic, simultaneously
rejecting the look of heterosexual femininity and the tradition of butch-fem role-playing.
By the mid-1980s, however, a new appreciation for camp and drag, and a fervent debate
over sexuality, caused a reassessment of androgynous looks. As gay theorists in the
academic writings condemned notions of the natural, “lipstick lesbians” appeared all
made up on the street.
PEISS, supra note 439, at 267.
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assumption that reciprocal duties of loyalty and good faith defined her twentyyear relationship with Harrah’s. She had lived up to her end of the bargain by
giving Harrah’s twenty years of excellent personal service; it had a duty, she
believed, to refrain from requiring that she change her appearance. She was
wrong about the law, of course, but the state lawsuit—challenging employment
at will—was about her individual employment relationship with Harrah’s, and
not at all about gay rights, or women’s rights, or collective rights of any sort.
Her Title VII lawsuit, on the other hand, was potentially a case about
collective rights—about women’s rights, workers’ rights, and the rights of
gender nonconformists, including some members of the gay and lesbian
community. But as others have argued, the fact that Lambda Legal represented
Jespersen in her appeals and that the two other significant national women’s
rights groups, ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project and the NOW Legal and
Educational Defense Fund, did not file briefs may have suggested to the Ninth
581
Circuit that this was solely a case about gay rights. While local civil rights and
workers’ rights groups, including the Alliance for Workers’ Rights, filed amicus
582
curiae briefs, no union filed an amicus brief. Moreover, Jespersen was a single
plaintiff, not a member of a class filing a class-action lawsuit. All of these factors
likely eased the way for the Ninth Circuit to characterize her claim as the
583
idiosyncratic, subjective grumbling of one nonconforming employee.
C. Recasting the Claim as a Collective Rights Claim: The Role of Unions
Notwithstanding Harrah’s efforts to frame Jespersen’s claim as personal
and idiosyncratic, her Title VII challenge to Harrah’s appearance code was an
action that Jespersen, at least, saw as an assertion of group rights. In unionized
workplaces, workers might look to a union to mount broad-based challenges
against workplace grooming rules. Where were the unions in this case?
1. HERE and Nevada’s Culinary Union Locals
Jespersen had no union to turn to because she happened to be employed at
a Harrah’s property located in Reno rather than at one of Harrah’s unionized
584
properties in Las Vegas. Outside of Reno, a number of Harrah’s gaming
properties throughout the United States have collective bargaining relationships
with locals of HERE, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees

581. See Carbado et al., supra note 221, at 125–27.
582. Id. at 125–26. The following four amicus curiae briefs supporting Jespersen were filed by
various public interest and governmental organizations: (1) the National Employment Lawyers
Association, the Alliance for Workers’ Rights, and the Legal Aid Society—Employment Law Center
(June 23, 2003); (2) American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, Northwest Women’s Law Center,
California Women’s Law Center, and the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition (June 23, 2003); (3) the
National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Transgender Law Center (June 7, 2005); and (4) the
Hawai’i Civil Rights Commission (June 9, 2005).
583. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000) (finding that amicus briefs affect success rates in a
variety of contexts).
584. See Barbano, supra note 193 (describing a televised interview with Jespersen in 2000 in which
she said, “Las Vegas is union and in Reno, we’re not.”); see also www.unitehere.org (UNITE HERE
listing of unionized hotels) (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
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585

International Union. In 2000, the Culinary Workers Union, locals of HERE,
represented more than 50,000 food and beverage workers in Nevada, with most
586
employed in and around Las Vegas. At the time, Culinary Workers Union
587
Local 226 represented about 1,500 employees at Harrah’s Las Vegas. With the
exception of Reno’s Circus Circus, which the Culinary Workers Union organized
in 1981, and several other small bargaining units of other unions at other
properties, the casinos in Reno in 2000 were more or less union-free; but this
588
environment was beginning to change. From the mid-1990s, Culinary Workers
Union Local 86 had been engaged in organizing at the Reno Hilton and
589
Flamingo Hilton-Reno. In June 2001, around the time Jespersen was filing her
discrimination lawsuit, the union signed a contract with the two Reno Hilton
590
properties covering 1,575 food and beverage workers.
Because Harrah’s Reno casino was neither organized nor a focus of the
Culinary Workers Union’s organizing efforts in 2000, Jespersen was not likely to
have conceived of her dispute about the makeup rule as an issue that the union
might support. Once her dispute became public and was transformed into a
lawsuit with potential significance for female service workers generally,
however, it is less clear why the local union or HERE did not perceive her
individual claim as helpful to their organizing and outreach efforts locally or
nationwide. Nor is it clear why no union challenged the makeup rule at any of
591
Harrah’s unionized casinos. At the time that Harrah’s was beginning to roll
out its “Beverage Department Image Transformation Initiative” (BDIT) at its Las
Vegas casinos in May 2000, the new makeup policy did provoke criticism from a
staff director of Las Vegas’s Culinary Workers Local 226, who called it

585. The Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) merged with
UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees) in 2004 to form UNITE-HERE. By
2006, UNITE-HERE represented more than 90,000 workers in the gaming industry in casinos located
in Nevada, New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, California, and Washington. See
http://www.unitehere.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
586. Bill O’Driscoll, Nongaming Workers Get Union Pact at Hilton Hotels in Reno, RENO GAZETTE-J.,
June 29, 2001, available at http://www.rgj.com/cgi-bin/printstory.cgi?publish_date=20010629&story
=993871598. In 1938, HERE chartered Local 226 of the Culinary Workers Union in Las Vegas, and
despite lengthy strikes against several casinos, the union has flourished in Las Vegas, claiming to
have organized more than 22,000 new workers since the opening of the Mirage “mega-resort” in
1989 and to be the fastest growing local in America in 2006. See Culinary Workers Union Local 226,
Las Vegas, History, http://www.culinaryunion226.org/english/pages/history.html (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
587. Phil Levine, Harrah’s Sets Appearance Standards, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 11, 2000, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2000/may/11/510243167.html. Harrah’s Rio
Suites hotel-casino in Las Vegas, however, was not unionized. Id.
588. O’Driscoll, supra note 586.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Union locals at other Harrah’s casinos did, however, bring grievances under their collective
bargaining agreements over hair length and styling policies implemented as part of the Harrah’s
appearance code in 2002. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, No. 03-1540 (JBS), 2004 WL 1739724
(D. N.J. Aug. 4, 2004) (noting that union obtained reinstatement for one male server at Harrah’s in
New Jersey who was discharged for refusing to comply with hairstyle aspect of 2002 grooming
code).
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592

“intrusive and an invasion of individual choice” The union official said, “The
593
idea that the company thinks it can impose an image is outrageous.” But the
union focused on the impact of the waitresses’ uniform requirements on women
594
returning from maternity leave—an issue affecting a contractual leave policy —
and not on the new makeup requirement.
Unions’ failure to challenge Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming rules for
female beverage servers at casinos where they had collective bargaining
relationships, or to support Jespersen’s appeals as amicus curiae, may be
explained, if not justified, in several ways. First, if no other female beverage
servers at any of Harrah’s casinos complained about the makeup requirements,
as Harrah’s contended, the union locals may have concluded that it was not a
very significant issue. Harrah’s female beverage servers and bartenders may
have been willing to go along with the new grooming policy because they wore
similar makeup anyway, or because they believed the makeup rule conformed
to societal gender norms, or because they were willing to be branded by
Harrah’s if it was part of the job, or because they believed they would earn more
tips if they wore cosmetics that made them appear more attractive, or because
they were so used to dress and grooming rules that sexualized women workers
595
that they did not see themselves as being commodified. When Jespersen filed
her lawsuit, one news report observed,
From shoes to makeup, casinos traditionally have mandated different dress
codes for men and women. Sit at a slot machine or roulette table, and a female
server in a uniform that includes a short skirt, high heels, and makeup will stop
596
to offer a drink. The few male servers must wear long pants and look clean.

One of Harrah’s female bartenders who reported that she was happy to go along
597
with the casino’s new makeup policy said, “This is nothing new to us.”
Jespersen agreed that “[t]his has been going on forever. . . . You take it until it
598
pushes that button. And that’s what this did with me.”
Alternatively, the union may have viewed the grooming policy as business
as usual—falling within managerial prerogative to create the product, which in
the case of a frontline beverage service worker, is the employee. The unions’
1964 loss before the Ninth Circuit on the union insignia/nonadornment policy

592. Levine, supra note 587.
593. Id.
594. The BDIT required that female beverage servers be able to fit into their old uniforms
following twelve weeks of maternity leave. This requirement conflicted with the eighteen-month
maternity leave policy under the Culinary Workers Union contract with Harrah’s in Las Vegas. Id.
595. A less-benign explanation is suggested in one news account, which quotes cocktail waitress
comments made in reaction to newly-imposed grooming standards at Harrah’s Casino in Maryland
Heights, Missouri. While workers praised the company’s BDIT program during interviews held in
casino offices, workers interviewed off premises described the policy as “extremely restrictive,”
“rigid and intrusive.” These workers (unlike those interviewed in casino offices) refused to give their
names for fear of reprisal by Harrah’s. Policy at Harrah’s Governs Appearance of Servers, GAMBLING
MAG., June 4, 2000, http://gamblingmagazine.com/managearticle.asp?c=400&a=640.
596. Rhina Guidos, Fashion Checklist: No Blush, No Lipstick . . . No Job, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 18, 2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0718/p1s4.html.
597. Id. (quoting statement of Harrah’s bartender, Regina Hearrell).
598. Id. (quoting statement of Darlene Jespersen).
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might long ago have convinced unions that resistance to the appearance code
599
was futile. Or perhaps the management rights clause in Harrah’s collective
bargaining agreement had been construed by arbitrators (in unreported
decisions) as including managerial rights to establish and enforce appearance
codes. The record of successful union challenges to dress and grooming codes is
rather dismal: Unions lose most substantive challenges to employer dress and
600
grooming rules as long as management can justify them as being “reasonable.”
Unions are behaving rationally by not devoting scarce resources to losing cases,
which was how HERE and the Las Vegas Culinary Workers Union Local 226
apparently characterized Jespersen’s fight with Harrah’s.
Still another possibility is that the union’s interests have become aligned
with the employer’s in perpetuating the success of the corporate brand. The
union might have viewed Jespersen’s claims as a challenge to Harrah’s
corporate branding choices and processes, a realm of decision-making so central
to the success and continued expansion of the enterprise that the union either
had no right to interfere, or, if it had a right, no interest in interfering. The
collective bargaining agreement between Harrah’s and HERE included a card
check agreement and neutrality pledge pursuant to which Harrah’s agreed to
recognize and bargain with HERE based upon a majority card count and to
remain neutral during organizing campaigns conducted by HERE at any new
601
Harrah’s operation. In exchange, HERE agreed to cooperate with Harrah’s in
its efforts to expand into new markets, assisting Harrah’s in its lobbying efforts
with state legislatures and sending casino employees to testify before state
legislative committees in other states about Harrah’s beneficence as an
602
employer.
Thus, the union’s interest in expanding its membership base through card
check recognition at all new Harrah’s operations became aligned with Harrah’s
603
interest in expansion. From the union’s perspective, this partnership conferred
more bargaining leverage to seek better wages and benefits, and HERE
capitalized on this leverage in core economic areas: In 2001, HERE Las Vegas

599. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101 (discussing NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d 177
(9th Cir. 1964)).
600. See supra Part III.B.
601. David Moberg, Organization Man, NATION, July 16, 2001, available at http://www.thenation.
com/doc/20010716/moberg. Neutrality pledges have become an extraordinarily valuable tool for
unions seeking to organize workers outside the NLRB’s election processes. Unions with sufficient
bargaining leverage to obtain neutrality pledges enjoy a relatively smooth and speedy path to
recognition as the majority bargaining representative at all subsequently opened stores. For a full
discussion of the operation and significance of neutrality pledges, see James Brudney, Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 828
(2005) (noting that eighty percent of the workers who became union members between 1998 and
2003 did so outside the NLRB election process).
602. See Mayerowitz, supra note 157 (reporting that the Providence, Rhode Island, local chapter
of HERE “has been one of Harrah’s biggest supporters, flying in casino workers to testify before the
General Assembly [of Rhode Island] on how great it is to work for Harrah’s”); Andrew Conte, Second
Day of Gambling Hearings More Sedate, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Apr. 19, 2006 (referencing neutrality
pledge) (alteration added).
603. David Moberg reports that ninety percent of the Culinary Workers’ growth in Las Vegas
between 1989 and 2001 was attributable to card check agreements. Moberg, supra note 601.
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hotel room cleaners earned $22,000 per year—forty-four percent more than
604
similar workers in nonunion Reno—plus benefits. Nevertheless, skeptics
wonder whether the partnership between HERE and casino employers comes at
the expense of enhanced contract rights in noneconomic areas. The staff director
for the Las Vegas Culinary Workers admitted to one reporter “‘if we ditched
[the card-check and neutrality agreements in contracts] we could get a little
605
more money or one or two more rights.’” Is the tradeoff of easier organizing
and enhanced bargaining leverage on economic issues worth the potential
sacrifice of noneconomic rights, particularly those involving the interests of
workers historically subjected to discrimination on the job?
2. Successful Union Strategies in Other Branding Cases
Other unions have made different decisions about resisting branding, with
more encouraging results. Below we recount two contrasting stories. Common
to both situations are two complementary factors: (1) the presence of a union
committed to resisting branding that demeans workers and (2) the use of Title
VII litigation as a tactical strategy to advance the union’s objectives in
bargaining.
a. The “Safeway Smile”
In the early 1990s, Safeway Grocery Stores implemented a “Superior
Service” policy, which required workers to be outgoing, friendly, and helpful.
Specifically, workers were instructed to make eye contact with customers, smile
and greet them by name at the checkout counter (names were derived either
from credit cards or from store-issued customer cards), offer samples, and
606
accompany them to locate items that they could not find. Customer response
was very positive, but workers resisted. To enforce the policy, Safeway
instituted a “Mystery Shopper” evaluation system in which workers were
graded by secret shoppers who pretended to be regular customers. The Mystery
Shoppers used a nineteen-point rating scorecard to assess workers’ friendliness
as a part of the Superior Service program; results affected performance
607
evaluations and eligibility for bonuses and stock incentives. Reports on
workers’ cheeriness were posted in store break rooms, and unfriendly cashiers
608
were sent to “smile school.” One long-time cashier was discharged for failing
609
to comply with the policy. Others complained that the policy had provoked
610
sexual harassment or unwanted advances from male customers. Some workers

604. Id.
605. Id.
606. See Kristin Downey Grimsley, Service with a Forced Smile; Safeway’s Courtesy Campaign Also
Elicits Some Frowns, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at A1.
607. Id.
608. Kelly Barron, The Sam Walton of Supermarkets?, FORBES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 64; Michael
Harrison, EEOC Charges Filed Against Safeway, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Nov. 23, 1998, at 6.
609. See Larry Parsons, Safeway Fires 20-Year California Veteran for Violating Friendliness Rules,
MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, Oct. 10, 1998 (describing termination of twenty-year veteran employee
Sandi Lewtschuk for failure to smile and failure to use customer’s last name when thanking the
customer; her union grieved the termination under the arbitration provision in its labor contract).
610. Barron, supra note 608; Harrison, supra note 608.

02__AVERY_CRAIN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

BRANDED

115

were disturbed by the policy because it required them to engage in behavior that
seemed socially inappropriate: Male clerks complained that some female
customers displayed body language that suggested that they felt stalked or
harassed; others felt uncomfortable with overriding their instincts and following
corporate policy with customers who indicated that they were harried and
wished to be left alone. One worker, afflicted with Bell’s Palsy and unable to
smile, was written up for not smiling despite his inability to control the muscles
611
in his face.
In November of 1998, male and female workers filed charges with the
EEOC alleging that the Superior Service policy exposed them to sexual
harassment by customers, creating a hostile work environment. By forcing them
to suspend their natural defense mechanisms and act against their social
instincts, the policy made them vulnerable to offensive actions by customers.
The complaints alleged inappropriate customer comments, notes proposing
sexual acts, physical assaults in the grocery stores and in adjacent parking lots,
612
and stalking.
Although the complaints were filed by both male and female workers, it
was clear that there was a gendered component to the rule. One female worker
described her concerns in this way: “[A]s a woman, I am offended that a group
of men have come up with a policy to make me front like I’m a Playboy bunny.
613
That’s ridiculous. I’m not here to sell sex.” Another worker commented,
“When I’m asked to look up every few seconds and make eye contact with the
614
customers, I feel as though I’m flirting.” And a third put it most bluntly, “It’s
615
like a form of prostitution to me.”
The plaintiffs were assisted in filing charges by their unions, United Food
and Commercial Workers’ Locals 1179 and 373. They did not seek a significant
financial settlement; instead, they asked for a written statement from Safeway
preserving worker discretion to suspend compliance with company policy and
conform to their own social instincts when confronted with a situation that
616
made them uncomfortable. The unions simultaneously filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board alleging that the employer’s Superior Service
program was adopted unilaterally, without bargaining with the unions, thus
violating the NLRA. Both complaints were dropped when the cases were settled
in early 2000; Safeway agreed to work with the unions to develop and
617
communicate expectations under its Superior Service program in writing.

611. Grimsley, supra note 606.
612. Sarah L. Ream, Note, When Service with a Smile Invites More Than Satisfied Customers: ThirdParty Sexual Harassment and the Implications of Charges Against Safeway, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
107, 118 (2000).
613. Transcript of ABC’s 20/20 News Show, The Safeway Smile, Oct. 30, 1998 (statement of Amy
Kinyon) (on file with authors).
614. Id. (statement of Joyce Lindberg).
615. Id. (statement of Frances Work).
616. Specifically, the plaintiffs said that they sought a statement to the effect that “if somebody’s
coming on to you, you don’t have to smile at them or put on a happy face like a robot.” Daily
Briefing, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at A12.
617. Michael Liedtke, Smiles More Discerning at Safeway, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Knight
Ridder/Trib. News Serv.), Jan. 18, 2000.
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b. The Flight Attendants’ Challenges
In perhaps the best-known example of explicitly gendered branding,
airlines portrayed flight attendants—known as “stewardesses” until the 1970s—
618
as “alluring and nurturing hostesses.” Originally, both commercial airline
piloting and taking care of passengers’ needs in the cabin were male jobs. With
the advent of World War II, however, men were pulled from the labor market
and into the military, and women stepped into the gap as airline cabin
619
attendants. Although the job entailed a combination of waitressing (serving
620
food and drinks), nursing (caring for youthful, elderly, and infirm passengers),
and safety officer duties (enforcing safety rules, monitoring for emergency
621
situations), airlines selected for brand fit, hiring only white, young, single,
622
slender, attractive women.
Airline marketing and cultural representations exploited stewardesses’
623
femininity and its association with titillation and comfort.
The early
stewardesses were branded as “the girl next door”: They were white, middle624
class, youthful, and unmarried. The no-marriage rule—initiated first by United
Airlines and later adopted by others—was defended on multiple bases,
including concern about the conflict between stewardesses’ travel schedules and
their roles as wives, and the airlines’ desire to avoid calls from overprotective
625
husbands seeking their wives’ whereabouts. At bottom was the airlines’ effort
to portray stewardesses as “vestal virgins,” in a 1950s-era version of
626
sexualization.
Ideal job tenure from the airlines’ perspective was
approximately eighteen months, by which time the stewardesses were expected
627
to secure suitable husbands. The job was a short-term interlude and gateway
to marriage, which made it difficult for the stewardesses to be taken seriously as
members of a craft or profession.

618. Kathleen Barry, “Too Glamorous to Be Considered Workers”: Flight Attendants and Pink-Collar
Activism in Mid-Twentieth-Century America, 3 LAB.: STUD. WORKING-CLASS HIST. AM. 119, 119 (Fall
2006).
619. Alice Cook, Introduction to GEORGIA PANTER NIELSEN, FROM SKY GIRL TO FLIGHT
ATTENDANT: WOMEN AND THE MAKING OF A UNION xiii, xvii (1982).
620. Indeed, airlines required that stewardesses possess nursing degrees until World War II,
when nursing shortages made this impracticable. Barry, supra note 618, at 123.
621. Stewardesses reassured nervous passengers, made sure they did not mistake the exit door
for the restroom, and answered questions about the terrain below. In the early days of air travel,
particularly on the smaller airlines, stewardesses were also responsible for a great deal of manual
labor, including joining bucket brigades to fuel the airplanes, helping pilots push planes into
hangars, and loading all baggage on board. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 11.
622. Barry, supra note 618, at 121. The specifications for stewardesses in the 1930s required
applicants to be less than twenty-five years of age, weigh 115 pounds or less, and stand not more
than five-feet four-inches tall. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 10.
623. Barry, supra note 618, at 121.
624. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 20.
625. Id. at 19.
626. Id. at 20.
627. Id. The airlines’ policy was reportedly, “‘Use them till their smiles wear out; then get a new
bunch.’” Id. at 81. Those who stayed in the job longer than thirty-five months were labeled “the
wrong kind of girl,”—i.e., unmarriageable. Id. at 83.
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Airline rules mandated charm and attractive grooming, and imposed
628
prototypical demands for emotional labor. Airlines developed the earliest
metaphor of workers as “hostesses” and customers as “guests,” which rendered
the stewardesses’ emotional labor invisible and secured their complicity in this
presentation of their efforts. The airlines’ marketing strategy thus minimized the
economic value of their labor: As a “natural, voluntary expression of female
629
domesticity,” their efforts lacked economic value.
Stewardesses’ appearance was governed by policies that were almost
“paramilitary” in stringency; “appearance counselors” monitored compliance
630
with the codes, and scales were an important feature in the appearance rooms.
Georgia Panter Nielsen describes the appearance code at United Airlines:
Girdles were to be worn, and periodic checks were made by some supervisors.
Nail polish and lipstick were required, and the colors were selected from an
approved list. Hair could not extend over the uniform blouse collar and could
not be worn in an upswept fashion. Dyeing of hair or bleaching of hair was
prohibited. Straightening of hair for black women was acceptable, but Afro,
cornrow, and braided hairstyles were taboo. Hats and gloves were to be worn at
all times. Part of the routine flight duties included appearance checks by the
flight attendant herself to ensure that her appearance was not disheveled.
Hosiery with runs was expected to be replaced by an extra pair of stockings
carried as important equipment. During the early 1960s white uniform blouses
631
were often checked for perspiration stains.

Cultural representations of stewardesses further glamorized them:
journalists, filmmakers, and novelists depicted stewardesses as eminently
desirable—the girl next door, dressed up, enjoying the freedom to travel and
632
training for the “ultimate female ‘profession’ of homemaking.” The jobs were
highly sought after: throughout the mid-twentieth century, airlines averaged
633
one hundred applicants for every three to five stewardesses hired. The
popularity of the job was understandable. Stewardessing was a near-certain
path to the altar and featured opportunities to meet high-income men
(encounters with celebrities and VIPs were common); it also offered travel and
634
an independent lifestyle, rare opportunities for women of the postwar era.
635
These “wages of glamour” came at considerable cost, however. Once
married, stewardesses were grounded. By age thirty-two, they were considered

628. Barry, supra note 618, at 122; see HOCHSCHILD, supra note 27.
629. Barry, supra note 618, at 122; see also Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework
and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (explaining why labor that is perceived to be primarily
affective, such as housework and caretaking, is defined as not-work, and those who perform it—
primarily women—are not seen as workers).
630. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 99.
631. Id. at 98–99.
632. Barry, supra note 618, at 124.
633. Id. at 124–25. United Airlines reported receiving an average of fifty thousand applications a
year for the job. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 82.
634. Barry, supra note 618, at 124.
635. Id. at 125; see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 13 (1991) (describing social and psychological “wages of whiteness”
enjoyed by white workers: whites’ feelings of racial privilege relative to blacks muted their hostility
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past their prime and forced to retire. Long-term benefits and promotional
opportunities were nonexistent. Glamorization in marketing invited sexual
636
harassment in the air.
Seeking respect as “real workers, with economic needs and skills as real as
637
men’s,” stewardesses turned to unionization. In order to gain respect and the
attendant economic benefits, they needed to shed their “mystique of glamorous
638
femininity,” which “made them unrecognizable as workers of any kind.”
Overcoming barriers of a transient workforce with high turnover, little
experience with labor unions, and a self-consciously elitist attitude, the
639
stewardesses organized independent unions. Initially, the AFL denied their
independent union affiliate status, and they were forced to affiliate with the Air
Line Pilots’ Association (ALPA), an AFL union. ALPA was determinedly white
640
and male in its membership. This partnership provided resources and clout,
but trapped the stewardesses in a subordinate relationship structured by yet
another gender hierarchy. Both ALPA and the Transport Workers’ Union
(TWU)—a CIO union which ultimately affiliated a national local of
stewardesses—embraced the stewardesses primarily to keep the group from
bringing in a more powerful rival union and to restrict them to a narrow range
641
of issues at the bargaining table. The airlines’ occupational segregation by sex
of pilots (male) and stewardesses (female), together with the male-dominated
642
unions’ turf-guarding strategies, yielded sex-segregated unions.
Though the unions protested the age limits and marriage bans at the
bargaining table and by filing grievances under collective bargaining
agreements, their efforts were sporadic and produced no widespread change.
First, many stewardesses supported the age limits, weight restrictions, and
643
marriage bans. Second, airlines strenuously resisted alteration of the branded
image at the bargaining table and in arbitration, and only piecemeal progress
644
was made. Without a clear-cut cultural norm of antidiscrimination stemming
from a federal statute, unions had difficulty persuading arbitrators to reject the
645
well-accepted practice in the industry.
With the enactment of Title VII and parallel state legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination, the tide turned. With union support, stewardesses initiated legal

toward employers; employers deployed racial privilege to “make up for alienating and exploitative
class relationships”).
636. Barry, supra note 618, at 125.
637. Id. at 120.
638. Id. at 121.
639. Id. at 126; NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 36. It appears, however, that airlines did not resist the
unionization of stewardesses, believing it easier to deal with a recognized agent on behalf of the
predominantly short-term, temporary workforce. Id. at 32.
640. Until 1942, the ALPA constitution contained a clause restricting membership to “white
males of good moral character.” Cook, supra note 619, at xv.
641. Id. at xx.
642. See id.; Barry, supra note 618, at 127.
643. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 84, 102.
644. Barry, supra note 618, at 132; NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 87–90.
645. See NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 84.
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646

challenges to the airline age limits and marriage bans. Stewardesses also
exploited their public personas to tell their story through the media. They held
press conferences, testified before congressional committees, and initiated
protests, sparking a public debate. Gradually, public opinion shifted. Changing
sexual mores and the demands of the women’s movement for equality were
647
inconsistent with the marriage ban and the early-retirement rule. By the early
648
1970s, the age limits and marriage bans had been denounced by the EEOC and
649
the federal courts.
Throughout this period, however, stewardesses were careful not to
challenge the airlines’ branded marketing, the appearance policies, or the
employment restrictions themselves in the court of public opinion. Instead of
accusing airlines of exploiting women by creating “flying bunny clubs” that
valorized youth and sexual availability, the stewardesses emphasized the
unfairness and illogic of generic rules that applied to stewardesses who still fit
the branded occupational image—still youthful, slim, and attractive—albeit
650
married and/or over thirty-two years of age.
During the 1970s, the airlines turned to more explicitly sexualized branding
651
and marketing campaigns. Stewardesses went from “vestal virgins” to “sexy
swingers” in marketing campaigns: Instead of portraying the stewardess as the
fresh-faced girl next door in search of a suitable husband, airlines sought to cast
stewardesses as provocative teases, “commercial standardbearer[s] of the sexual
652
revolution.” Marketing slogans were explicitly sexualized: National advertised
“Hi, I’m Cheryl—Fly Me”; Continental’s slogan was “We Really Move Our Tails
For You”; and Braniff instituted an “Air Strip” in which stewardesses shed parts
653
of their uniforms in flight. Uniform trends shifted from tailored suits to
miniskirts and hot pants.
In response, stewardesses’ demands for respect as workers intensified.
They advanced challenges to the sexual subordination that was intermingled
with exploitation of their labor, and for the first time sought to distance
themselves from their glamour-girl image. Their movement for dignity
coalesced with the feminist movement of the 1970s, and they collaborated with
the National Organization for Women and formed alliances with prominent
feminists like Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem. They protested both their
cultural representation and the airline marketing strategies, and sought respect
for their skilled labor. As one member of Stewardesses for Women’s Rights
explained, “I don’t think of myself as a sex symbol or a servant. I think of myself
as somebody who knows how to open the door of a 747 in the dark, upside

646. Id. at 91.
647. Barry, supra note 618, at 129–31.
648. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 86.
649. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (striking down marriage ban);
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (striking down policy of hiring only
women for cabin service).
650. Barry, supra note 618, at 131.
651. NIELSEN, supra note 619, at 20.
652. Barry, supra note 618, at 134.
653. Id.
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down and in the water.” They also cast the airlines’ sexualized marketing
strategy as potentially dangerous, implicating public safety if passengers did not
655
take stewardesses seriously in an emergency.
The transition from stewardesses to “flight attendants” with autonomous
unions and long-term career prospects soon followed. In 1973, the stewardess
division of ALPA split away from the pilots’ union and initiated its own union,
the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), which subsequently obtained an
AFL-CIO charter of its own. From its earliest days, the AFA was chaired and led
by women, with a predominantly female executive board and collective
656
bargaining committees. In the mid- to late 1970s, other unionized flight
attendants split away from the Transport Workers’ Union, where they had
maintained a national “local” of stewardesses, and formed new, autonomous
657
unions.
658
Legal challenges to maternity bans and weight restrictions soon followed,
directly confronting the airlines’ branded image of sexual availability and
standardized image of an attractive woman. One of the most famous cases of the
659
era, Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., involved a challenge to Southwest
Airlines’ practice of hiring only women as flight attendants in order to further its
branded service as the “love airline.” Southwest raised a BFOQ defense, arguing
that its practice of hiring women was essential since the female sex appeal of its
flight attendants was a critical part of its marketing strategy designed to appeal
660
to its “predominantly male businessmen” customer base. Among other things,
Southwest television commercials promised “inflight love” and depicted
scantily clad female flight attendants serving male passengers “love bites”
661
(toasted almonds) and “love potions” (cocktails). The court rejected the
airline’s defense, concluding that sex was not essential to the airline’s primary
662
business purpose, which was transporting passengers safely and quickly. The
court explained, “[S]ex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer
chooses to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool, or to better insure
663
profitability.”
The flight attendants’ effort to resist sexualized branding was relatively
successful. The flight attendants conceptualized sex-stereotyped appearance
654. Id. at 135.
655. Id.
656. Cook, supra note 619, at xix.
657. Barry, supra note 618, at 136.
658. See Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (denouncing strict
weight limits on female flight attendants where no such restriction applied to male flight
attendants); Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (striking down weight policy that
applied different weight standards to female and male flight attendants, but was based upon large
frame norms for men and medium frame norms for women, rendering compliance more
burdensome for women than for men); see also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973),
vacated and remanded in part and aff’d in part, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (striking down a rule
forbidding female flight attendants to wear eyeglasses).
659. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
660. Id. at 294.
661. Id. at 294 n.3.
662. Id. at 302.
663. Id. at 303.
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codes as an issue impacting workers’ collective rights as workers and as women.
They challenged the branding process as an unacceptable form of social control
664
that occurred upon gendered as well as classed terrain. The presence of unions
and the flight attendants’ alliances with feminist groups at the height of their
power and influence played a significant role in turning the tide of community
opinion in their favor, and with it, ultimately, courts’ views about the legitimacy
of the sexualized branding practices employed by the airlines.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Katharine Bartlett observed more than a decade ago that courts interpreting
Title VII have paid excessive deference to community norms and used them as
an objective standard for evaluating employer practices, exacerbating the gap
665
between the law’s aspirations and its actual impact. This trend has been
particularly noticeable in the appearance code cases, where the appearance
codes are predicated on established community norms that simply encode
666
sexual stereotypes.
In this Article, we argued that employers’ increasingly sophisticated
branding strategies create a property-like interest that is engrafted onto the
faces, bodies, and psyches of service sector workers through appearance codes.
The codes reflect the cultural stereotypes of the day, based as they are upon
customer surveys or feedback. The workers thus become uniformed, painted,
smiling, talking billboards mirroring the cultural stereotypes of the employer’s
target market. When the law enforces such codes, it authorizes employers to
convert cultural stereotypes into a form of property—separate and distinct from
the workers’ actual physical and mental labor—and to seize the profits.
To the extent that the law reflects and is steeped in the social practices and
biases that it seeks to eradicate, it should not surprise us to learn that it is
incapable of rising above these practices and biases. As critical race feminists
have repeatedly reminded us, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the
667
master’s house.” This is particularly apt as a description of antidiscrimination
law. As Judith Butler recently explained,
[W]e ought not to idealize the law as a neutral instrument that might intervene
in the social operation of such categories [of discrimination] in order to
eliminate them. Antidiscrimination law participates in the very practices it seeks
to regulate; antidiscrimination law can become an instrument of discrimination
in the sense that it must reiterate—and entrench—the stereotypical or
discriminatory version of the social category it seeks to eliminate. . . . Insofar

664. See Eileen Boris, Desirable Dress: Rosies, Sky Girls, and the Politics of Appearance, 69 INT’L LAB.
& WORKING CLASS HIST. 123, 127 (Spring 2006).
665. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994).
666. Id. at 2543–44.
667. Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in THIS BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: RADICAL WRITINGS BY WOMEN OF COLOR 108, 109 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria
Anzaldua eds., 1981).
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as . . . society is underwritten by stereotype, it is hard to see that
668
antidiscrimination law might transcend the stereotypes it seeks to eliminate.

The law does not simply reflect the underlying social norms and values,
however; it also reaffirms and enforces them, creating as well as reflecting
669
consensus and, ultimately, distributing power. This is particularly true where
social movements animate the evolution of law, as in the case of both
antidiscrimination law and labor law. The law that has developed around the
regulation of worker appearance has functioned to delegate to employers the
power “to enforce the dominant expectations about appearance and to discipline
deviance from the approved social norms,” including “policing and reinforcing
gender lines,” enforcing “social norms regarding proper behavior,” and
“insist[ing] that employees conform to socially constructed norms and
670
expectations about how the sexes should act and look.” Thus, we should look
to law to intervene toward the end of changing those social norms.
671
672
As scholars ranging from Cass Sunstein to Pauline Kim to Cynthia
673
674
675
Estlund to Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare have suggested, shifting the
ground or “default” rules in the employment context would be a desirable step
toward altering the ground rules for the exercise of power at work. Even with a
shift in default rules underlying the at-will employment contract, however,
individual workers are unlikely to have the bargaining leverage to negotiate fair
compensation or to resist altogether the imposition of corporate branding that
undermines individual autonomy. Only by standing together—as the Safeway
workers did against the Smile program, or the flight attendants did against the
airlines’ sex stereotyped branding strategies—might workers have the strength
to demand appropriate compensation or to resist branding.
While necessary, however, collective action may not be sufficient. Darlene
Jespersen’s story tells us why: Even the best-intentioned efforts of majoritarian
labor unions seeking to advance the interests of workers qua workers overlook
the interests of outlier individuals—those who comprise a numerical minority in
the occupational category at issue. Moreover, labor unions confront the same
sorts of underlying assumptions about the primacy of employer property rights

668. Judith Butler, Appearances Aside, 88 CAL. L. REV. 55, 62 (2000). For example, the Jespersen
court effectively took judicial notice of cultural norms regarding the widespread use of makeup by
women in American society in concluding that Harrah’s policy was not unreasonable, hinting that it
was relying upon norms of the “entertainment industry.” Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444
F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). At the same time, however, the court refused to take judicial
notice of the time it takes to put makeup on and the expense of makeup, instead requiring Jespersen
to present evidence of the time and cost involved in complying with the rule. In constructing
antidiscrimination doctrine, then, the court chose to reify a particular set of cultural stereotypes.
669. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 107 (1993).
670. Klare, supra note 92, at 1398, 1420.
671. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002).
672. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 147–55 (1997).
673. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 21–28 (2002).
674. KENNEDY, supra note 669, at 107.
675. Klare, supra note 92, at 1448.
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to manage and control their businesses and their workforces that plaintiffs in
individual employment discrimination cases must overcome, and in a far more
676
hostile, ossified, and weakened legal arena. Finally, sexualized branding in
nonsexualized contexts imposes burdens that workers should not be required to
accept, regardless of the compensation offered. As Darlene Jespersen’s case
illustrates, progressive doctrinal reform in antidiscrimination law is an essential
piece of a platform for progressive change.
At the end of the day, Darlene Jespersen’s story demonstrates that the most
promising strategies are those that connect workers’ identities as workers with
their status-based identities and proceed simultaneously on multiple legal and
social fronts. Collective organizing and bargaining strategies, Title VII litigation,
and community activism and media campaigns are all necessary to alter both
legal rules and cultural norms that drive sex-stereotyped corporate branding.
Sometimes legal reform will bring pressure to bear on cultural norms, while on
other occasions or in other contexts, cultural norms will cause doctrinal shifts in
law. Law is both constitutive and reflective, but it always matters.

676. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527 (2002).

